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‘The People Have Spoken …’
Steven Ratuva and Stephanie Lawson
Fiji’s general elections of 17 September 2014, held eight years after 
Fiji’s fourth coup, saw some significant firsts, generated largely by new 
constitutional arrangements. These included a radically deracialised 
electoral system in which the entire country forms a single electorate 
and utilises open-list proportional representation. This  system, 
brought in under the regime of coup leader Voreqe (Frank) 
Bainimarama, was designed first and foremost to encourage a  shift 
away from previous patterns of electoral behaviour which, due in 
large measure to provisions for communal electorates and voting, were 
inevitably attuned to communal political identities and the perceived 
interests attached to them. Elections under such a system certainly 
allowed ‘the people’ to speak, but in a way which gave primacy to 
those particular identities and interests and, arguably, contributed 
to a political culture that saw democracy itself severely undermined 
in the process. This was illustrated only too clearly by the recurrence 
of coups d’état between 1987 and 2006 that all revolved, in one way 
or another, around issues of communal identity expressed through 
discourses of indigenous Fijian (Taukei) rights versus those of other 
ethnic or racial communities, especially of those of Indian descent. 
These discourses remain highly salient politically but, under the 
Constitution promulgated by the Bainimarama regime in 2013, they 
are no longer supported institutionally via electoral arrangements. 
As  a  result, political parties have generally been forced to at least 
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attempt to appeal to all ethnic communities. These institutional 
changes have brought Fiji’s political system much closer to the 
standard model of liberal democracy in which ‘one person, one vote, 
one value’ is a basic norm. 
The elections of September 2014 held under the new system delivered 
a  resounding victory to Bainimarama’s newly established political 
party, FijiFirst, founded on a modernist ideology repudiating the 
politics of race or ethnicity and emphasising equality and development 
for all communities in Fiji. However, the notion that election results 
indicate a clear and unambiguous statement of political intent on the 
part of the electorate—as reflected in the phrase ‘the people have 
spoken’—is rather simplistic. Although this phrase does emphasise 
the most basic right of citizens in a democracy, or at least a majority of 
them, to choose their own government, the people rarely speak with 
one voice. After all, a key feature of liberal democracy is that it creates 
space for the expression of contested ideologies, strategies, visions 
and hopes. There is also the question of the conditions under which 
the people speak—a particular issue for Fiji’s 2014 elections. Freedom 
of expression and political opposition had been tightly constrained 
during the period in which Bainimarama’s military government 
had ruled by decree, and remained problematic during the election 
campaign. These circumstances favoured FijiFirst, which is, when 
all is said and done, the product of military power. These are among 
the issues we review below by way of introduction and which are 
analysed in more detail in the chapters that follow.
Constitutionalism, democracy 
and elections in Fiji
Politics in Fiji has gone through turbulent and transformational 
periods since independence in 1970. These have been shaped in 
part by  disagreements over what institutional and normative form 
democracy should take as well as the particular interests it should 
serve, for in Fiji it has rarely been simply a matter of serving 
‘the people’ as a whole. This is a reflection of Fiji’s ‘plural society’, 
in which the claims of the Taukei, who constitute some 57 per cent of 
the population, have very often been portrayed as trumping those of all 
other communities, especially citizens of Indian descent, who number 
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around 37 per cent. The remainder of the population is made up of 
Europeans, part-Europeans, other Pacific Islanders, Chinese, and other 
small minorities. 
In a highly ethnicised political climate, adherence to democratic 
values for nationalist Taukei leaders was meaningful only if it served 
the apparent interests of their own ethnic community and, when it 
failed to do so, democracy as a form of government was considered 
inappropriate at best and illegitimate at worst. Reactions to the electoral 
success of those perceived as ‘other’ ranged from expressions of 
private displeasure around kava bowls to mass public demonstrations 
and the overthrow of elected governments. The latter, of course, is the 
antithesis of democratic constitutionalism, which requires that the 
rules of the game, once established, be respected by both winners and 
losers. 
Elections in Fiji since independence have been held on an irregular 
basis, largely as a result of coups. Each coup has had its own peculiar 
characteristics, impacting on political processes, institutions, 
practices and discourses, and on people’s everyday lives. Coups have 
unfortunately become the principal chronological and political 
landmarks from which Fijians take their historical bearing. Prior to the 
first coup in May 1987, many had seen riots in 1959 as the ‘watershed’ 
event in Fiji’s history because of the way it united Taukei and Indo-
Fijian workers against colonial and foreign corporate hegemony. 
However, the May 1987 coup, followed by a second intervention in 
September of the same year, completely eclipsed 1959 as a watershed 
event, this time appearing as the manifestation of an unbridgeable 
divide between the two major population groups. 
This interpretation did not last long either, as Fiji’s political, social 
and economic fortunes foundered on the rocks created by the system 
of political apartheid established under the 1990 Constitution. In the 
ensuing decade, politics took a very different turn with coup leader 
Rabuka reinventing himself as both a democrat and a multiculturalist 
and supporting a new, much more liberal constitution, which 
recognised all Fiji’s citizens as ‘Fiji Islanders’, even though it retained 
a partly communal electoral system. The vision of a new, liberally 
oriented, multicultural Fiji seemed to become a reality in 1999 when 
Fiji’s first (and so far only) Indo-Fijian prime minister came to power, 
thus creating another watershed event. But antagonistic race politics 
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appeared to become re-established as the status quo context for Fiji’s 
politics with the 2000 coup and its aftermath washing away the 
apparent achievements of the previous decade. Although the civilian 
2000 coup leader, George Speight, was prosecuted and subsequently 
incarcerated for treason, the government established in the wake of 
the coup, and subsequently legitimated through elections in 2001 and 
2006, nonetheless followed an agenda attuned to discourses of race 
and Taukei privilege promoted by Speight and his supporters. 
By the time of the 2006 coup, the term ‘watershed’ had all but lost 
its significance in a political environment where coups and elections 
alternated as defining moments, with new constitutions being 
promulgated along the way. In some ways, elections have come to 
play a role as pre-coup and post-coup historical signposts. Memories 
of an election may now be based on which coup was associated 
with it. The 1987 elections precipitated the 1987 coup and the 1990 
Constitution, although the latter proved so unsatisfactory that it was 
replaced (without a coup) less than a decade later. This was followed 
by an election under a new electoral system that produced the 
unexpected election of an Indo-Fijian prime minister, which in turn 
precipitated the 2000 coup. The elections of 2001 that followed served 
partly to legitimate the essential aims of the 2000 coup, even while its 
prime perpetrators remained behind bars. But it established political 
stability on a tenuous basis only. The new government’s leadership 
came increasingly into conflict with the military commander 
Bainimarama, who campaigned vigorously against it in the lead-up to 
the May 2006 elections. Since, according to Bainimarama, the people 
‘spoke incorrectly’ on this occasion, there followed Fiji’s fourth coup 
in December 2006. 
Eight years later, electoral democracy returned to Fiji, albeit with 
a former military commander and coup leader as prime minister and 
under yet another new constitution. The 2014 elections were clearly 
a direct historical offshoot of the 2006 coup—an event claimed by 
Bainimarama as a ‘coup to end all coups’. Certainly, it is unlikely to 
be the precursor to another in the foreseeable future, at least so long 
as Bainimarama retains the loyalty of those now in command of Fiji’s 
military forces. It may also require that he retain the confidence of the 
majority of the electorate. Under the current Constitution, Bainimarama 
and FijiFirst will face the judgment of the electorate again in 2018, 
but of course there is no saying how the people will speak then. 
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In light of these events, democracy in Fiji appears as both a blessing 
and a curse—a blessing because it created space for multicultural 
participation in the political process and a curse because multiethnic 
participation too often revolved around communal interests, thereby 
sparking inter-communal antagonism. While liberal democracy is 
predicated on the idea of political plurality, in Fiji this took a different 
form, labelled elsewhere as ‘communal democracy’ (Ratuva 2005) 
or ‘ethnic democracy’ (Lawson 2012) which, paradoxically, became 
the nemesis of liberal democracy itself, undermining democratic 
constitutionalism and the stability it is meant to deliver.
Attempts to craft the ‘right’ type of democratic architecture through 
constitutional engineering based on national consensus has faced 
challenges due to both inter- and intra-communal interests, divided 
political loyalties and lack of faith in constitutional processes, among 
other reasons. It is as if exercises in constitutional engineering, 
which have followed coups, were designed as temporary post-conflict 
rehabilitation measures addressing immediate concerns rather than 
having a sustainable long-term trajectory. The latest Constitution, 
cannibalised from an earlier draft put together by the Constitution 
Commission under eminent international expert Professor Yash 
Ghai, but rejected by Bainimarama on the grounds that it pandered 
to indigenous nationalism, is yet another attempt at resetting the 
political compass. 
Fiji’s first three constitutions from the time of independence in 
1970 had incorporated electoral systems conceived with communal 
considerations foremost in mind. The 1970 Constitution attempted 
to provide for ethnic balance while the 1990 Constitution imposed 
political hegemony by the Taukei. The 1997 Constitution adopted 
a halfway position between communalism and individual voting. 
In 1999 it delivered a multiethnic coalition government led by Fiji’s 
first Indo-Fijian prime minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, subsequently 
overthrown in the civilian coup of May 2000 led by George Speight. 
In  the 2001 and 2006 elections, however, the same constitution 
delivered the stridently nationalist government of Laisenia Qarase. 
This was the government overthrown by Bainimarama in December 
2006, ostensibly on the grounds of its highly divisive and retrograde 
racialist policies. 
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In contrast with all previous constitutions, the 2013 Constitution 
removed all traces of communalism in its formal provisions. Although 
this did not necessarily prevent appeals to communal interests and 
a certain degree of communal voting behaviour, it clearly represented 
the most profound institutional change in Fiji’s post-independence 
political history. In opting for proportional representation in 
a single national constituency without any communally based 
reserved seats, the new Constitution forces political actors—political 
parties, individual politicians and voters—to think, behave and act 
‘nationally’. Although this did work to some extent in September 
2014, the new electoral system has created another set of dynamics 
involving new alliances and contradictions. It requires political parties 
to become trans-ethnic in appeal if they are to have any chance of 
forming government. FijiFirst did so with ease because its leadership, 
which had effectively designed the new Constitution, had repudiated 
communal politics entirely. On the other hand, other parties that were 
successors to older communally attuned parties, such as the Social 
Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA), effectively the same party that 
Qarase had led to victory in 2006, and the National Federation Party 
(NFP), Fiji’s oldest political party that had emerged in the colonial 
period mainly to serve Indo-Fijian political needs and interests, 
were shackled by their communal history. 
Elections in established liberal democracies generally work to 
legitimise ruling elites and provide the fulcrum for delivering stable 
governance and social order. In Fiji, as in other post-colonial states, 
there are additional dimensions that give it a unique character. 
The prevalence of culture-based chiefly power structures and kinship 
alliances among indigenous Fijians, which are often intertwined 
with liberal democratic systems and norms either in a contradictory 
or complementary way, have produced additional dynamics. These 
have been at the heart of both intra- and inter-communal politicking, 
with battle lines drawn and redrawn, and alliances configured and 
reconfigured in different ways, in different places, at different times. 
They have interacted with social variables such as religion, kinship ties, 
tribal loyalty, ethnic consciousness, regional affiliations, professional 
agendas, socioeconomic interests, political ideologies, gender 
considerations and personal appeal, all of which play a part in shaping 
political alliances and voting behaviour. Politics in Fiji has therefore 
never been a simple contest between the two major population groups. 
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Indeed, an important but often underemphasised aspect of politics in 
Fiji has been intra-communal contestation. Although always a factor, 
this became most clearly evident, especially among Taukei, after the 
first coup of 1987 and continues to this day. 
Another key factor in the analysis of Fiji’s politics is the coup 
discourses that also emerged after 1987. Since that time, there has been 
a latent fear of coups and coup conspiracies before, during and after 
elections, as reflected in the normalisation of the word coup (or ku in 
Fijian) in everyday vocabulary. There is also the frequent use of coup-
related dates and events by scholars, political analysts, journalists and 
the public at large as historical landmarks around which historical 
narratives are constructed. Thus coups loom large in people’s historical 
memory and many historical events are understood relative to periods 
before, during, after or between coups. Bainimarama’s coup of 2006, 
however, was portrayed as the ‘coup to end all coups’. While this claim 
remains to be tested over the longer term, the prospect of another 
coup following the resounding victory of Bainimarama’s FijiFirst party 
in September 2014 does seem unlikely under FijiFirst rule.
The Bainimarama regime
The results of the September 2014 polls served to confer legitimacy, 
both nationally and internationally, on a regime that had previously 
refused to accept the verdict of ‘the people’ in 2006. Eight years later 
the newly elected government, headed by former military commander 
and 2006 coup leader Bainimarama, was more than content to invoke 
the phrase. But for those on the losing side the rancorous utterance 
of Dick Turner, a US Democrat unsuccessful in the 1966 California 
State Senate election, may have had more resonance: ‘The people have 
spoken—the bastards’ (Synlick 2006, p. 1). 
The 2014 elections followed a period in which Bainimarama’s regime 
deployed coercion and intimidation to implement its own vision of an 
essential social transformation and to mobilise people’s consent to his 
agenda for change. While these methods were highly undemocratic, 
the regime did introduce a number of important firsts, which may 
be seen as enhancing the longer-term prospects for democratic 
consolidation under FijiFirst rule. For instance, while the first past 
the post (FPTP) system under the 1970 and 1990 Constitutions and 
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the alternative voting (AV) system under the 1997 Constitution were 
technically different, they were both largely communally and multi-
constituency based. The communal element was a carry-over from 
the pre-independence period, when electorates were first established 
on the basis of race. In contrast, the 2013 Constitution, in discarding 
the communal text, aimed very deliberately to eradicate the politics 
of race that had characterised all previous elections in Fiji. As any 
student of electoral engineering knows very well, electoral system 
design does have an impact on voter attitudes and political culture 
more generally. If the electoral system is communal, electioneering 
and voting behaviour will inevitably be oriented to communalism. 
Under a fully open system with no communal elements the dynamics 
are likely to change, as indeed they did in 2014, although not entirely. 
For these reasons, among others, the 2014 elections may be seen as 
a turning point in Fiji’s politics. The 2013 Constitution, with its radically 
different electoral system as well as a very significant rebranding of 
politics—itself very different from previous interventions in terms 
of its essential justification and subsequent outcomes—has defined 
a demarcation line between an ‘old’ Fiji and a ‘new’ Fiji, created largely 
by the Bainimarama regime. To many observers, the nation may appear 
to have reinvented itself, assuming a new identity at least with respect 
to issues of race or ethnicity. This new Fiji is meant to evince much 
greater political inclusiveness with the Taukei, Indo-Fijians and other 
minority groups being treated as equal partners as they move towards 
a more prosperous future, leaving behind the legacy of a colonial past 
in which particularistic interests, privileges, agendas and mindsets 
had become entrenched. Or so the narrative goes. 
One point easily overlooked in all this is that the military, which may 
be seen to still hold ultimate power despite the return to electoral 
democracy, remains almost 100 per cent Taukei and there are no 
indications that this is set to change. Also, although the emphasis on 
equality and inclusiveness in FijiFirst’s vision of the country’s political 
future resonates strongly with democratic values, the fact remains that 
Bainimarama came to power initially through a military coup, ruled by 
decree, and used repressive measures to enforce his political will on 
the people of Fiji. This is readily interpreted as the very antithesis 
of democratic behaviour. So too, of course, are the three coups that 
occurred in 1987 and 2000 respectively. It is pertinent to note that 
many of those most vociferously opposed to the Bainimarama coup 
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had supported the previous coups. ‘Democracy’, at least for some in 
Fiji, therefore means accepting an electoral result only when one’s 
favoured party wins at the polls. When it loses, ‘democracy’ may be 
either rejected because it is not an appropriate form of government 
for Fiji, redefined to reflect one’s own particular interests, values and 
ideology, or put on hold until such time as the people are ‘re-educated’. 
Bainimarama’s regime had put democracy on hold for eight years, 
during which time it pursued a policy of both radically overhauling 
the electoral system to eliminate one key form of institutionalised 
race-based communalism and to re-educate the people to reject the 
discourses of race that had been so prominent in all previous elections. 
Even so, the politics of race, played out mainly in the assertion of 
the superior political rights of the Taukei as the indigenous people 
of the Fiji islands vis-à-vis non-indigenous Fijians (mainly of Indian 
descent), remained an issue throughout the 2014 elections. SODELPA’s 
policies promoting a ‘Christian state’ became a proxy for race given 
that Christianity in Fiji is strongly associated with indigenousness 
while most Indo-Fijians are Hindu or Muslim. SODELPA also 
represented an ideology of traditionalism in which Taukei institutions, 
practices and values, such as those associated with chiefly authority 
and privileges, were vigorously defended. In contrast, Bainimarama’s 
FijiFirst promoted an ideology of modernism in which real progress 
and development could be achieved only by the elimination of 
traditionalism as manifest in the communal electoral system itself, 
as well as in the political privileges of chiefly authority and all the 
vested interests associated with these. Having said that, we must be 
wary of a endorsing a simplistic dichotomy between tradition and 
modernity, even though these are the general categories adopted, 
either explicitly or implicitly, by the major contestants themselves. 
We now come, very briefly, to the Bainimarama regime’s first year as 
a democratically elected government. With a resounding majority of 
60 per cent in favour of FijiFirst, translating into 32 seats in a 50-seat 
parliament, the balance of power was overwhelmingly in its favour. 
Theoretically, the AV system is supposed to promote multiparty 
cooperation, but the strength of FijiFirst’s victory means that it does not 
need to work cooperatively with other parties. The only other parties 
with seats in the parliament, SODELPA and the NFP, constitute an 
opposition virtually smothered by FijiFirst’s parliamentary hegemony. 
With parliament so firmly under its control, the Bainimarama 
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government passed numerous items of legislation in its first year; 
altogether, a total of 413 decrees and statutes were enacted between 
2006 and September 2014, one year after the elections. 
Much of this legislative activity has supported the continuation of 
the modernist developmental agenda inaugurated under the previous 
Bainimarama regime. Interestingly, this approach is characteristic 
of many South East Asian countries, especially Singapore, where it 
has succeeded in enhancing the ‘performance legitimacy’ of semi-
authoritarian governments. Here we may note that developmental 
state theory emphasises the centrality of the state in determining 
the country’s economic direction and in imposing firm control over 
resources, the bureaucracy and general development policies. In Fiji, 
post-2006, various reform and development projects relating to the 
economy, land, infrastructure, social welfare, housing, education, 
communications and aviation have been implemented following new 
legislation. The latest measures have been passed with ease in the new 
parliament. Supporters of FijiFirst may point to Fiji’s steady economic 
growth, which reached 5.3 per cent in 2014. Tourism reached a record 
high of 692,630 in that year and was expected to easily exceed 700,000 
in 2015. Despite this growth, however, there has also been an increase 
in inequality. This is expected to worsen over time, as it has in other 
parts of the world where the fruits of development are unevenly 
distributed.
Parliamentary debates over the economy and development have been 
vigorous and the opposition has engaged in fierce verbal sparring. 
The  new parliament has become a venue for venting political 
frustrations, expressing ethnic grievances, articulating ideological 
interests and publicising religious beliefs. This was to be expected in 
the new space provided for democratic discourse denied under the 
previous regime. Not surprisingly, it has caused intense animosity 
and fractures between and within parties as well as between 
parliamentarians. It has made the work of the speaker, Jiko Luveni, 
the first woman speaker in Fiji’s political history, very difficult. 
The speaker herself was allegedly abused in a SODELPA public meeting 
by party president Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu, leading to a furious 
debate in parliament and eventually to Lalabalavu’s suspension from 
the house for two years. 
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Despite these developments, the committees of the house have 
worked reasonably well in creating at least some semblance of a 
bipartisan environment for serious deliberation. However, this has 
been undermined by the dominance of FijiFirst in the parliamentary 
votes on committee recommendations, which has killed off much 
enthusiasm on the part of the minority opposition. Even so, some 
opposition figures have done some valuable work. The revelations of 
the parliamentary finance committee, headed by economist Dr Biman 
Prasad, about previous unaccounted for spending since the 2006 coup 
has sparked much-needed debate about the financial accountability 
system of the regime. This illustrates the value of legitimate 
parliamentary opposition, which was missing throughout the eight 
years of Bainimarama’s post-coup rule by decree. 
One year on from the 2014 elections, political parties are already 
in campaign mode for the 2018 general elections. While FijiFirst is 
confident of another victory because of the apparent popularity of 
its intensive nationwide developmentist approach, SODELPA is 
struggling with internal leadership issues and fractures. The 2018 
elections will test whether FijiFirst and its developmental policies can 
once again be translated into votes and, at the same time, whether the 
opposition parties have learnt anything from their previous mistakes 
and can refashion their agendas accordingly. 
Analysing the 2014 elections
As the dust from the 2014 elections settles and as Fiji embarks on 
a fresh journey of democratic rule, questions are being asked from 
multiple viewpoints about the significance of the 2014 elections. This 
is what the book is about. It is a collection of chapters by contributors 
from both academia and outside academia who by no means speak with 
one voice. The varying positions taken by the authors are in no way 
an attempt to throw fuel on the fire of Fiji’s ideological contestation 
but rather seek to elucidate some of the deep-felt sentiments on both 
sides of the political divide, sentiments that are often oversimplified at 
best, or obscured at worst, in the robust exchanges of politicians and 
their supporters in the public sphere. The chapters therefore attempt 
to engage in a serious dialogue about the elections, perhaps the most 
paradigm shifting of all of Fiji’s elections since 1970. The chapters 
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focus primarily on the 2014 elections itself, with some providing 
relevant historical context to fill out the broader picture. They vary 
in style, political position and intellectual framings of Fiji politics and 
the 2014 elections. Unfortunately, despite attempts to solicit chapters 
from political parties about their experiences during the elections, 
only SODELPA responded. This is a major gap in the collection. 
Chapter 2 by Steven Ratuva provides a broad discussion of electoral 
engineering, or the process of changing people’s voting behaviour 
and political culture, through electoral system design. Fiji has gone 
through three different types of electoral systems: the first past 
the post (FPTP) system under the 1970 and 1990 Constitutions; the 
alternative vote system (AV) under the 1997 Constitution; and the 
open list proportional representation (OLPR) system under the 2013 
Constitution. Different types of political systems generate different 
voting patterns and behaviour; the examples presented by the Fiji 
elections show different patterns of electoral outcomes. The electoral 
system itself does not determine voters’ actual personal choice, but 
rather influences how people vote and how the results of voting are 
allocated and counted. There is a complex mix of factors which shape 
voter psychology and choice, including political and ideological 
preference, appeal through campaigns and manifestos by political 
parties, social group (ethnic, religious, cultural and political), 
individual loyalty, mode of mobilisation and influence of the media, 
among other things. 
Chapter 3 by Stephanie Lawson examines the historical evolution of 
chiefly politics leading to the 2014 elections. Since independence, the 
chiefly system in Fiji has been part of the national system, primarily 
through the Great Council of Chiefs as well as through the role of 
individual chiefs in state leadership. This has changed over the years 
as a result of coups and other influences. The 2006 coup was a defining 
moment in the creation of the political conditions for the demise of 
chiefly authority in the state system, as exemplified by the abolition 
of the Great Council of Chiefs, more equal distribution of land lease 
money and reform of the Fijian administration, among other measures 
imposed by the pre-election regime. The victory of FijiFirst in the 2014 
elections seems to have signalled the death knell for chiefly authority 
at the national level, although the chiefly system is still strongly 
embedded within the Fijian community. 
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Chapter 4 by Brij Lal provides a critical evaluation of some of the 
forces that shaped Indo-Fijian politics after the 2006 coup and factors 
that influenced Indo-Fijian votes during the 2014 elections. During 
the 2001 and 2006 elections, the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) won about 
80 per cent of the Indo-Fijian votes, but during the 2003 elections 
the two predominantly Indo-Fijian parties—the FLP and the NFP—
polled very poorly amongst the Indo-Fijian community as more than 
70 per cent of them shifted their support to FijiFirst. Included in the 
numerous factors identified by Lal are issues ranging from an Indo-
Fijian sense of insecurity to unrivalled propaganda by the incumbent 
FijiFirst. A lesson to be learnt from this is that, at least in Fiji where 
ethnic identification runs deep, group political loyalty can quickly 
shift when sociopolitical circumstances change. 
Chapter 5 by David Robie, both a professional journalist and a 
scholar, provides an empirical assessment of the media environment 
and challenges in Fiji, especially after the 2006 coup and immediately 
before the 2014 elections. The media acts as the information nerve 
centre in any modern society and plays a vital role in shaping 
perceptions and values. Because of this, various forms of media often 
become effective tools for political propaganda, election campaigning 
and community mobilisation by state forces, political parties and other 
groups representing particular interests. In Fiji, the media has gone 
through some challenges posed by the post-2006 coup media decree 
that is still in force. The struggle to create a freer and better-informed 
society has been a central dilemma for Fijian journalists and Robie’s 
chapter provides suggestions for positive change in the future. 
Chapter 6 discusses the role of the Christian churches after the 2006 
coup and during the elections. The author, Lynda Newland, who 
has carried out considerable fieldwork in Fiji, provides an analysis 
of the sometimes mutually supportive and sometimes antagonistic 
relationship between church and state in Fiji. Central to the chapter 
is the debate relating to the secular state, one of the most contentious 
issues during the election campaign. Throughout modern history, 
the relationship between the state and the church has been complex 
and has assumed different forms, sometimes mutually supportive and 
sometimes antagonistic. Fiji is no exception. The paper explores the 
often precarious interface between theology and political ideology, 
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especially how one is used to legitimise and operationalise the other. 
This interface was manifest in explicit and subtle ways during the 
2014 elections and no doubt influenced the way some cast their votes. 
Chapter 7 by Sefanaia Sakai focuses on land as a political issue during 
the 2014 campaign. Land is of the most volatile of all issues in post-
colonial Fiji. Sakai’s contribution looks at how land has been used 
by ethno-nationalists to instil fear of an ‘Indian takeover’ and Taukei 
marginalisation. He emphasises that land reform, including the equal 
distribution of lease money amongst all members of the landowning 
unit (as opposed to a 30 per cent share for chiefs as was the case 
previously), has empowered ordinary Taukeis. Sakai suggests that 
fearmongering used by political parties during the elections may 
have influenced some voters, but was insufficient to draw a significant 
number of votes away from FijiFirst. 
The role of youth in Fijian politics and especially in the elections is 
discussed by Patrick Vakaoti in Chapter 8. Because of the change in 
voting age to 18, the number of voters below the age of 35 was in excess 
of 50 per cent of all voters and so youth naturally became a major 
target for political parties. But as Vakaoti argues, young voters were 
not a homogeneous voting bloc but were divided by diverse interests 
and expectations. The efforts of political parties to target youth voters 
met with mixed success. 
Jone Baledrokadroka’s Chapter 9 provides an analysis of the role 
of the military, as the most powerful coercive institution in Fiji, on 
political governance and change. His analysis problematises the 
Fiji military’s interventionism, focusing on how it has transformed 
the political landscape through the use or threat of force since the 
2006 coup. Baledrokadroka examines the extent to which support 
for FijiFirst among the military, and its incumbency, contributed to 
FijiFirst’s victory. He suggests that the post-election period may well 
see the role of the military becoming more pronounced as an ally of 
the FijiFirst government and this may give the latter more enthusiasm 
for unrestrained reform. 
The only politician among our contributors, Pio Tabaiwalu, discusses 
the fortunes and otherwise of SODELPA in Chapter 10. Because of 
SODELPA’s narrow ethnic appeal and campaign to mobilise largely 
Taukei votes (who constitute about 60 per cent of the electorate), 
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it was virtually impossible for the party to win the elections outright 
and so it had to seek out coalition partners. But even with the NFP, 
traditionally an Indo-Fijian party, they could not make up the required 
26 seats to control parliament. SODELPA campaigned largely in the 
shadow of the more resourceful and tactically astute FijiFirst and 
needs to re-strategise in the next election if it wants to increase its 
numbers in parliament. 
Scott MacWilliam’s Chapter 11 looks at SODELPA from the opposite 
vantage point to Tabaiwalu. While Tabaiwalu places blame on FijiFirst 
for SODELPA’s electoral misfortunes, MacWilliam locates SODELPA’s 
woes squarely within the party itself and its inability to adapt to 
the demands of a new multiethnic political climate. The chapter also 
argues a case for demarcating the Fijian political scene along a rural/
urban divide, suggesting that this division was also reflected in the 
party votes. 
The coup in 2006, and certainly the 2014 elections, impacted 
significantly on Fiji’s relationship with its neighbours, an issue 
examined in Chapter 12 by Alexander Stewart. Fiji’s suspension from 
the Commonwealth and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and sanctions 
by countries like Australia and New Zealand were meant to isolate 
Fiji as a ‘pariah state’, and force the Bainimarama regime to hold an 
election sooner rather than later. Instead, Fiji took advantage of the 
situation to mobilise support among fellow Melanesian Spearhead 
Group members as well as countries beyond the region, and to set up 
the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF). Fiji’s new government 
is now demanding the removal of Australia and New Zealand from the 
PIF as a precondition for rejoining the organisation. 
Chapter 13 by Alisi Daurewa is a personal account of her work as a 
member of the Fiji Election Commission. The breadth and depth of 
the work of this organisation has not been fully appreciated, largely 
because the public’s information about them has been based mainly 
on formal descriptions in the Constitution and electoral decree and 
media reports. Daurewa’s contribution is a story of the more human 
dimension of the commissioners and electoral officials who expended 
great energy travelling to the far corners of the country under extremely 
challenging conditions. Yet, despite these sacrifices, she argues that 
they were still unfairly vilified by armchair critics. 
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In Chapter 14 Leonard Chan, who was a member of the international 
monitoring group (MOG), discusses his personal experience as a 
member of this group. MOG played a very significant role in ensuring 
the credibility of the elections in the eyes of the international 
community. As with the previous chapter, this is a personal story of 
a kind not usually captured in the media and public discourse. 
A note on the use of terms
With ethnic-based contestations over political power and constant 
shifts in the discourse of race, ethnicity and the definition of cultural 
boundaries, the use of labels is both complex and sensitive. Until 
recently, indigenous Fijians were usually known simply as ‘Fijians’. 
The term ‘Taukei’ (literally ‘owners’) is now more commonly used, 
since ‘Fijian’ officially applies to anyone who is a citizen of Fiji 
(although this is contentious among more conservative indigenous 
Fijians). Some readers will be familiar with ‘iTaukei’. Here the ‘i’ stands 
as the definite article as in the Taukei. We use Taukei without the ‘i’ 
to avoid the error that often appears when people say ‘the iTaukei’ 
(which is the same as saying ‘the Taukei’). In the colonial and early 
post-colonial period, people of Indian descent were usually just called 
‘Indians’. Then ‘Fiji Indians’ became more common, but over time the 
term ‘Indo-Fijians’ has become standard. 
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Electoral changes in Fiji
Steven Ratuva
Electoral systems play a pivotal role in shaping voter political 
behaviour and choices, the national political culture and institutional 
political governance processes of a country. Scholars of electoral 
engineering have often differed on the most appropriate electoral 
system because different systems have different philosophical 
assumptions about democracy; and also they tend to create different 
outcomes based on the type of voting system, how constituency 
boundaries are designed and how the electoral system is manipulated 
by political parties and candidates to their advantage. In ethnically 
divided societies like Fiji, the focus has been increasingly on 
identifying an electoral system that promotes moderation, provides 
proportionality and representativeness and enhances inter-group 
harmony and long-term stability (Fraenkel & Grofman 2006; Horowitz 
1997; Lijphart 1994; Reilly 2001). However, some electoral systems are 
configured specifically to suit the local circumstances or the interests 
of local elites or particular social groups at a particular point in time. 
Also,  different electoral systems are based on certain assumptions 
about what democracy means, what it ought to be, how it should work 
and what the behavioural outcomes should be (Scholdan 2000). 
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While some theories of constitutional engineering such as the rational 
choice institutional approach (Norris 2004) have been influential, 
they tend to be too focused on individual behavioural dispositions 
and choices and how these interface with institutions; they often 
ignore the broader ethno-political and cultural dynamics which help 
shape group choices. In Fiji, constitutional engineering has been 
influenced by a number of factors. The first past the post (FPTP)–
based electoral system under the 1970 Constitution, together with 
the communal allocation of seats, was inspired by the desire to create 
ethnic representativeness and balance and inter-ethnic harmony 
in a potentially volatile ethno-political situation. The shift in the 
balance of power after the 1987 elections created the conditions for 
military intervention. Following the coup, the 1970 Constitution was 
abrogated and a new one was promulgated in 1990 which retained 
the FPTP system and which was based on the assumption that 
stability could be achieved only through Taukei (indigenous Fijian) 
hegemony. This constitution was deemed inoperable in a multiethnic 
situation and it was amended, leading to the 1997 Constitution, which 
proposed an alternative voting (AV) system in the hope of creating 
moderation and stability (Lal 1998). This expectation was shattered by 
the 2000 coup. Today Fiji’s new open list proportional representation 
(OLPR) electoral system, provided for in the 2013 Constitution, has 
been justified on the ground that it will steer the country away from 
an ethnic-based contestation for power and political mobilisation 
promoted by past FPTP and AV models. While this is true at the 
institutional level, whether it actually changes people’s thinking and 
political behaviour in a way that negates communal consciousness is 
a big and challenging question. 
This chapter examines some of the broad patterns of electoral change 
in Fiji, focusing fundamentally on the differences between the FPTP, 
AV and OLPR – their characteristics and their implications for shaping 
Fiji’s ethno-political landscape. 
The first past the post system
The FPTP system is based on a winner takes all approach: it is easy to 
administer and count and the results from highest to lowest are ordered 
through a simple process of ranking. The winner is the one who scores 
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a simple majority of one vote above the second highest. Most countries 
in the Pacific, such as Tonga, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Cook 
Islands, use the FPTP system. In some cases, the constituencies are 
so small that the difference between the winner and runner-up is as 
small as one to three votes. In these cases, recounts often take place 
and these can be expensive. After the 27 November 2014 elections in 
Tonga, for example, the former Ha’apai No. 12 people’s representative 
Mo’ale o’ale Finau, who won 532 votes but lost his seat by a margin of 
three votes, applied for a recount and was required to pay a recount 
fee of TOP$1,000 (Fonua 2014).
The FPTP voting system was used in Fiji’s first election under 
universal suffrage in 1966 when the Fijian Association, the forerunner 
to the Alliance Party, won 22 seats. In addition to these, five other 
independents and Great Council of Chiefs nominees were aligned 
to the Alliance Party and in total it was able to muster 27 seats in 
the Legislative Council. The Indo-Fijian National Congress, which 
later became the National Federation Party (NFP), won nine seats 
(25  per  cent) in the 36-seat legislature (Lal 2008). With three times 
more votes than the NFP, this was the largest victory the Alliance Party 
was to ever win. Prior to 1966, Taukei representatives were nominated 
while Indo-Fijian and European representatives were directly elected 
by voters. This patronising system was based on the assumption that 
Taukei interest was best served by chiefs through the Great Council 
of Chiefs as well as other colonially patronised institutions such as 
the Native Land Trust Board, Fijian Affairs Board, provincial councils 
(Bose ni yasana), district councils (Bose ni tikina) and village councils 
(Bose vakoro). 
At the time of independence in 1970, Fiji’s dilemma was how to 
accommodate the distinctive communal interests of competing ethnic 
groups in an overarching national rubric. It was a classic case of 
accommodating the often competing and potentially volatile aspirations 
of ethno-nationalism and civic nationalism (Stavenhagen  1996). 
The solution, after horse-trading between the leaders of the two major 
ethnic groups, was a consociationalist arrangement, encapsulated in 
the 1970 Constitution, whereby the Taukei and Indo-Fijians were to 
be allocated the same number of seats. To appease the Taukei, who 
feared political domination by Indo-Fijians and loss of land and 
political rights, there was agreement that the Senate would provide 
greater Taukei representation.  
THE PEOPLE HAVE SPOkEN
20
The first election under the 1970 Constitution, in 1972, saw shifts in 
the results compared to the 1966 elections. Based on the FPTP system, 
the gap between the Alliance Party, which won 33 seats (63 per cent), 
and the NFP, which won 19 seats (37 per cent), began to close. 
The allocation of seats under this constitution was largely communal 
in nature. Of the 52 seats, 22 were reserved for the Taukei, 22 for Indo-
Fijians and eight for other minorities, usually categorised as ‘General 
Electors’. The 22 seats for each of the two major ethnic groups were 
further divided into 12 communal (elected by members of the same 
community) and 10 national roll seats, to be elected cross-ethnically. 
For the general electors the division was three communal and five 
national roll seats (Fiji Government 1970). The ethnic division at this 
early stage was very clear, with the Alliance Party winning all the 
Taukei communal seats with the support of 82 per cent of all Taukei 
votes, and all general communal seats. The NFP won all Indo-Fijian 
communal seats, securing 73 per cent of all the Indo-Fijian votes. 
The voter turnout for the communal seats overall was 85.2 per cent.
Based as it was on the FPTP system, elections under the 1970 
Constitution should have been relatively straightforward, but they 
were complicated by the communal allocation of seats in different 
categories, as mentioned above. Each voter actually had four votes—
one in his or her own local communal constituency and one each for 
the ‘national’ constituencies for all three communal groups (i.e. Taukei, 
Indo-Fijian and General). This required four separate ballot papers. 
For instance, a Taukei voter would vote for a candidate in his or her 
local communal constituency (in which all the candidates and voters 
were Taukei), then the same voter would also vote three more times—
one for each of the ‘national’ (cross-communal) seats for Taukei, 
Indo-Fijians and General Electors. 
Because all four votes were counted, the tally of total votes as well as 
of party votes appeared to be inflated: the total number of votes was 
689,673, although the population of Fiji was barely 400,000 in 1972. 
Another feature of the voting system was the disparity between the 
proportion of the votes and the number of seats. The Alliance Party 
polled 57.5 per cent of the votes but won 33 or 63.4 per cent of the 
seats; the NFP with 33.9 per cent of the votes won 19 or 36.5 per cent 
of the seats; and the Fijian Independent Party, which won 0.2 per cent 
of the votes, and independents, who won 6.4 per cent of the votes, 
both failed to win any seats (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001).  
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The second election under the 1970 Constitution was held in 
March  1977, when the NFP sent shockwaves through the Taukei 
political establishment after they won 26 seats to the Alliance’s 24 
seats, despite the Alliance gaining 46 per cent of the votes as opposed 
to NFP’s 45.2 per cent, an unfortunate disparity created by the FPTP 
system. Under the current OLPR system, the Alliance could have won 
the elections with about 24 seats, but the Alliance Party actually lost 
nine seats and the NFP gained an extra seven seats, while the Fijian 
Nationalist Party (FNP) and an independent candidate won a seat 
each. The more than 39,000 votes collected by FNP contributed to the 
Alliance defeat. There were altogether 47,690 informal votes, a high 
number indeed (Fiji Elections Office 1977). 
The NFP was not able to form a government following the elections due 
to an internal leadership struggle and other factors and the governor-
general, Ratu Sir George Cakobau, invited Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, the 
former prime minister and leader of the defeated Alliance, to take over 
as caretaker prime minister in a ‘palace coup’ of sorts until the next 
elections in September of the same year. 
 The September 1977 elections saw the Alliance’s fortunes shift in their 
favour. The Alliance won 36 seats, a gain of 12, while the NFP, which 
by then was divided between the ‘flower’ and ‘dove’ factions, lost 
11 seats, ending up with 15 (12 for the flower faction and three for 
the dove faction). The FNP votes declined by more than half as Taukei 
voters realised that votes for the FNP (which lost almost half of its 
support) would weaken the Alliance, thus risking the possibility of 
Taukei losing political power as in the March elections. The number of 
informal votes increased to 51,713. 
Again, as in previous elections, the disparity in the percentage of the 
votes and number of seats was quite marked. The Alliance Party polled 
52.2 per cent of the votes but won a massive 69 per cent of the seats; 
the NFP (flower) won 23.7 per cent of the votes and won 23.07 per cent 
of the seats, indeed a rare coincidence of proportionality under the 
FPTP system; the NFP (dove) won 20.6 per cent of the votes but won 
only 5.7 per cent of the seats; and perhaps the biggest loser was the 
FNP, which won 18,854 votes but did not win any seat, while the 
independent candidate won a seat with only 6,228 votes. 
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The disparity between votes cast and seats won was not really obvious 
during the 1982 elections, when the Alliance Party, with 51.8 per 
cent of the votes, won 53 per cent of the seats, while the NFP won 
42 per cent of the seats with 41.2 per cent of the votes. This election 
saw the entry of the western Viti Levu–based Western United Front 
(WUF), which won two seats. The number of informal votes reduced 
to 19,605, a low total compared to the previous elections (Fiji Elections 
Office 1982). 
The last and most significant election under the 1970 Constitution’s 
FPTP system was the April 1987 elections, which led directly to the 
May and September 1987 coups, following which Fiji’s politics was 
drastically transformed through a serious of coerced regime changes 
(Ratuva 2011). In 1987, the Alliance Party lost power, winning only 
24 seats, although they won 49.5 per cent of the total votes. With 
only 47.1 per cent of the votes, the NFP–Fiji Labour Party (FLP) 
coalition won 28 seats, or 54 per cent. One key factor contributing 
to the coalition victory was the new energy and promise provided by 
the newly formed FLP. Also the shift of Taukei votes to the WUF and 
FNP, although the latter once again failed to win a seat, drew votes 
away from the Alliance Party. The shift in the balance of power away 
from the Taukei establishment created the conditions for instability 
in a highly charged ethno-political climate. Again, as in the previous 
elections, the exaggerated total of over 1 million votes for a population 
of about half a million was reflective of the type of multiple votes 
required under Fiji’s communal FPTP electoral system. 
The FPTP system under the 1970 Constitution had a number of 
distinguishable factors. The fact that voters had to vote four times 
complicated the process and inflated the total number of voters by a 
factor of four. This meant that voters did not necessarily have to vote for 
the same party on all four ballot papers: one for the voter’s communal 
seat, one for the voter’s national seat and two for the national seats 
of the other two ethnic categories. This system provided a chance for 
both trans-ethnic and communal voting within the broader rubric 
of ethnic classification. The complexity of the system led to a large 
number of informal votes. Another feature was that the seats won 
were disproportionate to the votes because of the large differences in 
the size and number of voters in different constituencies. 
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While the electoral system under the 1970 Constitution was seen as a 
panacea for Fiji’s divergent communal interests because it prescribed 
a seemingly balanced voting equation (especially the provision for an 
equal number of seats for Taukei and Indo-Fijians), in some ways that 
prescription reinforced communalism and entrenched what has been 
described as ‘communal democracy’ (Ratuva 2005). These elections 
did not really serve the purpose of a power-balancing exercise, which 
the seat allocation formula was assumed to do, but became an arena 
for both inter- and intra-ethnic contestation of choice and power. 
When  there was a shift in political gravity away from the Alliance 
Party and, effectively, the Taukei establishment, Fijian democracy, 
which up until then was underpinned by the notion of paramountcy 
of Fijian interest, began to unravel in unrestrained ways. 
The May 1987 coup, a month after the elections, led to a fundamental 
transformation of Fiji’s political environment, including the declaration 
of Fiji as a republic and the promulgation of the 1990 Constitution 
which promoted Taukei political ascendency (Lawson 1991; Norton 
1990; Sutherland 1992). There was a dramatic transformation from the 
discourse of balance to the discourse of communal hegemony, spawned 
by the waves of Taukei ethno-nationalism that have swept Fiji since 
1987. The 1990 Constitution prescribed a FPTP electoral system with 
70 parliamentary seats, 37 of which were reserved for Taukei, 27 for 
Indo-Fijians, one for Rotumans and five for other ethnic minorities 
(Fiji Government 1990, p. 49). There were no national seats as in the 
1970 Constitution. Another significant development was the demise of 
the Alliance Party and the emergence of the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa 
ni Taukei (SVT) as the dominant Taukei party. 
Predictably, the first general elections under the 1990 Constitution, 
held in 1992, was won by the SVT with 43.6 per cent of the votes and 
30 seats, or 43 per cent. This was an unusual coincidence of vote–seat 
proportionality. Indo-Fijian votes were largely shared between the 
NFP with 16.1 per cent (14 seats) the FLP with 16.1 per cent (13 seats). 
This even split in votes can be interpreted as a result of the equal 
level of appeal of the two political parties amongst Indo-Fijian voters 
at this time, but that was to change dramatically in the next elections. 
After a long drought the FNP made a comeback under a new name 
(Fijian Nationalist United Front), winning three seats. The WUF also 
made a comeback with two seats and the General Voters’ Party (GVP), 
THE PEOPLE HAVE SPOkEN
24
because it was the only party representing the General Electors, won all 
five general communal seats (7.14 per cent) but with only 1.4 per cent 
of the total votes (Fiji Elections Office 1992). 
The balance of power in the new parliament was very precarious. 
With only 30 seats and a slim majority, the SVT struggled to hold on 
to power and it came as no surprise that a snap election took place 
two years later in 1994 after the government failed to pass its budget 
through parliament. The SVT came back strongly in the elections, 
winning two extra seats with 40.9 per cent of the votes. The NFP also 
increased its number of seats by six to 20 (17.8 per cent of the votes) at 
the direct expense of the FLP, which lost six seats and ended up with 
seven (14.6 per cent of the votes). The newly formed Fijian Association 
Party (FAP), a direct rival to the SVT, won five seats (9.9  per cent 
of the votes) while the FNP won 4.1 per cent of the votes and lost 
its three seats. The number of informal votes was the lowest ever up 
to that point (Fiji Elections Office 1994). The 1994 elections were the 
last under the FPTP system before a review of the 1990 Constitution. 
This review saw major revisions, leading to the 1997 Constitution that 
introduced the alternative voting (AV) system. 
The political dynamics in Fiji had started to swing in a way that 
the framers of the 1990 Constitution did not envisage. The ethnic 
distribution of seats to guarantee Taukei hegemony was premised 
on the assumption that Taukei political interest and aspirations were 
homogenous and solidarity of the vanua (Taukei culture and social 
structure) was primordially indivisible. This mythical view failed 
to appreciate and acknowledge the contesting tribal, regional and 
ideological discourses within the Taukei community, some of which 
are rooted in pre-European times. The split within the SVT and the 
formation of the FAP testified to this. The SVT, with only 30 seats, 
was faced by opposition from both the Taukei and Indo-Fijian 
political parties.
The voting system under the 1990 Constitution was relatively simple. 
Every voter voted for only one candidate in the single-member 
communal constituency. This was a significant contrast to the mixed 
communal and cross-voting system of the 1970 Constitution, which 
required four ballot papers for each voter. Because of its simplicity, 
the informal vote was quite low. Despite this, the undesirability of this 
electoral system was its ethnically skewed nature, which provided the 
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Taukei disproportionate political power and simultaneously reduced 
other ethnic groups into marginalised political subalterns. The system 
further fragmented Fiji’s multicultural society and overseas migration 
by Indo-Fijians continued unabated as they attempted to escape from 
the communally restrictive political climate. 
The FPTP system under the 1970 and 1990 Constitutions was 
framed around the reservation of ethnic seats in multiple single-
member constituencies. While the 1970 Constitution prescribed a 
mixture of communal and national rolls to accommodate a mixture 
of intra- and inter-ethnic votes, the FPTP system under the 1990 
Constitution was totally communal, without any trans-ethnic votes. 
Nevertheless, both variants encouraged ethnic mobilisation and the 
creation of communally based political cleavages, which contributed 
to tension and instability. This was because the communally based 
FPTP system created the conditions for ethnic-based competition for 
political power on the basis of a winner takes all contest. Ethnic-based 
political parties became the vehicle for promoting and facilitating 
the ethnic struggle for political ascendency on the basis of zero-sum 
gamesmanship. The mixture of the winner takes all principle under 
FPTP and ethnically exclusive political mobilisation overshadowed 
the potential for middle-ground compromises. This nurtured the 
development of a demarcated and antagonistic political culture, 
which, over time, laced with economic disparity, ethnic competition 
over state control and deliberate ethnic mobilisation, spawned large-
scale ethno-political schism.
A negative feature of the FPTP system was the disparity in the 
proportionality of votes in relation to the number of seats. We have 
seen this occur in all the elections under FPTP since universal suffrage 
was introduced in 1966. The number of seats won by political parties 
was often disproportionate to the votes they had won. In addition, the 
figures show that the winners of the elections in 1966, 1970, 1987, 1992 
and 1994 did not achieve the 50 per cent threshold to be able to claim 
majority support. This raises the technical and ethical question of the 
democratic value of votes and whether attaining victory by winning 
less than 50 per cent of the votes was sufficient to make a victory 
legitimate. This was a major dilemma that the AV system attempted to 
address when it was introduced under the 1997 Constitution. 
THE PEOPLE HAVE SPOkEN
26
The alternative voting system
As Fiji moved away from the shadow of the 1987 coup and its 
associated Constitution of 1990, internal and external pressure for 
a more ethnically accommodating constitution increased. After a 
constitutional review process by the constitutional commission, 
which carried out local and international consultation, parliament 
unanimously passed the 1997 Constitution. The AV system used in Fiji 
under the 1997 Constitution was considerably more complex than the 
FPTP system previously used. A major rationale behind the use of the 
AV system was a belief in its capacity to ameliorate tension by fostering 
cooperation and moderation (Horowitz 1997; Reeves, Vakatora 
& Lal 1996; Reilly 2001). This was because the system allowed for a 
consociationalist process based on exchange of preferences between 
political parties. Theoretically the AV system was supposed to provide 
middle-ground consensus as well as remove extremism and promote 
opportunities for minority parties to win seats. However, like any 
other electoral system, the AV system was subject to manipulation by 
politicians and this, to some extent, had some influence on electoral 
outcomes. 
Of the 71 seats provided for under the 1997 Constitution, 25 were to 
be open seats in which voters could vote for any candidate from any 
ethnic group, while 46 seats were reserved for specific communities. 
In these communal seats, 23 seats were reserved for the Taukei, 
19 for Indo-Fijians, one for Rotumans and three for other minorities. 
The  boundaries for 17 of the constituencies were based on the 
administrative provincial boundaries prescribed under the Fijian 
Affairs Act; each of the larger provinces of Ba, Tailevu and Cakaudrove 
were divided into two constituencies, and each of the other provinces 
became a single constituency. The remaining six constituencies were 
comprised predominantly of urban and peri-urban areas containing 
roughly equal numbers (Fiji Government 1997). In terms of the 
value of votes (determined by seat–voter ratio), the rural provincial 
constituencies, which were demographically smaller in size, had more 
advantage than the urban and peri-urban constituencies.
The ballot paper was divided into two parts: the ‘above the line’ vote 
required voters to tick the party of their choice and the ‘below the 
line’ vote required voters to list the candidates in order of preference 
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from 1 to 5. If no candidate achieved 50 per cent plus one vote of 
the valid votes cast in a constituency, the votes of the lowest-polling 
candidate were redistributed among the other candidates according to 
the preferences listed on the ballot paper. This process was repeated 
until one candidate had at least 50 per cent plus one vote of the total 
valid votes cast. 
The system of preferential exchange between parties tended to 
nullify the power of voters to determine the outcome of their votes. 
In fact it was tantamount to parties ‘fixing’ the election results, as 
parties traded preferences to maximise benefits for themselves while 
conspiring against those they detested. For instance, during the 1999 
elections, the first under the AV system, the Veitokani ni Lewenivanua 
Vakarisito (VLV) and the Party of National Unity (PANU), two moderate 
Taukei parties, gave high preferences to the Indo-Fijian-dominated 
FLP as a tactical move to undermine the NFP and Soqosoqo Duavata 
ni Lewenivanua (SDL), who had formed a close alliance. In the 2001 
elections, NFP transferred its votes to SDL, thus enabling it to win, 
although the NFP failed to win a single seat (Fiji Elections Office 1999).
During the 1999 elections, many voters found the AV system complex 
and confusing, and the informal vote was as high as 10 per cent. 
In addition, there was a massive disparity in the proportion of seats 
in relation to the votes, similar to elections under the FPTP system. 
For instance, with only 32.2 per cent of the total votes after distribution 
of preferences, the FLP won 52.1 per cent of the seats. On the other 
hand, the NFP, with 14.6 per cent of the votes, failed to win a seat, 
while the Fijian Association Party (FAP), with only 10.1 per cent of the 
votes, won 10 seats. The UGP, with a mere 1.4 per cent of the votes, won 
two seats. This disparity in vote value raised fundamental questions 
about the viability of the AV system as an electoral mechanism for 
democracy, especially in an ethnically divided society.
The AV system did indeed promote minority parties and interparty 
cooperation, much more than the FPTP system had. However, the 
problem was that the inter- and intra-communal formal engagements 
were still ‘floating’ on deeply embedded ethnic cleavages and 
consciousness, whipped up by ethnic entrepreneurs who had personal 
and political motives. This, together with a host of other factors, 
including Chaudhry’s governance style, built up the momentum 
towards the 2000 coup. 
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The attempt by the NFP and SVT, two major ethnic parties, to forge an 
alliance failed because the leaders, Jai Ram Reddy (NFP) and Sitiveni 
Rabuka (SVT), could not secure the backing of their respective 
communities. To the Indo-Fijian voters, Reddy was committing 
sacrilege by allying himself with the man who staged the 1987 coup 
against Indo-Fijian political interests. To his Taukei supporters, 
Rabuka was seen as selling out Taukei interests by crossing the sacred 
line that kept the Indo-Fijians and Taukei apart. The attempt to move 
towards a middle ground position was a tectonic shift that reflected 
the new spirit of the 1997 Constitution and the AV system and the 
appeal for moderation. However, this came into direct collision with 
the highly ethnicised political culture nurtured under the communally 
oriented FPTP. Voters showed their dissatisfaction through the ballot: 
the SVT lost a total of 24 seats, winning only eight, and there was a 
mass exodus of Indo-Fijian voters from the NFP to the FLP. The latter 
won a massive 37 seats while the NFP lost 20. The FLP was now seen 
as the party representing Indo-Fijian interests, an image propped up 
by its use of racial fearmongering among Indo-Fijian voters. Its leader, 
Mahendra Chaudhry, became the first Indo-Fijian prime minister. 
The FLP forged a coalition with the FAP and VLV and held power for 
a year before being overthrown in the coup of May 2000. While the 
AV system cannot be blamed for the increasing ethnic polarisation, it 
could not really transform a political culture, which had long thrived 
on ethno-political polarity in a significant way. The process of party 
cooperation was not sufficient to heal the ethno-political schism. 
The demise of the SVT led to the emergence of the SDL, an even more 
strongly ethno-nationalist party. During the 2001 elections, the SDL, 
under the leadership of Laisenia Qarase, who was appointed by the 
military as interim prime minister after the 2000 coup, won 32 seats 
with only 26 per cent of the votes, while the FLP, with 34.8 per cent 
of the votes, won only 27 seats. The Conservative Alliance, a party 
formed by supporters of George Speight, the ethno-nationalist coup 
leader, won six seats and subsequently formed a coalition with the 
SDL (Fiji Elections Office 2002). 
The 2006 elections continued to show the dominance of the SDL and 
FLP as major ethnic political groupings for Taukei and Indo-Fijians 
respectively. With 44.59 per cent of the votes, the SDL won 36 seats and 
with 39.18 per cent of the votes, the FLP won 31 seats (Fiji Elections 
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Office 2006). The results showed an increasingly polarised society, 
dashing expectations that AV was going to create a middle ground 
consensus.
The proliferation of political parties under the AV system stemmed 
from misplaced optimism about its capacity to facilitate minority 
party interests. The real dynamic behind how the AV system worked 
was how parties strategically shared their preferences both to benefit 
themselves and to undermine the chances of parties perceived as arch 
rivals. By and large, this led to major ethnic parties such as the SDL and 
the FLP making deals that promoted their interests while undermining 
intra-ethnic competitors. As we have seen, inter-ethnic deals usually 
ended up promoting the dominance of a major ethnic party.
Following the military coup in December 2006, which saw the 
overthrow of the SDL government, a new political order was created 
after a fundamental political transformation (Ratuva 2011). Among 
the changes was the creation of a new constitution prescribing an 
open list proportional representation system (OLPR), which was used 
for the first time in the 17 September 2014 elections. 
The open list proportional representation 
system and the 2014 elections
The underlying principle of the proportional representation (PR) 
system is that the proportion of seats won by a party or independent 
candidate corresponds with the proportion of votes gained. There are 
basically two types of PR systems: the closed system, in which the 
political parties provide a list of candidates; and the open system, 
where the candidates are ranked according to how many votes they 
win. Fiji uses the ‘open’ PR system. The ballot paper consists of 
numbers allocated to the candidates and the voter has to put a tick, 
a cross or a circle in the box beside the number of the candidate he 
or she supports. Other variants of the PR system include the mixed 
member proportional (MMP) system used in New Zealand and the 
single transferable vote (STV) used in Ireland. About 94 countries in 
the world use different variants of the PR system. The party list is the 
most popular, with about 85 countries using it.
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The introduction of the open list proportional representation (OLPR) 
system and the single national constituency system in Fiji is meant to 
promote trans-ethnic voting, multiethnic political party membership 
and national unity. As we have seen earlier, communally based 
constituencies under the FPTP and AV systems promoted ethnic 
contestation for political power, which contributed to tensions. 
The single national constituency ensures that politicians are not locked 
into localised loyalty but rather have a broader national outlook. 
The open listing is also meant to democratise the elections through 
the direct choice of the voters rather than allowing the political parties 
to determine the winning candidates through a closed list system. 
The number of parliamentary seats has been reduced from 71 to 50 as 
a way of creating a leaner and less expensive parliament. 
The ballot paper is in the form of a grid containing the number 
allotted to each candidate, picked at random, starting from number 
135. This avoided single digit numbers such as 1, which would give 
some candidates unfair advantage. The design of the ballot paper 
caused considerable controversy because political parties felt that 
simply allocating numbers to represent candidates was too simplistic 
and confusing for voters. An alternative suggestion was a ballot paper 
with party symbols. The use of the number grid represents an extreme 
version of design options. The other extreme is to list the names and 
symbols of all 247 candidates by using a ‘tablecloth’ ballot paper 
containing details such as names of candidates and party symbols. 
This option is not practical but there are other variations in between 
the two extremes that could show party symbols and even names. 
These could have been explored. 
The vote-counting system uses the D’Hondt method first suggested by 
Victor D’Hondt, a Belgian mathematician, in 1878. It involves dividing 
the total number of votes a party receives by a series of denominators 
from 1 to 50. Thus, the total vote is divided by 1 then the remainder 
is divided by 2 then the remainder is divided by 3 and then by 4 
and so forth, until 50 (because of the 50 seats). The seats are then 
divided amongst political parties that polled more than the threshold 
of 5 per  cent of the total votes; the allocation of seats is based on 
the proportion of votes they gain. For instance, a party that polls 
50 per cent of the votes gets 50 per cent of the seats and one which 
polls 10 per cent of the votes receives 10 per cent of the seats. From 
the party’s total seat allocation, the individual seats are then allocated 
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according to their ranking within the party, based on the individual 
votes they receive. For instance, with 60 per cent of the votes, FijiFirst 
(FF) was allocated 60 per cent of the seats, which totalled 32 seats. 
The FijiFirst candidates were then allocated seats on the basis of the 
32 highest-polling candidates. 
Results of the 2014 elections 
As Table 1 shows, the elections delivered a decisive victory for FijiFirst 
with 59.17 per cent of the votes and 32 seats, followed by the Social 
Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA), a renamed version of the SDL. 
The revived NFP won three seats, while none of the other four parties 
and two independent candidates reached the 5 per cent threshold 
and thus they failed to win any seats. In a way, the OLPR system had 
opened up the space for multiethnic competition, with all the parties 
claiming to be multiethnic although the degree to which they were in 
terms of membership or support varied considerably. 
Table 1: Election results by political party
Political party Total no. of votes Percentage No. of seats
FijiFirst 293,714 59.17 32
SODELPA 139,857 28.18 15
NFP 27,066 5.15 3
PDP 15,864 3.2 0
FLP 11,670 2.35 0
One Fiji 5,839 1.18 0
FUFP 1,072 0.22 0
Roshika Deo 1,055 0.21 0
Umesh Chand 227 0.05 0
Total 496,364 100 50
Source: Fiji Elections Office (2014). 
Note: The figures in this table have been rounded up and do not exactly match the totals 
supplied.
FijiFirst (FF) turned out to be the biggest beneficiary of the new 
system by appealing nationally across ethnic groups. The party leader 
himself, Frank Bainimarama, won a massive 202,459, 41 per cent of all 
the votes cast, which was 12.6 per cent higher than the total SODELPA 
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votes, 70 per cent of all FF votes and four times more than the votes 
won by Ro Temumu Kepa, the leader of the SODELPA. Bainimarama’s 
votes created a ‘coat-tail effect’: his votes enabled members of his party 
with very low votes to win seats (Fiji Elections Office 2014). 
The estimate for the ethnic and party distribution of the votes 
in Table  2  shows the extent to which FF extended its electoral 
success across  all ethnic groups, winning 50 per cent of Taukei 
votes, 71 per cent of Indo-Fijian votes and 80 per cent of minority 
votes. In  comparison, SODELPA initially strived to present itself as 
multiethnic but failed to attract sufficient non-Taukei candidates, 
winning only 0.4 per cent of Indo-Fijian votes and 1.5 per cent of 
minority votes. Although its campaign focused on attracting Taukei 
votes, they managed only 46 per cent of all Taukei votes. 
Table 2: Estimates of ethnic votes and percentage
Party Taukei Indo-Fijian Minority Total
FF 148,909 50% 120,979 71% 23,826 8% 293,714
SODELPA 137,523 46% 751 0.4% 432 1.45% 139,857
Others 11,386 4% 47,034 28% 5,533 18.57% 62,793
Total 297,818 100% 168,764 100% 29,782 100% 496,364
Source: Estimated from Fiji Elections Office figures for 2014.
Note: The figures in this table have been rounded up and do not exactly match the totals 
supplied.
Because FF had an undisputed dominance over Indo-Fijian and 
minority votes, the real battle to determine the winner was between 
FF and SODELPA as they battled over the Taukei votes, which made 
up 60 per cent of the total voters.  
Taukei versus Taukei contest
One of the central trends in the 2014 Fiji general elections was the 
contestation for political dominance by indigenous Fijian (Taukei) elites 
representing the two major political parties: the FF and the SODELPA. 
The differences between FF and SODELPA were deeply rooted in their 
different conceptualisations of Taukei history, cosmology, culture 
and the future direction of Taukei social transformation. SODELPA’s 
ideological position supported a protectionist doctrine harking back 
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to the colonial and post-colonial period, while FF was committed to 
the fundamental transformation of neo-colonial institutions, norms 
and ideologies.
As already stated, FF scored a decisive victory with almost 59.17 
per cent of the total votes and about 50 per cent of the Taukei votes, 
compared to SODELPA’s 28.18 per cent and 46 per cent respectively. 
The almost 50/50 split in the Taukei votes was indicative of major 
changes in social dynamics within the Taukei community as well as in 
the relationship with other communities. This will continue to shape 
the future trajectory of Fijian politics in significant ways. 
The OLPR system opened the way for a three-tier, all-out contest 
between first, political parties; second, individual candidates of 
different political parties; and third, candidates of the same party. 
Taukei votes consisted of 297,818 (60 per cent) of a total of 496,364 
votes. As noted above, this was the main battleground for FF and 
SODELPA. Because SODELPA was a predominantly Taukei party, 
with an exclusively ethno-nationalist ideology, it was statistically and 
politically handicapped from the beginning—it had to win 247,188 
or 83 per cent of the Taukei votes to be able to reach the 25 (+1) seat 
threshold to form government in the 50-seat parliament.
The 139,857 votes for SODELPA equated to about 46.9 per cent of 
Taukei votes. The non-Taukei votes for SODELPA may have come largely 
from the three Indo-Fijian candidates, whose votes totalled 751, and 
Mick Beddoes, a member of the minority part-European group, who 
collected 865 votes. If we assume that about half of Beddoes’s votes 
came from Taukeis then the approximate number of minority groups 
who voted for SODELPA would be about 432. Thus the total number of 
non-Taukei votes for SODELPA would be about 1,183 or 0.85 per cent 
of the total SODELPA votes and 0.2 per cent of the overall national 
votes. Thus we can conclude that of the total SODELPA votes, about 
137,523 or 99.1 per cent, were Taukei. This represented 46 per cent of 
the total Taukei votes. 
Predictably, the last two candidates in the SODELPA list were Indo-
Fijians. In the beginning, SODELPA was optimistic about attracting 
other ethnic groups but abandoned the idea of a multiracial party 
after failing to attract sufficient non-Taukeis to stand as candidates. 
If it hopes to have any chance of winning a future election, SODELPA 
basically has two choices. The first is to increase its share of Taukei 
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votes by 83 per cent and more, a virtually impossible feat. Second, 
it should reconfigure its ideological and political strategy in a more 
trans-ethnic direction and compete head on against the FF on the same 
multiracial platform. 
In contrast to SODELPA, FF clearly has a trans-ethnic appeal and 
therefore had a lower level of difficulty in winning, because all it 
needed was 50 per cent Taukei votes, 50 per cent Indo-Fijian votes 
and 50 per cent votes from other minorities to reach the 25 seats 
threshold. Anything on top of that was a bonus. This meant SODELPA 
had to work harder by 33 per cent than FF to reach its 83 per cent 
threshold. With 46 per cent of the Taukei votes going to SODELPA, 
the share for FF and minority parties was 54 per cent. Assuming that 
the minority parties’ share of Taukei votes was 4 per cent, the other 
50 per cent would have voted for FF. This clear division in Taukei 
votes reflected the shifting nature of Taukei interests, expectations 
and political choices in a fast-changing social, economic and political 
environment. This is a significant lesson for electoral strategising in 
the next elections for political parties who hope to win Taukei votes. 
With 148,909 (50 per cent) of Taukei votes (or 29.9 per cent of the total 
votes) secured, all that FF had to do to ensure total victory was to top 
up with Indo-Fijian and minority votes. In the end, FF secured 293,714 
or 59.17 per cent of the total votes, about twice as many as SODELPA, 
with 139,857 or 28.18 per cent of the total votes. In addition to the 
Taukei votes, the Indo-Fijian and minority voters who voted for FF 
totalled around 144,805 or 29.1 per cent of the total FF votes. Based 
on the assumption that Indo-Fijians made up 34 per cent of the total 
votes, the total number of Indo-Fijian votes was 168,764, while the 
total number of minority votes (again assuming that they made up 
6 per cent of the total votes) was 29,782. If we assume that 80 per cent 
(23,826) of the voters from minorities voted for FF, then about 120,979 
(71 per cent) of the Indo-Fijians would have done the same. 
The margin of error for these calculations is about 2 to 3 per cent 
but, by and large, given the absence of any official figures on ethnic 
categorisation, this estimation, based on the figures available, gives us 
a good idea of the dynamics of shifting voting patterns. The fact that 
there was an almost 50/50 split in the Taukei votes between SODELPA 
and FF means that one cannot talk strictly about a ‘Taukei Party’; 





SODELPA’s strategy in carving up the single national constituency 
into 50 sub-constituencies as the focus of its campaign for the 50 
individual candidates was quite innovative and commendable because 
it won the party most of their seats. Winning SODELPA candidates 
did well in their allocated local areas by taking advantage of kinship 
and other sociocultural links within the local community. The only 
SODELPA candidate who collected substantive votes across the sub-
constituency boundaries was party leader Ro Teimumu, with a massive 
49,485 votes, light years ahead of Niko Nawaikula, who came second 
with 7,348 votes. However, while this strategy worked well in rural 
areas it was less successful in semi-urban and urban areas. These were 
FF territories. 
The FF approach was in direct contrast to that of SODELPA. FF used 
the ‘rock star’ phenomenon very strategically by cleverly using 
the VFR principles (visibility, familiarity and relevance), which 
underpinned the voter–politician relationship in the OLPR system. 
The focus was on maximising the VFR of the already well-known party 
leader Bainimarama to draw votes for the party. This also worked well 
in the context of the number grid system used in the ballot paper, 
where one just needed to remember the number 279. Also, FF’s 
presidential campaign style, its use of ‘cargo cult’ politics (provision of 
development projects) and a last minute pro-poor manifesto, amongst 
other strategies, helped to consolidate its dominance. These  tactics 
achieved phenomenal results, especially for the FF leader, who also 
won votes for another 49 members of the party who collectively won 
only 30 per cent of the party votes. It is often assumed that one of 
the advantages of the PR system is to ensure greater parity in the 
votes between parties, but the lopsidedness of the votes in favour 
of FF destroyed this assumption. 
FF had an advantage over other parties in terms of incumbency 
and access to state resources as well as through its control over the 
media and freedom of association during the pre-election period. 
It also effectively marketed its development projects to voters, 
sometimes with veiled threats of what might happen if FF did not 
win the elections. Eight  years of unrivalled hegemony entrenched 
their visibility, familiarity and relevance in voter consciousness. 
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It is reasonable to assume that if an election had taken place in 2009, 
FF would have struggled to win because at that time the country was 
still going through a turbulent period and the Bainimarama regime 
had very little to market to voters. 
Political contestation between FF and SODELPA centred on the very 
different ideological positions adopted by each. SODELPA’s vision of 
land, the Great Council of Chiefs, identity and the Christian state placed 
it at the protectionist, ethno-nationalistic and conservative end of the 
continuum (SODELPA 2014), while FF was more towards the reformist, 
secularist, modernist and multiethnic end (FijiFirst 2014). What they 
shared in common were tactics involving psychological coercion in 
the form of private and public fearmongering. Rumours, conspiracy 
theories and hate stories were circulated widely through blog sites, 
social networks and other means, both modern and traditional, of 
communication. This created much tension and negative energy, 
which unfortunately did not really wither away after the elections but 
instead continued unabated into the 2015 parliamentary debates. 
The stark ideological distinction between the two parties provided 
voters with a clear choice. Indo-Fijians and minority groups found 
the FF position more trans-ethnically embracing and supportive of 
their long-term security in Fiji compared to the ethnically exclusivist 
SODELPA position. For the Taukei, the choice was between 
SODELPA’s conservative cultural preservation approach or FF’s 
cultural transformation and socioeconomic modernisation strategy. 
The  patterns of Taukei support for both parties were apparent. 
SODELPA had massive support in the rural polling stations of Lau, 
Kadavu and Lomaiviti as well as in Cakaudrove and Bua, while FF 
performed well in Viti Levu, especially in Nadroga, Nadi, Ba, Serua, 
Ra, Naitasiri and Tailevu. For instance, Cuvu, Nadroga’s ‘capital’, was 
overwhelmingly FF, despite the close kinship links between Cuvu 
and the SODELPA leader. In Tailevu, home of the FF leader, the tussle 
was quite even but SODELPA dominated in Rewa, home of SODELPA’s 
leader (Fiji Elections Office 2014). 
Data from polling stations in urban areas such as Lami, Kinoya, 
Nausori, Nasinu, Raiwaqa, Nabua, University of the South Pacific, Fiji 
National University and Suva Civic Centre, amongst others, showed 
that FF had unsurpassed support (Fiji Elections Office 2014) in these 
places. Thus it appears that support for SODELPA was strong among 
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the more traditional and conservative members of the rural Taukei 
community, while support for FF was dominant amongst the more 
urban and also those who had direct benefit from the government’s 
development projects. But development did not always work as a 
payoff for party loyalty. For instance, although a large number of 
development projects in the form of roads and mining had taken 
place in the Bua province, FF still performed very badly in many Bua 
polling stations. In a Kadavu polling station, despite the provision of 
solar electricity to the villages concerned, only two people voted for 
FF out of a total of 77 voters. 
The OLPR system will likely be around for some time yet because 
provisions for amending the Constitution are very restrictive; 
for instance, three-quarters of parliamentary votes are required 
in addition to support by three-quarters of voters in a national 
referendum. The new system promised hope of representation for 
minority parties and independents but there were disappointments, 
as only three parties won seats. While it ensured parity between the 
number of parliamentary seats a party gained and the number of votes 
it had received, it still created discrepancies in the actual ranking of 
individual candidates. For instance, there were winning candidates 
in FF who collected fewer votes than losing candidates in SODELPA. 
Bainimarama’s coat-tail appeal may have distorted the actual total 
support for FF, as winning party members actually benefitted from 
the massive support for Bainimarama. The FF tactic of deliberately and 
actively promoting their party leader as a political rock star attracted 
popular votes and worked to their advantage. Perhaps the burning 
question for FF is what happens when Bainimarama is gone, perhaps 
in two or three elections’ time. This is when competition between 
political parties will be stiffer and the results more unpredictable. 
Conclusion
Fiji has come a long way in its electoral journey from the FPTP used 
in the first universal suffrage in 1966 and post-independence elections 
under the 1970 and 1990 Constitutions to the AV system under the 
1997 Constitution and eventually the OLPR system under the 2013 
Constitution. The FPTP system was used in the context of communally 
divided constituencies, as reflected in the 1970 and 1990 Constitutions, 
which helped nurture and reproduce the creation of communal 
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political cleavages and ethnic contestation for political power. Ethnic 
politics became a significant driver for defining sociocultural identity 
and social change. One’s ethnic identity and political rights became 
closely linked in an almost symbiotic manner.
Attempts to move away from this communal political culture led 
to the introduction of the AV system under the 1997 Constitution. 
Theoretically, the AV system was meant to promote inter-ethnic 
engagement and moderation but given the simmering ethno-political 
dynamics in Fiji, the experiences in the 1999, 2001 and 2006 elections 
showed that sharing of preferences by parties was based not on their 
desire to move towards moderation but on the desire to leverage the 
system to maximise self-interest. The results still showed an ethnically 
polarised pattern of votes. 
The introduction of the OLPR system was part of the post-2006 political 
revolution to transform the sociopolitical landscape by eradicating 
ethnic mobilisation and consciousness. This has not been fully 
achieved because of the difficulty in de-ethnicising people’s identity 
and choices. Nevertheless, the rise of FF has shifted political discourse 
to the centre, where expressions of political choices by different ethnic 
groups have converged. The results of the 2014 elections appear to 
show that Fiji’s political culture has shifted away from ethnic polarity 
towards moderation. The next elections in 2018 will indicate whether 
this shift is substantive or merely temporary. 
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Chiefly leadership in Fiji after 
the 2014 elections
Stephanie Lawson
‘Chiefdoms are highly variable, but they are all about power.’  
(Earle 2011, p. 27)
Introduction
The last quarter century has seen a significant decline of chiefly 
influence in Fiji’s politics, albeit with some periods of enhanced status 
for the paramount symbol of indigenous Fijian traditionalism, the 
Great Council of Chiefs (GCC). This body, however, was abolished 
by decree under the military regime of Commodore Josaia Voreqe 
(Frank) Bainimarama in March 2012. The September 2014 elections 
held prospects for the restoration of chiefly authority and the role of 
traditionalism through the Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA) 
led by Ro Teimumu Vuikaba Kepa, holder of a prominent chiefly title. 
A victory by SODELPA would also have seen the restoration of the 
GCC. With SODELPA’s resounding defeat by Bainimarama’s FijiFirst 
Party, such prospects have received a significant blow. 
This chapter provides an account of chiefly leadership in national 
politics, beginning with a survey of Fiji’s colonisation, the role of 
chiefs in the British colonial regime generally, and their domination 
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of national politics up until 1987. The second section reviews the 
political dynamics surrounding chiefly leadership from 1987 until 
the Bainimarama-led coup of 2006. The final sections examine chiefly 
involvement in national politics in the lead-up to the 2014 elections 
and prospects for the future of traditional chiefly political leadership 
which, given the results, look somewhat bleak.
British colonialism and chiefly rule
In contrast with many other parts of the world, where colonial rule was 
imposed by force, the paramount chiefs of Fiji petitioned the British 
to establish a Crown Colony. This act also ensured that the leading 
chiefly clans, mainly from the south and east of the island group, 
were incorporated into the colonial administration and remained 
entrenched there throughout the colonial period. The Deed of Cession 
signed on 10 October 1874 was unconditional in terms of ceding 
authority to the British Crown but it came to be regarded as a charter 
of native rights, especially those of the chiefs, and a guarantee that 
these rights would always be paramount over those of settlers in the 
colony. This ‘doctrine of paramountcy’ came to underpin traditional 
chiefly institutions and has constituted the foundational principle 
from which indigenous nationalist claims proceed (Lawson 2004). 
There was no traditional national political authority in pre-cession 
Fiji but, rather, a range of sociopolitical units that varied across the 
island group with different structures of authority and landholding 
practices. But if the sociopolitical groupings throughout the islands 
and their relationship to the land were complex and varied, it was 
the task of the colonial administration to simplify and rationalise 
them. Pre-existing structures therefore underwent something of a 
transformation, resulting in what is best described as a neo-traditional 
order (MacNaught 1982). This included the formalisation of the 
provinces as administrative units and the establishment of provincial 
councils presided over largely by chiefs. 
At the apex of the colonial Fijian Administration was the Great Council 
of Chiefs or GCC. It had not existed prior to colonisation but arose 
initially when Fiji’s first substantive colonial governor, Sir  Arthur 
Gordon, summoned the high chiefs to a meeting. This event became 
a more or less annual affair and was in turn transformed into a formal 
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advisory body. When the Legislative Council was established, leading 
chiefs were appointed to represent indigenous Fijians, with the initial 
nomination process conducted through the GCC. Reforms in the 1950s 
allowed a small number of ‘commoners’ to serve, but indigenous 
Fijians as a whole were not enfranchised until the early 1960s. The GCC 
continued to nominate two members of the legislative council until 
independence, when all seats in the new House of Representatives 
were filled through elections, albeit on a communal basis. The 1970 
Constitution of independent Fiji also provided for a Senate with 
appointees nominated by the GCC comprising the largest bloc and 
with the GCC as a whole having a veto over any legislation affecting 
indigenous Fijian interests. At the same time, GCC membership 
widened to include all indigenous Fijians elected to the lower house 
as ex officio members.
The most prominent chiefs of the colonial period had been Ratu Sir 
Lala Sukuna and his protégé, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. Mara became 
chief minister in the colonial government, then prime minister at 
independence in 1970 and president from 1993 to 2000. Both Sukuna 
and Mara enjoyed high chiefly status in the traditional sphere, but 
both were also highly educated. Sukuna established the Native Land 
Trust Board, which rationalised the leasing of native land to Indo-
Fijian tenant farmers, bringing benefits to both communities at the 
time (Norton 2005, p. 149). A number of other key chiefly figures 
who came to occupy high office benefitted from Sukuna’s mentorship 
as well, including Fiji’s first two indigenous governors-general, Ratu 
Sir George Cakobau and Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, as well as Ratu Sir 
Edward Cakobau, a leading politician in the transition to independence 
and after. 
Colonial practices and institutions produced a certain cultural 
uniformity that provided the basis for an emergent indigenous 
national identity based squarely on respect for chiefly leadership. 
This was reinforced through the introduction of a substantial non-
indigenous population from India to provide cheap labour for the 
colony’s plantation economy. Gordon’s paternalistic policies required 
commoner Fijians to remain in their own villages and under the control 
of their chiefs, thus preserving the ‘Fijian way of life’ in what Gordon, 
and most of his successors, saw as its ‘natural state’. This  remained 
largely the case until the Native Regulations were abolished in 
1967, only three years before independence (Madraiwiwi  2005). 
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Nayacakalou (1975, pp. 7–8) noted that with the emergence of a modern 
state a different kind of leadership may be required, challenging those 
who derived their leadership status from traditional sources.
Preservation of the Fijian way of life also meant that Indians were 
strictly segregated from indigenous Fijians in virtually every sphere of 
life. When political representation was introduced, Indians, Europeans 
and Fijians were all catered for separately, giving rise to communal 
(i.e.  race-based) political representation and therefore communal 
electoral politics that persisted in one form or another right through 
to the promulgation of Fiji’s 2013 Constitution. 
The presence of a substantial ‘alien’ population contributed to an 
ideology not only of Fijian ‘paramountcy of interests’ over those of 
other population groups but also of chiefs as differentiating symbols 
of racial/ethnic identity and guardians of the vanua, a term understood 
as embodying a sacred connection between chiefs, land and people. 
This was strengthened rather than undermined by the widespread 
adoption of Christianity (lotu) among indigenous Fijians (Ryle 2012; 
Tomlinson 2002). Around 98 per cent of indigenous Fijians are Christian 
and of those about three-quarters are Methodists. Indo-Fijians remain 
predominantly Hindu while approximately 15 per cent are Muslim 
and 5 per cent Christian (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 2013). 
Chiefly politics and indigenous 
nationalism in independent Fiji
Under the 1970 Constitution, the establishment of communal seats 
required that both candidates and electors be classified as indigenous 
Fijians, Indo-Fijians or General Electors (the latter mainly European 
and part-European but with small numbers of ‘others’, such as 
Chinese or other Pacific Islanders). Additional cross-voting seats 
modified strict communalism, but electoral politics was inevitably 
attuned to perceived communal interests. The National Federation 
Party (NFP) was essentially an Indo-Fijian party. The Alliance initially 
sought to embrace all communities, and attracted around 25 per cent 
of the Indo-Fijian vote in the first general elections of 1972, but it 
could not maintain this backing in a system so oriented to communal 
politics. Rather, the Alliance came to embody a reified notion of ‘Fijian 
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tradition’, including the privileged role of chiefs in every sphere of 
political life from the village to the national level. However, it was 
challenged in the mid-1970s by an ultra-nationalist Fijian party—
the  Fijian Nationalist Party (FNP)—led by a disgruntled former 
Alliance member, Sakeasi Butadroka, who believed the Alliance under 
Mara was selling out indigenous Fijian interests to ‘foreigners’, and 
Indo-Fijians in particular (Lal 2012, p. 76). 
The Alliance was never to recapture the popularity it enjoyed in the 
early 1970s. Butadroka had opened up an aggressive discourse that 
threatened to outbid the Alliance in catering to indigenous interests, 
thus forcing the Alliance to shift its own discourse in that direction. 
The Alliance nonetheless enjoyed the advantage underpinned by 
its traditional leadership, something that Butadroka as a commoner 
was unable to challenge effectively at that time. This was despite the 
fact that the GCC itself had, by the late 1970s, come to include in its 
membership chiefs of modest rank and non-chiefs from various walks 
of life (Norton 2009, p. 99). 
Developments before the elections of 1987 saw the emergence of the 
Fiji Labour Party, led by Dr Timoci Bavadra. It grew out of both blue- 
and white-collar trade union interests and attempted to promote a new 
discourse attuned to the rights and interests of all middle and lower 
socioeconomic groups. It became clear, however, that a split in the 
Indo-Fijian vote would guarantee an Alliance victory, thus prompting 
a coalition agreement between Labour and the NFP. In the meantime, 
the Alliance continued to warn of the dangers to indigenous Fijian 
interests, especially with respect to the land, if the Alliance and its 
chiefly leadership were to ever lose office. One senior figure argued:
[T]he chiefs represent the people, the land, the custom. Without 
a chief there is no Fijian society. When Fijian chiefs are attacked or 
criticized in whatever capacity – personal or political – it is the Fijian 
vanua which is also being criticized (quoted in Lawson 1996, p. 62). 
Although these were not the only issues of importance during the 
campaign, the very idea of an overriding threat to indigenous 
Fijian land, traditional chiefly leadership and their very identity as 
indigenous Fijians, expressed through the vanua, dominated Alliance 
discourse. 
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Following victory by the Labour–NFP coalition, nationalist rhetoric 
focused on the threat to everything that the vanua concept stood 
for. In the following weeks, an emergent Taukei movement (Taukei 
meaning, literally, ‘owners’) promoted an extremist nationalist 
agenda, fomenting civil disorder and violence against Indo-Fijians. 
Alliance leaders did little or nothing to calm the situation. The fact 
that indigenous Fijian rights and interests were triply entrenched in 
the 1970 Constitution, with a GCC veto the final block on any change, 
was never mentioned by Alliance or Taukei leaders. 
When the third-ranking officer of the Royal Fiji Military Forces, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, intervened less than six weeks 
after the elections by taking the coalition government hostage at 
gunpoint on the floor of the parliament, Alliance leaders professed 
shock and amazement. Despite denial all around that anyone but 
Rabuka and his immediate followers in the military were involved 
in the plot, there can be little doubt that key Alliance figures had 
prior knowledge of the plans. Rabuka certainly justified the coup in 
precisely the same general terms used by Alliance and Taukei figures 
alike—namely, the threat to the Fijian vanua posed by an ‘Indian 
government’ accompanied by the aggressive assertion of indigenous 
nationalist claims (Lawson 1996, p. 64). 
There were, however, tensions within the forces aligned with the coup-
maker, including some anti-Alliance/anti-Mara antagonism among 
Taukei members. Norton (2005, p. 153) observes that proponents of 
the more extreme Taukei/FNP ethno-nationalist vision of exclusivity 
have typically been commoners while Howard (1991, p. 358) notes 
that after the first coup, when Mara lost control of the GCC, extremists 
in the Taukei movement had sought to use it to thwart Mara’s quest 
to regain control. Nonetheless, an interim administration comprising 
leading Alliance figures was endorsed by the GCC.
 A few months later, however, Rabuka led a second intervention, 
claiming that the ‘objectives’ of his May coup, namely the permanent 
entrenchment of indigenous Fijian political and cultural dominance, 
had been compromised by the interim administration in making too 
many concessions to Indo-Fijians. On 7 October 1987, Rabuka declared 
Fiji a republic. But the chiefs were soon back at the helm. Mara 
became interim prime minister and Ganilau was appointed president. 
The  Taukei movement remained a force, but a diminished one. 
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It  could not ‘sustain an aggressive ethnic movement independently 
of the ideology that affirmed the legitimacy of chiefly leadership.’ 
(Norton 2009, p. 103)
A fresh review of the Constitution led in due course to the 
promulgation of the 1990 Constitution of the ‘Sovereign Democratic 
Republic of Fiji’, approved by the GCC, dictating that all seats in the 
new parliament were to be communal, with the majority reserved for 
indigenous Fijians. Reforms to the GCC excluded many lesser chiefs 
and commoners, thereby boosting the power of higher chiefs. Around 
two-thirds of the Senate was to be made up of GCC appointees. 
Since the Alliance had imploded in the aftermath of the 1987 coups, 
a new political party sponsored by the GCC was established. Called 
the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), its very name embodied 
indigenous exclusivity. The NFP and Labour went their separate 
ways, both attempting to maintain a multiethnic character. The SVT, 
led by Rabuka, now turned civilian politician, won the 1992 elections 
but serious factionalism in the ranks led to another general election 
in 1994. The SVT won again but disunity remained a major problem. 
Although the SVT had initially been sponsored by chiefs, chiefly 
leadership within the party was rarely in evidence. Indeed, since the 
departure of Mara before the 1992 elections, no one of chiefly status, 
low or high, has held the office of prime minister, although high chiefs 
have continued to be appointed to the symbolic offices of governor-
general or president. Mara himself became vice-president and then 
president of Fiji after Ganilau’s death in 1993, a position he retained 
until the coup of 2000. Mara was succeeded by Ratu Josefa Iloilo and 
then by Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, who had been the military commander 
at the time of the 1987 coup (but was absent overseas when it took 
place). He is a son of the late Ratu Sir Edward Cakobau and is also 
Mara’s son-in-law. He has since become one of Bainimarama’s strongest 
supporters.
Despite, or perhaps because of, guaranteed political predominance, 
disunity continued to characterise intra-indigenous Fijian politics. 
This disunity together with continuing international opprobrium 
surrounding a constitution that discriminated so deeply against a 
population on grounds of race were no doubt factors that influenced 
a  rethink of political arrangements. Racial discrimination had led 
to many skilled Indo-Fijians emigrating, taking the edge off the 
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demographic issue of indigenous Fijians being ‘swamped’ by an 
immigrant race. After 1994, Rabuka initiated moves to review the 
Constitution, resulting in the 1997 Constitution of the ‘Republic 
of the Fiji Islands’. Although introducing some open electorates, 
it retained a significant number of communal seats. Indigenous 
Fijian primacy of status was reflected in the retention of the GCC’s 
restricted membership and enhanced privileges, which included 
the right to appoint the president and vice-president, although the 
number of senators nominated by the GCC was reduced. The GCC had 
been persuaded to endorse this new constitution by both Mara and 
Rabuka, an endorsement seen as essential for broader acceptance by 
indigenous Fijians. But the more extreme nationalists nonetheless saw 
it as a sell-out. 
Opposition was heightened following the result of the 1999 elections, 
which saw Fiji’s first and so far only Indo-Fijian prime minister, 
Labour’s Mahendra Chaudhry, emerge as leader of a coalition which 
defeated an STV–NFP coalition led by Rabuka and long-standing NFP 
leader Jai Ram Reddy in a surprise result. The latter coalition, and 
the compromises it entailed, had inflamed nationalists further and 
split the indigenous Fijian vote. Chaudhry’s cabinet was balanced 
and included Mara’s daughter (and wife of Ratu Epeli Nailatikau), 
Adi Koila Nailatikau, elected to her father’s old seat as a member of a 
new regionally based party that had joined the Labour-led coalition. 
After a difficult year in office, during which issues concerning the 
renewal of leases on agricultural land further inflamed nationalist 
sentiment, the Chaudhry government was overthrown on 19 May 2000 
in a coup led by failed business entrepreneur George Speight and a 
handful of disloyal soldiers from the military’s Counter-Revolutionary 
Warfare (CRW) unit, who took government members hostage in the 
parliamentary compound. Their justification was once again the 
threat posed to indigenous Fijians by an ‘Indian government’. But this 
was not a military coup, and it was not backed by the Republic of 
Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) commander Bainimarama. Ratuva (2011, 
p.  110), reports that some (unnamed) ethno-nationalist politicians 
had actually approached the military commander some time after the 
1999 elections to ask that he lead a coup, but were met with refusal. 
By the end of the month, however, Bainimarama declared martial 
law in the absence of an effective government following the Speight 
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intervention, sidelining President Mara. Following a complicated 
set of events, Mara’s position as president became untenable and he 
eventually tendered a formal resignation.
Bainimarama also sidelined the GCC, which was split between pro- and 
anti-coup supporters. Norton (2009, p. 105) observes that dissent and 
rivalries had always been a feature of GCC meetings, but the impasse 
created by the coup was unprecedented. He further observes that 
the failure of leading chiefs to unite in support of a constitution they 
themselves had endorsed was partly due to a long-standing resentment 
among some Bauan chiefs over the continuing political pre-eminence 
of the Lauan paramount chief, Mara. Among the Bauans was Adi Litia 
Cakobau, daughter of the late Ratu Sir George Cakobau and a strong 
supporter of the Speight coup, who had previously served in the post-
1987 government. The GCC later accepted a court ruling that the 1997 
Constitution remained the law of the land. In any event, a nationalist 
government went on to win two general elections held under its 
auspices, thereby dampening some of the nationalist opposition to the 
constitution’s more liberal provisions. Two weeks after the 2000 coup, 
Bainimarama declared he was no longer willing to let the chiefs decide 
who should rule (Guardian 2000). This followed Speight’s demands 
that the GCC be granted executive authority (Guardian 2000). These 
were rejected by Bainimarama, and Speight himself was to be sidelined 
soon enough.
The coup saw Mara’s forced resignation as president and the 
appointment of a caretaker government led by Laisenia Qarase, a former 
GCC appointee to the Senate. Speight had agreed to this appointment, 
had relinquished his own claims to office and finally freed the hostages 
after accepting an amnesty agreement. However, he soon broke the 
terms of the amnesty, was arrested and subsequently faced trial for 
treason. He is now serving a life sentence. 
The personal tipping point for Bainimarama was an attempted 
mutiny by a small number of CRW soldiers, which involved a plan to 
assassinate Bainimarama for his opposition to Speight. It very nearly 
succeeded, but was thwarted by Bainimarama loyalists. Eight soldiers 
were killed. Five from the CRW unit were beaten to death by loyalists. 
No one has ever been charged over the deaths. 
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In the meantime, Qarase went on to win elections in 2001, espousing 
nationalist sentiments clearly aligned with those of Speight. Qarase’s 
new government included members of a new party, the Conservative 
Alliance Matanitu Vanua (CAMV), set up by Speight and his supporters, 
which had won six seats. Speight won a seat from prison but soon 
lost it for non-attendance in parliament. Qarase’s own party, the 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL), had formed government in 
coalition with the CAMV (later absorbed into the SDL). Thus the new 
government rode what seemed to be a high tide of indigenous Fijian 
nationalism. Qarase also sought to ingratiate himself with the GCC by 
suggesting that the sovereignty of Fiji be shared between parliament 
and the GCC. His government also established an independent 
income stream for the GCC and work on a grand new building next 
to Government House commenced (Norton 2009, p. 106). 
But Qarase failed to ingratiate himself with Bainimarama, and in fact 
provoked his implacable hostility by attempting to pave the way for 
the early release of the coup perpetrators and mutineers through the 
Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill, which could have provided 
an amnesty. For Bainimarama, the very idea of an amnesty for the coup 
perpetrators meant Qarase was contemplating the release of his would-
be assassins. Bainimarama’s relationship with Qarase had reached the 
point of no return. For his part, Qarase made several unsuccessful 
attempts to remove Bainimarama as head of the military (Lal 2012, 
pp. 29–30), no doubt contributing to Bainimarama’s determination 
to remove him. Bainimarama subsequently campaigned strongly 
against the SDL in the May 2006 elections and although Qarase 
emerged victorious, Bainimarama refused to accept his government’s 
legitimacy, charging it with corruption, incompetence and racism 
(Norton 2009, p. 107). These were the principal themes justifying the 
December 2006 coup. 
In the final days before the coup, Qarase attempted to use the GCC to 
help resolve the confrontation with Bainimarama, but the latter refused 
to have the GCC involved. As Bainimarama announced his takeover, 
the GCC chair, the Tui Tavua, Ratu Ovini Bokini, highlighted his 
betrayal: ‘You told the GCC you would protect this country. Now you 
have turned your back on God, the chiefs, our country and the church 
…’. (quoted in Norton 2009). Bainimarama certainly promised to 
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bring about not just a change of regime, but a revolution in political 
thinking and behaviour in Fiji that moved well beyond traditionalism 
and indigenous nationalism and all that these entailed. 
The retreat of traditionalism in 
post‑2006 Fiji
Qarase’s SDL government was clearly based on a nationalist/
traditionalist ideology with close ties to the GCC, the Methodist 
church, provincial councils and other smaller groups and organisations 
(Ratuva 2011, p. 112). But another major institution that had previously 
been closely aligned with a nationalist ethos was the military itself, 
around 99 per cent of whose members were indigenous Fijians. Part of 
Bainimarama’s task was to reorient the military away from that ethos, 
a task not without its difficulties given that a significant proportion of 
military personnel had probably voted for the SDL (Firth & Fraenkel 
2009, p. 117). This task required two key strategies: first, the purging 
of all elements among senior officers suspected of disloyalty; and 
second, the re-making of the military’s corporate identity separate 
from, and indeed in opposition to, a nationalist/traditionalist identity 
(Lawson 2012).
Bainimarama’s post-2006 military regime was determined to counter 
the anti-modernist elements in indigenous Fijian society, again 
through two key strategies: the political repression of oppositional 
opinion on the one hand, and the concerted engagement of indigenous 
Fijians through a major exercise in public relations on the other. 
The  latter was boosted by long-overdue infrastructure works to 
upgrade roads and bridges, school buildings, water supplies and to 
extend electrification of villages. Constitutional change would also 
prove essential to Bainimarama’s long-term vision, as we see shortly.
In the meantime, the relationship between the GCC and Bainimarama 
was deteriorating, even though GCC appointee President Ratu Iloilo 
had ‘meekly accepted being shunted aside’ by Bainimarama during 
the events of 2006, then ‘ignominiously [accepted] re-appointment 
as President, and consequently doing all of Bainimarama’s bidding’ 
(Narsey 2012). In April 2007, matters came to a head when the 
GCC rejected the nomination of Bainimarama supporter Ratu Epeli 
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Nailatikau for the vice-presidency. Bainimarama responded by 
suspending the GCC. In February 2008, new regulations for the GCC 
were introduced, designed to ‘depoliticise’ it. But this exercise became 
irrelevant as the GCC was never to meet again. 
In April 2009, another major development occurred following 
a court case in which the coup of 2006 was declared illegal under 
the Constitution and Bainimarama’s interim government invalid. 
Bainimarama promptly bade Governor-General Iloilo to abrogate the 
Constitution. Public Emergency Regulations (PERs) were introduced 
and Bainimarama commenced rule by decree while muzzling the 
media, trade unions, NGOs and the arch-nationalist Methodist church. 
The aim was to suppress not just racist/nationalist discourse but any 
criticism of the regime. The PERs were withdrawn in January 2012, 
ostensibly to allow public debate on a new constitution, but new 
amendments to an older public order act simply reinstated them in 
another form (Welch 2012). 
In March 2012, Bainimarama abolished the GCC as an anachronism that 
could serve no positive function in the new Fiji under construction by 
his regime. The GCC, he said, ‘is a product of our colonial past and Fiji 
must now focus on a future in which all Fijians are represented on the 
same basis’ (quoted in Ratuva 2013, p. 175). Another product of the 
colonial past were the privileges chiefs enjoyed as major beneficiaries 
of rental income generated through native land leases. Part of the logic 
was that chiefs required this income to meet their traditional obligations 
as chiefs in funding projects for their communities. There had been 
criticism over the years, however, that many chiefs kept most of the 
money for themselves. Under the Bainimarama regime, new provisions 
were made for distributing land rental monies on an equal basis to all 
members of the landowning units, with chiefs to receive no more and 
no less than any other member (Fiji iTaukei Land Trust Board 2010; 
Sakai, this volume).
The abolition of the GCC in 2012 coincided with the announcement 
of an independent constitutional review committee to draft a new 
constitution. In the event, Bainimarama rejected many elements of 
the draft, believing it pandered to the very same groups that had 
previously brought the country to grief. The draft was therefore 
amended substantially to reflect the regime’s own vision and the new 
Constitution promulgated in September 2013. A decree relating to the 
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registration of political parties had been issued in January 2013, 
allowing parties only 28 days to register, severely restricting sources 
of funding, disqualifying civil servants and trade union officials from 
candidature as well as undischarged bankrupts, and those who had 
served a prison sentence for more than six months in the previous five 
years. Parties were required to use English names, have multiracial 
membership, and were prohibited from advocating ‘racial or religious 
hatred, incitement or vilification’ (Fiji Elections Office 2014a).
The conviction of Qarase in 2012 on corruption charges relating to 
activities back in the 1990s disqualified him from candidature, while 
the ruling on party names disallowed the use of Soqosoqo Duavata 
ni Lewenivanua. The party was renamed ‘Social Democratic Liberal 
Party’, an interesting assortment of monikers designed to at least 
retain ‘S’, ‘D’ and ‘L’ in its acronym, SODELPA. Its new leader was 
Ro Teimumu, who had succeeded to the paramount chiefly title of 
Roko Tui Dreketi on the death of her older sister, Ro Lady Lala Mara 
(wife of Ratu Mara). She had been appointed a senator in 1999 and 
then served in the Qarase government from 2001 while also a member 
of the GCC. Chiefly leadership therefore featured once again in Fiji’s 
foremost traditionalist political party. 
A statement by Ro Teimumu and the Tui Cakau, Ratu Naiqama 
Lalabalavu, issued as a critical response to the 2013 Constitution on the 
139th anniversary of the signing of the Deed of Cession, referred, among 
other things, to the regime’s undermining of ‘group rights’ in relation 
to land and appealing to international instruments underscoring 
respect for historical treaty obligations, while also claiming that the 
group rights of indigenous Fijians should be a concern ‘of all right 
thinking Fiji citizens who proudly share in the ownership of its unique 
identity’ (Statement from Rewa and Cakaudrove chiefs 2013).
This last appeal can scarcely have persuaded the great majority of 
Indo-Fijians to defer to the very institutions of indigenous Fijian 
tradition that had so often been used to cast them in the role of 
second-class citizens. Rather, Indo-Fijian political support had swung 
firmly behind the Bainimarama regime, which promised to make them 
fully equal citizens in a new Fiji. What is more surprising, however, 
is the extent to which indigenous Fijians also shifted their support to 
Bainimarama in the 2014 elections.
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The 2014 elections
The 2013 Constitution had abolished communal voting and the 
elections were conducted on the basis of one voter, one vote, one value 
under an open list proportional representation system with every 
citizen over 18 years of age enfranchised on a single national register. 
The main parties contesting the elections were Bainimarama’s FijiFirst, 
SODELPA, the Fiji Labour Party, the National Federation Party, and 
the People’s Democratic Party (a new party sponsored by the liberal-
oriented Citizens’ Constitutional Forum). But the main contest was 
between FijiFirst and SODELPA, the former promising a new, modern, 
secular Fiji free of the crippling legacies of a racially divided past. 
FijiFirst also promised a continuation of development projects that 
had brought tangible benefits to many towns and villages around the 
islands and which no doubt played a significant part in attracting 
indigenous Fijian support. But Bainimarama’s efforts to eliminate racist 
discourse and to curb the power and privileges of chiefs played its 
part among indigenous Fijians as well as Indo-Fijians. It would be too 
much to claim that racist discourse has disappeared, as various rather 
vicious blogs in unregulated cyberspace attest, but public expression 
of racist/nationalist views and scare tactics were certainly repressed. 
This was a positive feature of the campaign, although it came at the 
expense of freedom of expression. 
SODELPA, while declaring its sensitivity ‘to the traditions of all 
communities who call Fiji home’ (SODELPA 2014a), nonetheless 
promoted the nationalist cause as far as it could. The manifesto called 
for the restoration of the GCC and other chiefly privileges lost under 
the Bainimarama regime, again appealing to the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2007.
It is important to put to rest the fears of our native Fijians about 
what they see as the erosion of their rights, interests and place in 
the islands they first populated. The principles of the UN Declaration 
and the ILO Convention are not racist … They are internationally 
recognized platforms for indigenous populations everywhere ... 
(SODELPA 2014a). 
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SODELPA also made much of Bainimarama’s support of Fiji as a secular 
state in which no particular religion was to be elevated over others. 
In contrast, SODELPA promoted Fiji as a ‘Christian state’, while 
denouncing the 2013 Constitution as ‘Godless’ (SODELPA 2014b). 
Neither the NFP nor Labour could match Bainimarama’s appeal to both 
Indo-Fijian and indigenous Fijian voters. Labour, with just 2.4 per cent 
of the vote, failed to secure a single seat, while the NFP managed just 3 
seats with 5.5 per cent. SODELPA gained 28.2 per cent of the votes and 
15 seats (Fiji Elections Office 2014b). The victory by Bainimarama’s 
FijiFirst, securing almost 60 per cent of the vote and 32 seats, can 
only be described as resounding. There were, inevitably, claims of 
electoral fraud, but international observers declared the elections 
largely free and fair, at least procedurally. The main limitation on ‘free 
and fair’ was not ballot-rigging, of which there was little evidence, 
but the muzzling of the media, political parties and others with critical 
opinions to voice. 
Even given this, it was remarkable that a country mired so long in 
racially oriented politics could produce a stunning victory for a leader 
who had consistently opposed any form of race-based discourse, 
repudiating virtually everything that indigenous Fijian nationalists 
had stood for. That he did so largely through the military, an institution 
that historically has been as much a part of the traditionalist/nationalist 
superstructure of Fiji as any other, remains a paradox. 
Conclusion
Traditional chiefly leadership has been a powerful political force 
in Fiji’s national politics from the moment the Fiji islands became a 
unified state entity under colonial rule. Initially institutionalised 
through the colonial administrative structure, supported by a strong 
traditionalist ideology and allied at times with an uncompromising 
indigenous nationalism, paramount chiefs held all the higher offices 
of the Fijian state until 1987. The Great Council of Chiefs maintained 
an authoritative presence in government until it was suspended and 
then finally abolished by the Bainimarama regime in 2012. The only 
remaining high official position still held by a leading chief is the 
presidency, which the present incumbent holds only by virtue 
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of his support for Bainimarama. The only other official position 
in the parliamentary system now held by a high chief is Leader of 
the Opposition. 
The future of traditional chiefly leadership in Fiji’s national politics 
therefore looks rather bleak. Bainimarama has not only routed the 
chiefly establishment, but has also achieved considerable success 
in quashing nationalist discourses. Although achieved partly 
through suppression, the apparent strength of electoral support for 
Bainimarama’s vision of a modern, secular Fiji can scarcely be denied. 
At the same time, it would be foolish to claim that the ideas and beliefs 
underpinning racism in Fiji—evident among all communities—have 
been eliminated, as attested by ongoing diatribes in the blogosphere. 
Nor has the chiefly system as such disappeared. It is likely to continue 
to hold a valued place among indigenous Fijians in ceremonial life, and 
may well maintain a strong presence in local and provincial politics. 
But it seems unlikely that chiefs will ever dominate national politics to 
the extent that they once did, especially given the persistent tensions 
within their own ranks. Having said that, Fiji’s politics never fail to 
surprise, and what seems unthinkable at one historical moment may 
well come to pass at another.
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Fiji Indians and the Fiji general 
elections of 2014: Between a 
rock and a hard place and a few 
other spots in between
Brij V Lal
In the September 2014 Fiji general elections an estimated 80 per cent of 
Indo-Fijians voted for Commodore Frank Bainimarama’s newly formed 
FijiFirst Party (Lal 2014; Larson 2014).1 The extent of the support 
was startling even though Indo-Fijians have a history of splitting 
their votes more frequently than indigenous Fijians have. In the 1972 
general elections, for instance, 24 per cent of Indo-Fijian votes went 
to the Alliance Party, with that figure declining significantly over 
the decades as coups and ensuing convulsions soured race relations 
and deepened the divide between the two communities (Lal  2006a; 
Ali 1973). However viewed, the Indo-Fijian shift away from traditionally 
Indo-Fijian parties to FijiFirst is significant, even perhaps historic. 
Several factors are responsible. On the one hand was the Bainimarama 
Government’s ruthless use of incumbency to its enormous advantage 
and to the manifest disadvantage of the opposition parties, inventing 
and bending rules as it went along, and its generous and unaccounted 
1  I am grateful to Jon Fraenkel, Padma Lal and Patrick and Vanisha Mishra Vakaoti for their 
comments and advice for revision. The usual disclaimer applies.
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use of the public purse for electioneering (Fraenkel 2015). On the other 
was a deep sense of fear and foreboding among Indo-Fijian voters: fear 
of revenge and retribution from Fijian nationalists should the regime 
lose, and foreboding about their future without the illusion of security 
provided by the Fijian military. Muzzling of the media through 
coercive decrees, suppressing dissent and disabling rival centres of 
power (of the trade unions and non-government organisations, for 
instance, or the Methodist Church and the Great Council of Chiefs) 
contributed their share of pressure. Then there were those who made 
hay while the sun shone or, as the local expression goes, an omelette 
from eggs broken in the melee. 
But just as one swallow does not a summer make, so one election, 
held under a new and controversial constitution promulgated by a 
political party intent on remaining in power at all cost, cannot tell 
us much about the future pattern of political culture in a country 
with a history of military coups. Contrary to the official narrative, 
Fiji’s future stability is far from assured. Nevertheless, what is clear 
with the advantage of hindsight is that, wittingly or unwittingly, 
Indo-Fijian voters have for the time being rejected one model of 
democracy for another, preferring the rule of a single strongman 
within an overarching architecture of democracy to the principles of 
representative democracy of the type enshrined in the conventional 
Westminster system which Fiji had inherited at independence in 1970. 
There is change, no doubt, but whether that change is an aberration or 
permanent, superficial or significant, and whether it will necessarily 
serve the long-term interests of the Indo-Fijians, and of Fiji more 
generally, remains an open question.
Any analysis of the 2014 Fijian general elections and of Indo-Fijian 
political behaviour would have to begin with the political environment 
in which these took place. To begin with, 2014 was clearly not 1970, 1990 
or even 2000 (Firth 2012). All the fundamental and familiar markers of 
the Fijian political framework had changed. The  assumptions and 
understandings which had governed Fijian political discourse for nearly 
half a century were gone, gone with the leaders who had engineered 
them, most notably Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, the long-reigning prime 
minister and the pre-eminent Fijian leader of the second half of the 
20th century, who died in 2004 (Scarr 2008). The 2013 Constitution, 
introduced in controversial circumstances without public consultation 
(Kant & Rakuita 2014), had several features that differentiated it from 
61
4. FIJI INDIANS AND THE FIJI gENERAL ELECTIONS OF 2014
its predecessors. Communal voting was abolished, although not the 
practice of voting along ethnic lines. The voting age was reduced 
from 21 to 18, enfranchising an age cohort that had come of age in an 
environment corrupted by coups and endless talk of more coups and 
which yearned for another, steadier, coup-free future. A new electoral 
system, open list proportional, replaced the former alternative vote 
system of the 1997 Constitution which itself had replaced the first past 
the post system adopted at independence. These factors influenced 
the response of Indo-Fijian voters and the outcome of the elections.
The years since independence had seen Indo-Fijian society change 
dramatically (Lal 1992; Taylor 1987). In 1970, Indo-Fijians constituted 
around 50 per cent of the national population. They had overtaken 
the indigenous Fijians during the Second World War, spawning 
deep fears among Fijians and Europeans of ‘Indian domination’. 
That fear, whether real or manufactured for political purposes, 
determined the course of Fiji’s political development as it entered 
the decade of decolonisation in the 1960s (Lal 2006a). Fijian leaders 
refused to countenance any change towards internal self-government 
or independence except on their terms. This included the demand 
for the full retention of the communal system of voting and a tacit 
acknowledgement of the principle of Fijian political paramountcy in 
the governance of the country. In other words, Fijian leaders would 
accept change, including independence, only if they were assured of 
political control (Norton 2012). A contrived political arrangement, 
with communal representation and European overrepresentation at 
its heart, devised by the departing British, delivered that outcome, 
papering over cracks regarding fundamental issues which divided the 
country. 
Fiji enjoyed fragile political stability during its early post-independence 
years, but beneath a placid surface and feel-good atmosphere lurked 
fears and phobias that would wreck its prospects. Fiji was a symbol 
of hope to the modern world, Pope John Paul II had intoned during 
his fleeting visit to Fiji in1985, but that was more comforting rhetoric 
than a reflection of reality.2 Fijian control of the government depended 
on unity among Fijians and enough disunity among Indo-Fijians for 
Fijians to win power. But neither group was homogenous, divided as 
2  The Fiji Visitors Bureau turned the Pope’s words into ‘Fiji: The Way the World Should Be’ 
for tourism promotion.
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they were (and still are) along regional, religious and cultural lines. 
Sakeasi Butadroka’s Fijian Nationalist Party exposed the fissures 
among Fijians by polling 25 per cent of the Fijian communal votes 
in the April 1977 elections, enough to cause the defeat of the ruling 
Alliance Party. The lesson was quickly relearnt that Fijian political 
solidarity was the sine qua non for Fijian control of government. To that 
end, the Alliance made strenuous efforts, reclaiming lost ground with 
a handsome majority in the September elections of that year, helped 
by a massive split among Indo-Fijians about why they were unable 
to form government after narrowly winning the elections in April 
(Lal 2009b). The embers from that distant split glowed for decades 
afterwards, energising factions and divisions that debilitated Indo-
Fijian politics, and still do. 
But the Alliance’s victory had come at a cost not fully appreciated at 
the time. It irrevocably fractured the multiracial foundations of the 
Alliance Party. Its pro-Fijian tilt, evident in the appointments and 
promotions in the civil service, the allocation of tertiary scholarships 
and the reservation of Crown land, among other things, saw many 
founding fathers of the Indian Alliance, including Sir Vijay R Singh 
and James Shankar Singh, both former cabinet ministers, joining the 
National Federation Party (NFP). In 1982, when the NFP (24 seats) 
came close to defeating the Alliance Party (28 seats), the Great Council 
of Chiefs (GCC), meeting at the historic island of Bau and opened for 
the first time by a reigning British Monarch, passed resolutions to 
change the Constitution to entrench permanent political control of 
government (Lal 2009a). When the Alliance was defeated at the 1987 
polls by a nominally multiracial coalition of the Fiji Labour Party and 
the NFP, the month-old government was overthrown in a military coup 
carried out by Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, the third-ranking 
officer of the Fiji Military Forces, tacitly supported by the leaders of the 
defeated Alliance Party and by Fijians more generally. ‘Fijian rights in 
danger’ was the catch cry, and it caught on. The depth of Indo-Fijian 
anger and hurt caused by the coups was not fully apprehended at the 
time. Two decades later, Commodore Bainimarama would tap into it to 
his great electoral advantage.
The goals of the coup were entrenched in the decreed 1990 Constitution, 
allocating a disproportionate number of seats in parliament to 
indigenous Fijians, abolishing all multiracial voting in favour of 
communal voting, decreeing a race-based, legally unchallengeable, 
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affirmative action programme, and reserving the offices of prime 
minister, governor-general, commissioner of police and commander of 
the military and heads of important government bodies (such as the 
civil service) to Fijians. The Methodist Church, one of the principal 
instigators of the coup, added fuel to the fire by demanding a strict 
observance of the Sabbath, known popularly as Sunday Ban. For that 
agenda of religious zealotry, it would pay an incalculable price two 
decades later. And the Taukei Movement, which had morphed into 
existence from a diverse group of Fijian nationalists soon after the 
1987 elections, demanded the complete fulfilment of the ‘aims of the 
coup’. Violence was threatened and begun in some places and leases 
to Indo-Fijian tenants were not renewed. Race relations in Fiji were 
strained to breaking point in the post-coup years. 
The Indo-Fijian reaction to all this was to try to emigrate. Emigration 
had been taking place in small numbers since the 1970s, mostly to 
North America and the United Kingdom, but after the coup that 
trickle turned into a torrent. In two decades, over 120,000 Indo-
Fijians, mostly well-educated professionals, emigrated, depriving 
the country of much needed skill and talent (Chetty & Prasad 1993). 
Many departed deeply embittered and their sense of unjust treatment 
and rejection continued unabated for decades afterwards. Most never 
forgave Rabuka for the coups, despite his repeated pleas for forgiveness 
and his convincing claim that he had acted at the behest of others 
(Sharpham 2000). Revenge and retribution loomed large in their minds, 
however vocally denied. The shoe, as the saying goes, was finally on 
the other foot or, to use a colloquialism, Fijians were now tasting their 
own medicine. So when Commodore Frank Bainimarama deposed 
the Qarase government in 2006, many in the Fijian diaspora openly 
supported him, as they still do, deriving perverse satisfaction at the 
treatment of the Fijian nationalists by the Fijian military, an eventuality 
they had never contemplated before. No  one had: a Fijian military 
publicly taking on the Fijian establishment and winning. In 2014 the 
overwhelming majority of Indo-Fijian voters voted for Bainimarama’s 
party.3 His well-publicised visits to Sydney and Auckland to thank his 
supporters and benefactors, mostly Indo-Fijians, was proof enough of 
that. Bainimarama’s words at the United Nations General Assembly in 
3  The 2013 Constitution allowed Fiji nationals living overseas to vote if they were properly 
registered, whereas before, voters had to be resident in Fiji for two years before the elections, the 
residency requirement exempted for those on officially authorised absence overseas.
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September 2013 were music to their ears: the coup-inspired emigration 
of Fiji citizens was ‘one of the most shameful episodes of our history’, 
he said, ‘and I determined that this must never, never happen again. 
We must never allow a fellow citizen to be a second-class citizen, to be 
less than the equal of his neighbour’. No Fijian leader had ever spoken 
such words of remorse and regret in this way before an international 
audience.
The massive demographic transformation in Fiji was accompanied by 
profound changes in the life of the Indo-Fijian community post-1987. 
None was more significant than the changes in the sugar industry, once 
the lifeblood of the economy but now in visible decline (Lal 2009b). 
One cause of this was the non-renewal of 30-year-old leases expiring 
under the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act. Leases were not 
renewed for many reasons. Among them was the genuine desire of 
some landowners to join the industry as cultivators themselves, 
attracted by the possibility of making a decent living they saw, or 
thought they saw, Indo-Fijian tenants making. Closer acquaintance 
would reveal the appearance of prosperity to be deeply deceptive. 
Many Indo-Fijians were actually keen to give up farming altogether 
for a more regular cash income just when Fijians wanted to come in. 
But political motivation was not far behind. Under Marika Qarikau, 
the fiercely, almost irrationally, nationalist head of the Native Land 
Trust Board, an implicit condition for the renewal of leases was Indo-
Fijian acceptance of Fijian political supremacy. Land was power, Fijian 
power, and he wanted to extract the maximum concession from its 
users in a simple quid pro quo. 
Non-renewal led to an exodus of displaced tenants from the sugar cane 
belts of Fiji, especially northern Vanua Levu, on an unprecedented 
scale. Squatter settlements mushroomed around south-eastern 
Viti Levu, clogging the Suva–Nausori corridor. Life in these settlements 
was plainly squalid: there was no running water, electricity, sewerage 
facilities, employment or educational opportunities. But the evictees 
had nowhere else to go and no one would have them. In the Cunningham 
squatter settlement in Suva, the Fijian landlord demanded money for 
the conduct of religious functions by his Indo-Fijian tenants. Refusal 
to pay, it was clearly understood, would mean immediate removal. 
To these people living at the edge of poverty and destitution on the 
sufferance of others, with little hope or optimism, talk of democracy 
and good governance and the disclosure of the Auditor General’s 
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report, withheld since 2006, was just that: talk, academic talk. They 
had heard of such things before, to no avail. What they wanted was 
relief and respite from misery. 
Here the Bainimarama regime had the upper hand, freely dispensing 
goods and services from the public purse. Most importantly, the 
regime promised squatters on state land 99-year leases, a dream come 
true for hundreds who had never imagined a place of their own, and 
their gratitude to Bainimarama was unbounded. The government also 
addressed, through active military patrols, the perennial problem 
of violent burglary in urban and peri-urban areas. On this frontier 
of lawlessness and violence, the voters knew that only Commodore 
Bainimarama could deliver. Often, the protocols of natural justice 
were blatantly breached. But the savage beatings of escaped prisoners 
beamed around the world to great consternation over the abuse of 
human rights in Fiji meant little to the squatters, who were often 
themselves targets of violent crime. They saw Bainimarama as the 
upholder of law and order, a leader who was finally on their side. 
The impression created was of a government at last caring for a group 
that had long lived literally and metaphorically on the unlovely 
fringes of society. They therefore rallied behind FijiFirst, as indeed 
did those who, following the decline of the rural sector, were making 
a meagre living in urban and peri-urban areas as casual labourers, 
domestic helpers, mechanics, drivers, or carpenters. Rural decline 
increased over some time, and will continue to swell the numbers 
of the desperate urban poor.
Bainimarama’s rhetoric justifying the coup also attracted many 
Indo-Fijians to his side. His was not a coup, he said repeatedly, 
if unconvincingly, in the face of undeniable evidence, it was a ‘clean-
up campaign’. He wanted to cleanse the country of corruption. 
His call resonated with ordinary citizens, who knew in their bones 
that greasing the palm had become an endemic feature of life in the 
country, and that things were getting worse by the day, not better. 
Many Indo-Fijians therefore gave him the benefit of the doubt, and 
their early support bought the military regime valuable time to 
consolidate itself. By the time people saw that there was more to the 
coup than what the Commodore had claimed—that corruption and 
mismanagement in various guises were alive and well, that what was 
alleged was never actually proven in a court of law (no big fish were 
ever caught)—it was too late. 
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Over time, Bainimarama, with the help of adroit image makers, 
including the American public relations company Qorvis, specialists 
in refurbishing the image of dictators and tyrants around the world, 
was portrayed as a selfless soldier embarking on a path to remake 
Fiji into a modern, vibrant, non-racial society, with Singapore as 
a model in mind. He was steadily transformed in the public eye 
from a tongue-tied, temperamentally volatile, short-fused military 
strongman into a man of the people, an appealing leader, modest and 
engaging, photographed sitting cross-legged on a mat with cheering 
uniformed school children, sharing a cup of tea with rural Indo-
Fijian housewives, inspecting government projects in shorts and 
floral bula shirt. No leader had done that before. His ‘visit diplomacy’ 
to previously neglected areas in remote regions was good theatre: 
on horseback, riding through stony rivers and rough terrain, with 
admirers in tow. Would a ‘dictator’ ever do that, people asked? He was 
anti-politics, he said, and blamed ‘old’ politicians for all the ills of Fiji’s 
past, overlooking the inconvenient fact that several ‘old’ politicians 
who had played key roles in previous coups (such as foreign minister 
Inoke Kubuabola) were serving in his own cabinet. And not altogether 
subtly, Bainimarama made it clear that it was he, and he alone, who 
stood between chaos and stability. There would be no coup as long as 
he was in charge, he told voters. People believed him. They had no 
reason not to. He was, after all, a former military commander still in 
touch with his former troops, his eyes and ears still firmly watching 
and listening to them.
Of all the leaders standing in the elections, Bainimarama was the only 
one who had the unquestioned loyalty of the military, whose leaders 
had said often enough that they would prefer him to continue. It was 
understood, though it did not need to be said, that the military would 
move in ‘to protect the Constitution’ if Bainimarama was dislodged. 
Some political parties had questioned the immunity provisions of the 
2013 Constitution, which spawned fear and anger among the rank 
and file of the military. Bainimarama was on their side. The military 
needed him as much as he needed them. Mutual self-interest was set 
in concrete. No one wanted another coup. The attraction of stability 
and security to a people long at the receiving end of previous coups 
counted for a lot. People reposed their faith in the coup leader. He was 
a strong man of action. As he often said, time for talk was over, time for 
action was now. He had stood up to the GCC and the Methodist Church 
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and hobbled them unceremoniously. He had stood up for Fiji against 
international opposition to his regime. Finer points about democratic 
principles and implications of the government’s policies in the long 
term, and the inherent dangers of relying on the whims of one man to 
govern, did not register with the voters. It was often said that nothing 
good had happened in Fiji until Bainimarama had come on the scene, 
and that Fiji would revert to its failed past without him at the helm. 
It was a familiar tactic of military dictators and authoritarian leaders 
around the world, who portray themselves as the very embodiment of 
the national spirit, indispensable to the destiny of the nation. Rabuka 
had done that in 1987 and Bainimarama was doing it now.
This narrative was given unfettered play in the local media, operating 
under severe restrictions imposed by the Media Industry Development 
Decree (29/2010). The  Fiji Sun newspaper became an unabashed 
cheerleader for the regime, with screaming front-page headlines 
praising the government for everything it did or purported to do, 
while belittling the motivations and modus operandi of its opponents. 
Fiji had not seen such grovelling journalism before nor such blatantly 
biased reporting. Unsurprisingly, Commodore Bainimarama was the 
newspaper’s choice for the ‘Person of the Year’. Radio stations, both 
commercial and state-owned, and the FBC television station, were 
similarly pro-regime. The national broadcaster was run by the younger 
brother of the regime’s attorney general. A prominent Indo-Fijian radio 
announcer, a household name among Indo-Fijians, pretended neutrality 
in her questioning of candidates who appeared on her show, but then 
on the eve of the elections suddenly resigned to stand for Bainimarama’s 
party. The chief executive officer of the Media Industry Development 
Authority similarly professed impartiality but (unsuccessfully) stood 
for FijiFirst.4 It was disturbing to see such boundaries crossed with such 
impunity and in full public view. Decency demanded some distance, but 
none was forthcoming. Now anything was possible, any transgression 
forgiven, if you were with FijiFirst.5 
4 In early 2016, Matai Akauola, chief executive officer of the Media Industry Development 
Authority, entered parliament under the d’Hondt system of voting when a seat became vacant 
on the government benches.
5  By contrast, students who campaigned for rival political parties were threatened with the 
cancellation of their scholarships, even as the regime encouraged the participation in politics 
of young people.
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In the upshot, the people heard only what the military regime wanted 
them to hear while neutral or contrary voices were noticeably absent 
from the public domain. The Media Authority, for its part, mouthed 
platitudes about fairness and responsibility and accuracy and balance 
in reporting, but it was in truth itself nothing more than a coercive 
and compliant instrument of and for the regime.6 Critics took to social 
media, but ordinary folk in the countryside without access to the 
Internet were innocent of the contrary views and voices floating in 
the cyber traffic.7 In the end, the regime’s manipulation of the media 
was as unprecedented as it was complete; it had learned well from the 
example of authoritarian regimes around the world that consolidation 
and unhindered and unaccountable exercise of power required a pliant 
media. And it had all the power in its hands to bend the media to its 
knees (by giving Fiji TV a six-month license, for example, or imposing 
huge fines for breaches of the Media Decree, and by restricting foreign 
ownership of the local media).
Several aspects of the 2013 Constitution helped to attract Indo-
Fijian voters to Bainimarama’s FijiFirst Party. One was the abolition 
of communal voting that had been a defining feature of all Fiji 
constitutions from the early 20th century (Ali 2007). ‘One person, 
one vote, one value’ was the new mantra. In truth, all votes were not 
equal under the open list proportional system, as the results showed, 
but what the regime said went. A common roll had been the catch 
cry of the Indo-Fijian community since 1929, when they first got the 
franchise, and it had been the signature platform of the NFP in the 
decolonising decade of the 1960s (Lal 1997). FijiFirst told Indo-Fijian 
voters it was doing nothing more than meeting a demand the leaders 
of the Indo-Fijians had been making for generations and therefore 
deserved its votes, not its condemnation. To see former staunch NFP 
members such as Praveen Bala (now the minister for housing and local 
government) in the FijiFirst line-up muddied the waters. Atul Patel, 
the eldest son of the founding father of the NFP, AD Patel, endorsed 
this common roll platform of FijiFirst and Faiyaz Koya, the elder son 
6  Petitions asking for the investigation of biased reporting from pro-regime sources and their 
refusal to publish views critical of the regime were routinely ignored. For instances, see blog site 
‘Wadan Narsey on Fiji – for fairness and freedom’.
7  The most trenchant critiques of the practices and policies of the Bainimarama Government 
appeared on Coupfourpointfive and on Wadan Narsey’s ‘Fiji – for fairness and freedom’. 
‘Fijileaks’ made important revelations. On the pro-regime side were ‘Grubsheet’ and to a lesser 
extent Cros Walsh’s blog site ‘Fiji: The Way it Was, Is and Can Be’.
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of another NFP founder and opposition leader, Siddiq Koya, stood as 
a candidate for FijiFirst and is now the minister for trade and tourism 
(after a few short days as attorney general).8 Their actual and virtual 
presence behind Bainimarama swayed many voters, who were asking 
why the NFP was opposing a man who was giving them what the party 
had been asking for all along: political equality, equal citizenship and 
a common roll. 
On the surface, the question was compelling: why, indeed? The 
truth was that Bainimarama’s brand of strongman, military-backed 
democracy was not what the NFP had been fighting for. Their quest 
all along had been for genuine representative democracy, with, right 
at the heart of it, a robust parliament of men and women elected in 
their own right rather than riding the coat-tails of their leader. Their 
platform was for a parliament that would be the ultimate guardian 
of the country’s freely adopted, rather than unilaterally imposed, 
Constitution; not for an unelected, ethnically lopsided military as the 
protector of multiracialism and as the arbiter of the national interest. 
NFP had stood all along for a democracy where power flowed from 
the ballot box, not from the barrel of a gun. That FijiFirst invoked 
the name of the NFP in support of its campaign platform was as 
incomprehensible as it was ironic.
Another feature of the 2013 Constitution that had a bearing on the 
outcome of the 2014 elections was the lowering of the voting age from 
21 to 18. This was recommended by the Reeves Commission in 1996 
(Reeves, Vakatora & Lal 1996) but was rejected by a subcommittee 
of the Parliamentary Select Committee, chaired by none other than 
Inoke Kubuabola, on the grounds that in Fijian culture 18-year-olds 
were considered children, not adults, to be seen rather than heard.9 
In 2014, a third of voters were below the age of 30. They had come of 
age during an era of coups in Fiji. They had very little knowledge or 
understanding of the country’s past and, more to the point, no interest 
in it. History was rarely taught in schools, and what little was taught 
was sanitised, brushed clean of the mud and muck of the past, ignoring 
the unarguable fact that Fiji had a fractured past with little common, 
unifying narrative. The new generation was obsessively focused 
8  Though his younger brother, Faizal Koya, stood for the NFP, saying ‘I was born in NFP and 
I will die in NFP’.
9  This I base on conversation with a member of the committee.
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on the Internet-dependent present. Not the book, but Facebook, 
was their source of information and knowledge and enlightenment. 
They  believed Bainimarama when he blamed Fiji’s ill-fated past on 
corrupt politicians; they believed him rather than the obvious truth 
that it was the military, aided and abetted by some ‘old’ politicians, 
which was the real cause of Fiji’s problems. They liked his empowering 
rhetoric of non-racialism and common citizenship, his standing up for 
Fiji against Australia and New Zealand (though they all secretly hope 
to migrate there one day and not to Fiji’s new-found friends in Iran 
and North Korea). And reflecting an international trend, a rich vein of 
anti-political sentiment ran among the youth of Fiji, to Bainimarama’s 
clear benefit. This is not to say that all young people voted for FijiFirst, 
but a substantial number did, out of a curious combination of apathy, 
indifference, naiveté, and misguided enthusiasm.
The new open list proportional system worked to Bainimarama’s great 
benefit. In the new system, the 50 seats in the House of Representatives 
had to be contested from a single national constituency, dispensing 
with the constituency boundaries of the past. Voters had to vote for a 
single candidate (with no indication of their name or party affiliation), 
with the vote for the individual candidate being automatically 
counted for his or her party. Seats in parliament would be allocated 
in proportion to the votes a party won. All parties and independent 
candidates would have to meet the 5 per cent threshold for victory. 
Theoretically, the open list system gives the voters, not the party, the 
power to choose whom they vote for, but FijiFirst encouraged voters 
to cast their vote for one person, party leader Frank Bainimarama. 
And that is precisely what happened. Bainimarama got 202,459 votes, 
nearly 70 per cent of the votes cast for FijiFirst and 40.8 per cent of 
all the votes cast. The system delivered handsomely for FijiFirst, but 
whether it augurs well for representative parliamentary democracy is 
another matter. What happens when Bainimarama is no longer around? 
Is Fiji fated to be governed from now on by strong men (and perhaps 
women too) backed by the military within an overarching illusion of 
democratic governance? In 2009, I wrote: ‘A militarized democracy 
seems in the offing in Fiji’ (Lal 2009a, p. 444). Sadly, that prospect is 
looking more and more likely. 
Support for Bainimarama and his party seems to have been fairly 
widespread across the Indo-Fijian community. Major Indo-Fijian 
businessmen were in his camp, with financial donations and 
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public expressions of support. Among the most prominent of them 
were CJ Patel, the Tappoos, the Damodars and Gokals, the Dewan 
Maharajs and owners of big transport and construction companies. 
Their  commitment to Fiji is questionable, as many have substantial 
assets outside the country and often their families too, with permanent 
residency papers in order. It is a truism that businessmen everywhere 
have a cosy relationship with those in power, but the Fiji business 
community seems to be a particularly myopic lot. There is no sense of 
loyalty or allegiance to any cause or ideology beyond turning a profit 
for themselves. They will readily embrace the next person in power, 
whatever their political ideology, as long as their coffers are full. 
Less easy to explain is the support given by Fiji’s educational and 
moral leaders. The vice chancellor of the University of the South 
Pacific (USP), Rajesh Chandra, an academic bureaucrat par excellence, 
was a strong supporter of the coup and its leader from the beginning. 
His staff took his cue, fearful of reprisals. USP’s most vocal anti-regime 
academic, Wadan Narsey, was forced to resign from the university, 
with the vice chancellor acceding to the military regime’s demand. 
Chandra knew which side of the bread was buttered, as the expression 
goes in Fiji, but he was also embittered by the denial, unfair as he 
saw it, of the top job at the regional university some years back 
because of Fiji’s refusal to support his nomination. This was his 
way of exacting revenge. The  vice chancellor of the Fiji National 
University (FNU), Ganesh Chand, a former Labour politician, was also 
in the Bainimarama corner, both by choice as well as by necessity. 
The FNU is a government-funded institution, and not all members 
of staff were always supportive of him for a variety of reasons, both 
personal as well as political. Despite his services to the regime, Chand 
was removed from his position in December 2014. For the historical 
record, not all Indo-Fijian academics in Fiji or in the Fijian expatriate 
community were with the regime. There were many, myself included, 
who opposed the coup through their writings and interventions in 
the media, but media censorship in Fiji and other forms of overt and 
covert harassment ensured that contrary narratives did not reach 
the mainstream public. We mostly talked in the cyberspace through 
emails and blog sites and Facebook accounts.
From abroad, retired academics in the twilight of their careers and 
other former Fiji professionals returned to lend support and write 
in praise of the regime and its leader, ostensibly convinced by the 
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regime’s rhetoric of creating a new Fiji. Most had left Fiji disillusioned 
after previous coups, and were returning now to settle old scores and 
to set things right, often for lucrative fees or appointments and the 
small, transient privileges of a fading limelight. Some were no doubt 
diligent, hoping to use the ‘opportunity’ of the coup to restructure 
Fiji’s political culture towards greater non-racialism and accountable 
and effective governance. The National Council for Building a Better 
Fiji became the vehicle for their effort on the clear premise that all 
changes made would be within the overarching framework of the 
1997 Constitution. Bainimarama gave that undertaking, but then 
proceeded to abrogate the Constitution in April 2009 after the council 
had completed its work and given the coup leader his much-heralded 
roadmap back to parliamentary democracy. He also discarded the 
process of political dialogue he had been urged to undertake by the 
Commonwealth, among others. He reneged on his promise to the 
Pacific Islands Forum to hold elections in 2009. Promises were made 
only to be broken at will. The Commodore tactically outmanoeuvred 
everyone; in the end, he had the last laugh.
It was often said before and during the campaign that the 2006 coup 
was a Muslim coup. This was supposedly due to the support for it, 
vocal or tacit, by many prominent Muslims, such as Aiyaz Sayed-
Khaiyum, Shaista Shameem, former head of the Fiji Human Rights 
Commission, and her younger sister and former high court judge 
Nazhat Shameem, now in Geneva as Fiji’s ambassador to the United 
Nations after a short stint as a private legal practitioner in Fiji and 
destined, many believe, to even higher offices in Fiji.10 The visible 
presence of Muslims in statutory organisations and government bodies 
reinforced that perception. But Muslims did not instigate the coup;11 
they were as divided over the event as other communities, and there 
are opportunists among Muslims as there are in other groups. What is 
beyond doubt, though, is that over time, as the picture of the political 
landscape became clearer, and realisation dawned that Bainimarama 
would be around for a long time, Muslim support firmed up for 
10  Michael Green (2013, p. 186) writes about Nazhat Shameem’s deep disappointment with 
the Qarase government for not nominating her for an international judicial post, urging the 
New Zealand government to sponsor her instead. Only Shameem will ever know if her sense of 
disappointment with the Qarase government was sufficient for her to adopt a ‘softer’ approach to 
the coup and all that followed.
11  Among the strongest opponents of the coup were Shamima Ali of the Women’s Crisis Centre, 
and Imrana Jalal, a human rights lawyer, both Muslims.
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FijiFirst. They voted in very large numbers for the party. Without 
that, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, widely distrusted among Indo-Fijians 
and among most Fijians for his controlling ways, confrontational 
approach and palpable love of power, and whose large hand was seen 
in the dismantling of many Fijian institutions, would not have got the 
votes he did (13,753 or 2.8 per cent of the votes cast), more than the 
total votes cast for the Fiji Labour Party.
But Muslims were not the only ones who supported the military regime. 
It was the same in other communities as the reality of Bainimarama’s 
determination to remain at the helm sank in. The leaders of Arya 
Samaj were among its early supporters, with one of them, former 
high school teacher Kamlesh Arya, appointed high commissioner to 
Australia without any discernible qualification for that important 
position. The  leaders of the largest Fijian Hindu organisation, the 
Sanatan Dharma, were not far behind; its then national president 
Dewan Maharaj, the owner of Quality Print, was among the early 
prominent backers of the regime. One of the schools in Nausori 
run by that organisation invited Bainimarama for a function and 
the welcoming ceremony included washing his feet while he sat on 
a chair smiling enigmatically, whether in bemused amazement or in 
genuine puzzlement at this gesture it is difficult to say. The abasing 
symbolism was arresting as an indicator of desperation. The ceremony 
is normally performed at serious religious or ritually significant 
occasions (washing the feet of deities, for instance, or formally 
welcoming a bridegroom at a wedding by the bride’s side), not for 
ordinary mortals, let alone politicians. Self-interest obviously played a 
part as organisations vied for government handouts. There were many 
Hindus who made a show of supporting Bainimarama to prevent him 
from falling completely into ‘the Muslim camp’. But there were other 
factors as well. Bainimarama’s firm rejection of the Methodist Church 
demand (and  the Social Democratic Liberal Party’s (SODELPA) also) 
that Fiji become a Christian state was widely welcomed by Hindus and 
Muslims. Many had witnessed at first hand the ugly religious bigotry 
of the late 1980s—the Sunday Ban and the ransacking, looting and 
burning of Hindu and Muslim places of worship—and they did not 
want those episodes ever to be repeated. Bainimarama’s confrontational 
attitude towards the Methodist Church, preventing it from holding its 
annual conferences and insisting that the church dissociate itself from 
party politics, was welcome among most Indo-Fijians. 
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Alternative political parties could not match what FijiFirst had to 
offer the Indo-Fijian voters. Let us take SODELPA. This was the old 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) under a new name, fulfilling 
the requirement that all political parties have English names.12 SDL 
held bad memories for most Indo-Fijians. Its pro-Fijian policies under 
the Qarase government (the ‘Fijian Blueprint’, scholarship programs 
for indigenous Fijians, subsidies to Fijian-only schools, among others) 
had deeply disenchanted many. Racist utterances by some of its 
parliamentarians (Asenaca Caucau, for instance, who likened Indo-
Fijians to noxious weeds and went un-reprimanded) were not forgotten 
or forgiven. Insult and humiliation are hardly ever forgotten among 
Indo-Fijians; hurtful memories last a long time. The renamed party 
began with a progressive agenda, but soon started espousing what 
can broadly be described as a pro-Fijian platform. Many Fijians were 
understandably angry with the Bainimarama regime for its dismissive 
policies towards Fijian institutions and protocols, such as abolishing 
the GCC, using ‘Fijian’ as the name for all Fijian citizens irrespective of 
ethnicity, appointing the chairmen of provincial councils, altering the 
formula of land rent distribution, and dismantling many race-based 
affirmative action programs. 
Hoping to tap into what appeared to be a swelling pool of indigenous 
Fijian resentment and anger about the regime’s policies, SODELPA 
soon jettisoned any pretence of being a multiracial party, becoming, 
instead, the vehicle for indigenous Fijian views and concerns. The GCC 
would be brought back, the party said, Christianity could become the 
state religion, and the name Fijian would be reserved for indigenous 
Fijians only. In short, SODELPA once again became the champion for 
the cause of Fijian paramountcy, though of a more subdued variety 
than that demanded by the supporters of the 1987 coup. It had little 
to say to the non-indigenous citizens of Fiji. It fielded only three 
Indo-Fijian candidates out of 50, among them a former SDL minister, 
George Shiu Raj, and one of the founders of the People’s Democratic 
Party, Nirmal Singh. They all polled miserably. SODELPA’s Fijian reach 
was strong but its urban base was fractured. The party must adopt a 
broader, more non-ethnic platform if it is become a serious contender 
for power in Fiji.
12  Under the Political Parties (Registration, Conduct, Funding and Disclosures) Decree 4/2013. 
The Decree also required all parties to register or re-register with 5,000 signatures from registered 
voters, with specified numbers from each of the country’s four administrative divisions.
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Indo-Fijian voters had three other parties to choose from: the Fiji 
Labour Party (FLP), People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the National 
Federation Party (NFP). None of them got the traction they hoped for. 
FLP’s fate was particularly tragic, winning only 11,670 (2.4 per cent) 
of the votes cast and for the first time in its history without a seat 
in parliament. Formed in 1985, the party had won government in 
1987 in coalition with the NFP, only to be overthrown in a military 
coup after a month in office. Its founding leader, Dr Timoci Bavadra, 
died in 1989, and was succeeded by the long-time trade unionist 
Mahendra Chaudhry, secretary of the Fiji Public Service Association, 
after a short stint at the helm by Bavadra’s widow, Adi Kuini Bavadra. 
Adept and politically astute, Chaudhry was also in a hurry to wrest the 
leadership of the Indo-Fijian community from the NFP, determined, 
in his own words, to ‘finish NFP off’ (Lal 2009a). To that end, 
throughout the 1990s he deployed his considerable political capital, 
emerging victorious in the 1999 general elections and becoming the 
country’s first Indo-Fijian prime minister. But his government, too, 
was overthrown in a quasi-coup after a year in office. The policies 
of his successor, Laisenia Qarase, kept Chaudhry out of government 
despite the power-sharing provisions of the 1997 Constitution by 
offering Labour miniscule ministries of no significance.13 By the time 
Qarase honoured the power-sharing formula after the 2006 elections, 
Chaudhry’s cup of disillusionment was full. He concentrated all his 
efforts on derailing the Qarase government, in which several of his 
own senior party members were ministers, though he himself had 
opted to stay out of the Cabinet (Green 2013). In that endeavour, he 
found an unlikely ally in the commander of the Fiji military forces, 
Commodore Frank Bainimarama, who had his own private grievance 
against the government besides genuine anger at proposed bills, 
in particular the Promotion of Reconciliation, Truth and Unity Bill, 
which could have granted amnesty to rebel soldiers involved in the 
mutiny in the military in November 2007, in which several loyalist 
soldiers had died. 
Chaudhry did not use his considerable political weight to oppose 
the impending coup. As the late Michael Green, New Zealand’s high 
commissioner to Fiji, put it, ‘Chaudhry would not stand in the way 
13  The 1997 Constitution provided that any political party with more than 5 per cent of 
seats in the House of Representatives was entitled to be invited into cabinet in proportion to its 
numbers.
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of a coup, let alone use his considerable influence to prevent one’ 
(Green 2013, p. 168). Instead, he joined the military cabinet in early 
2007. This was significant. Widely recognised as the leader of the Indo-
Fijian community, his joining the regime cabinet brought considerable 
Indo-Fijian support to Bainimarama, bought him valuable time and 
helped him consolidate his position. A year and a half later, in August 
2008, Chaudhry was forced out of the Bainimarama cabinet—left 
voluntarily, according to Chaudhry—and became a relentlessly vocal 
critic of the regime. But the regime had the last laugh. On the eve of the 
elections, Chaudhry was convicted of breaching the country’s Foreign 
Exchange Act for failure to declare ownership of foreign currency 
without the express permission of the Reserve Bank. As a result of the 
conviction, he was barred from contesting the elections. Without him, 
the Labour Party was nothing. Its makeshift leader, former academic 
Rohit Kishore, was an unimpressive novice. The party, which had 
once won the hearts and minds of the Indo-Fijian community and 
formed the government of the country, had lost its peoples’ affection 
and support. The reputation of its leader was now tarnished beyond 
repair. Indo-Fijians understandably saw no reason to vote for it.
The People’s Democratic Party was formed by a group that had broken 
away from Chaudhry’s Labour Party over disagreement about his 
leadership style. It included leading trade unionists. The PDP was 
genuinely multiracial and had members with fine talent but with little 
political experience beyond trade union circles. It lacked rural reach 
and political credibility too, in the eyes of many. The Fiji Trade Union 
Congress (FTUC) maintained a low profile in the early days of the 
coup, and general secretary Felix Anthony accepted his appointment 
to statutory boards by the military regime. For him to turn around 
now and condemn the regime sounded incongruous. Nonetheless, 
the party had socially progressive policies on law and justice and on 
protecting rights and freedoms, and about protecting workers’ rights 
and media freedom, among many other policies. Such policies were 
in truth unexceptionable but they failed to impress the Indo-Fijian 
electorate attuned to other offers and other voices. PDP’s policies 
on indigenous issues were sensitive and sensible, but they directly 
contradicted those of FijiFirst. The PDP declared in its manifesto that it 
‘respects the central place of iTaukei within Fiji’s wider multicultural 
society and will pursue policies and programs consistent with the UN 
Indigenous Tribal and Peoples Convention’. FijiFirst’s policy, which 
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many Indo-Fijians found more appealing, placed everyone on an equal 
footing, not giving any group prior rights and privileges. On the GCC, 
the PDP recognised ‘the important role of the GCC as an institution 
and the role of chiefs in modern Fiji’. Therefore, it would ‘reinstate the 
GCC and will assist it to promote indigenous customs and traditions 
and to improve the economic well-being of indigenous people’, while 
being guided by its advice ‘on all matters relating to the protection of 
indigenous rights and interests’. 
More Indo-Fijians were listening to FijiFirst on indigenous rights, 
which emphasised ‘mainstreaming’ indigenous practices. Aiyaz 
Sayed-Khaiyum had written about a ‘sunset clause’ on separate 
traditional institutions in his master’s thesis at the University of Hong 
Kong, under the supervision of Professor Yash Ghai (who would later 
chair the ill-fated Fiji Constitution Commission, whose report was 
unceremoniously discarded by the Bainimarama regime). And most 
Indo-Fijians saw the GCC as a part of the problem, not part of the 
solution, remembering its support for previous coups and its being 
out of touch with the realities of a modern Fiji in a rapidly globalising 
world. The fact that the PDP was new on the scene with no track 
record did not help its cause. It won 15,864 (3.2 per cent) of the 
votes cast. Soon after the elections, its leader Felix Anthony rejoined 
FTUC, which under the present dispensation would prevent him from 
participating in electoral politics. Without his active participation at 
the helm, the party’s future looks uncertain. It is likely to wither on 
the vine of public apathy and indifference.
Finally, there was the National Federation Party, which won 27,066 
(5.5 per cent) of the votes and three seats in parliament, ending an 
absence of over a decade. The NFP is Fiji’s oldest political party, founded 
in 1964, based in the Indo-Fijian community but with a non-racial 
platform, and in the vanguard of the movement for independence on 
the basis of a common roll. But it was communal representation which 
won the day and which was entrenched in the 1970 Constitution. 
Communal politics took root and racial divisions hardened to the 
point that a government elected with Indo-Fijian support was deposed 
in a military coup. The decreed 1990 Constitution entrenched racial 
apartheid. Nonetheless, the NFP leaders, principally Jai Ram Reddy, 
worked tirelessly with the Fijian leaders, principally the coup maker 
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Sitiveni Rabuka, to produce a moderate, multiracial 1997 Constitution. 
It was a massive achievement in the most unlikely of circumstances, 
but its significance was not appreciated by Indo-Fijians. 
The politics of moderation always loses in an atmosphere of polarised 
racial politics, and Fijian politics in the 1990s was deeply polarised. 
Both Rabuka and Reddy fell in the 1999 general elections. The NFP 
did not win a single seat then, or in the 2001 and 2006 elections. 
There was talk of closing shop, but the party persisted. It gained 
moderate momentum on the eve of the 2014 elections. It mattered that 
the party was led by a team untainted by a political past. Its leader 
was the academic economist Biman Prasad from USP, and its president 
was a young Fijian lawyer, Tupou Draunidalo. Her elevation to the 
presidency fulfilled the party’s founding non-racial vision. In the 
party’s line-up were several Fijian women and men with successful 
professional careers of their own. A decade or so ago, this would 
have been unthinkable, and likened to treachery. But it was to the 
party’s credit that it had broadened its multiracial base to this extent. 
Its  policies were principled, moderate and progressive, appealing 
more to the electorate’s intellect than to its heart. Its credentials as a 
party of principle were credible. Like all other parties, the NFP had 
been in the wilderness for the previous eight years, and the military 
regime had done all it could to hobble its prospects. The constraints 
were considerable. So too were its achievements: three parliamentary 
seats, won in the most difficult of circumstances. The NFP has a future 
if it maintains its multiethnic character and outlook and continues to 
infuse fresh blood into the party.
Indo-Fijian support for FijiFirst was due not only to the weaknesses 
and constraints of other parties; it was also due to its own strengths 
and appeal. From 2007 onwards, despite the downturn in the economy, 
Bainimarama spared little effort to win popular support, including 
among Indo-Fijian voters, and the voting figures show he managed 
to do so to a large degree. He exploited the military regime’s power of 
incumbency to the maximum, pointing to its record of achievements 
and making specific promises to the electorate, especially in the lower 
socioeconomic strata. Such promises had considerable attraction: an 
electricity subsidy for low-income families, water free of charge to 
those earning less than FJD$30,000 a year, price control and removal 
of value-added tax on basic food items and pharmaceutical items, 
free milk to all first-year primary school children, streamlining the 
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Tertiary Education Loan Scheme, providing free education to primary, 
secondary and pre-school students, and giving 99-year residential 
leases to squatters on state land were only some of the many promises 
the regime made, promises it was emphasised were backed by a record 
of achievements. 
No other party could give such concrete promises and no other party 
would have been likely to be believed even if it did. While other parties 
struggled to get their messages through to the electorate, FijiFirst used 
the full extent of government machinery and the services of a compliant 
media to campaign. It helped the party’s fortunes that all the district 
commissioners were former military men, along with many heads of 
government departments, some of who declared their intention to 
contest the elections within weeks of resigning their public service 
positions. This made a mockery of Commodore Bainimarama’s promise 
at the time of the coup that no one in his administration would benefit 
politically or stand for elections. But no one seemed to be overly 
concerned about broken promises. It was all a part of the ‘game’ of 
politics. And in any case, it was said with no sense of irony at all that 
Bainimarama was standing not because he wanted to but because the 
people of Fiji would not have it any other way—and the will of the 
people had to reign supreme, over and above personal preferences. 
That, after all, was the essence of democracy.
After the elections, Indo-Fijians were commonly blamed for their short-
sighted and self-centred choice and their unwillingness to consider 
the long-term implications of their actions. But it is understandable 
that Indo-Fijians, by choice as well as by necessity, voted the way they 
did. Taking a long-term view of democracy and governance is not a 
strong suit for a people struggling to make ends meet and keen to leave 
for other lands at the first opportunity. The best and the brightest of 
the Indo-Fijian community have left, are leaving, or will leave, leaving 
behind those who cannot migrate because they lack the skills or 
resources to do so. To them, the immediate fulfilment of their pressing 
daily needs was what mattered. By this criterion, FijiFirst had a clear 
advantage over its rivals. Democracy based on the will and whims of 
one strongman is dangerous, and Fiji may yet pay a heavy price for 
this; but for many this one strongman also stood for stability against 
chaos. Indo-Fijians knew well that if Bainimarama failed, they would 
be done for. More than anything else, ordinary people wanted peace 
and security, and insurance against future coups. Bainimarama offered 
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to be the buffer, and he was believed. But what happens when the well 
runs dry, or when some other saviour appears on the horizon, who has 
a different agenda, a different vision, perhaps even a nationalistic one? 
Does the military, for all practical purposes an indigenous institution 
itself, really have a multiracial vision? Do the Commodore’s own 
supporters, many of whom were in previous coup camps, have such a 
vision? In 2014, Indo-Fijians made the pragmatic assessment that, for 
the moment, Bainimarama, with the military solidly behind him, was 
their man. Tomorrow, as they say, is another day.
Democracy has had an ill-fated history in Fiji, having to contend 
with military coups as the vehicle for effecting political change in the 
country. Democracy was alive all these years more in its symbolism 
than in its substance, dependent on the goodwill of powerful men 
rather than implanted in the hearts of ordinary citizens or embedded 
in the sinews of its public institutions. It had few true defenders but 
many fair weather friends, who habitually deserted it in its moments 
of greatest need. Democratic values have been steadily eroding in Fiji 
since the 1987 coups and disillusionment with politics and politicians. 
All this made the Indo-Fijian reaction in 2014 understandable, but it 
is also true that Indo-Fijians have planted in the process the seeds of a 
new political order, a new kind of democracy, which is fundamentally 
at odds with the principles of representative democracy. Putting 
it colloquially, placing all your eggs in one basket in an uncertain 
environment is never prudent; nor is it prudent to pin all your hopes 
on one man to be your saviour, however good or great that saviour 
might turn out to be. The rule of law, freely arrived at, is infinitely 
superior to the rule of a group of men, however well intentioned they 
might be. Fiji is going through a massive process of transition from 
one order to another. Inevitably, there will be uncertainty, confusion, 
error, disenchantment and disappointment. The larger question is 
whether, to borrow words from Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are 
Dead, the exit from one place will lead to an entrance somewhere else. 
For the sake of Fiji, one hopes it will be entrance to a better place. 
That remains to be seen, but is something very much to be hoped for. 
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‘Unfree and unfair’?: 




Fiji was a media pariah among Pacific nations, as well as a political 
outcast, for much of the eight years after Voreqe Bainimarama’s 
military coup in December 2006. But while some media credibility 
was restored in the months leading up to the 2014 general elections 
and during the ballot itself, the elephant is still in the room: the 2010 
Media Industry Development Decree (Fijian Government 2010). While 
this Decree remains in force, Fiji can hardly claim to have a truly free 
and fair media.
Just seven months out from the September 17 elections, Fiji was 
ranked 107th out of 179 countries listed in the 2014 World Press 
Freedom Index prepared by the Paris-based global media freedom 
organisation Reporters Without Borders (RSF). That ranking was an 
improvement on the previous year (RSF 2014a), rising 10 places from 
the 2013 ranking. The major reason for this improvement was the 
adoption of the new Constitution on 6 September 2013, criticised as 
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it was in many quarters during that year, and the promise of ‘free and 
fair’ elections by 30 September 2014. The elections gave Fiji’s ranking 
a further boost, rising 14 places to 93rd (RSF 2015).
There was considerable hope among news media and civil society 
groups that the general elections would open the door to a free media 
climate, which had been lacking since the coup. Over the past few 
months there has been a marked improvement in public debate and 
news media have been relatively more robust in terms of published 
political comment and debate, particularly in news columns and in 
letters to the editor.
A major problem previously had been a ‘divided media’ and a void in 
professional leadership by the now-defunct Fiji Media Council, which 
had been ‘accused of failing to handle ethical lapses and controversies 
satisfactorily or fast enough’ (Morris 2014, p. 3). According to Ricardo 
Morris, editor of Repúblika and president of the recently revived 
Fijian Media Association, who spoke at the 20th Anniversary of Pacific 
Journalism Review conference in Auckland about the problems facing 
the media industry some seven weeks after the elections:
[I]t can be argued that such division was one reason [why] it was 
easy for the military government to force the Media Decree in 2010. 
The government justified its actions with reference to some of the 
unscrupulous journalist practices that should rightly be condemned. 
And I should point out here that the Fiji Media Council’s legacy does 
live here in the form of the code of ethics for media workers embedded 
in the Media Decree.
We realised a bit too late that we were all in this together despite our 
personal political views or those of the companies that we worked for. 
United we stand, divided we fall. (Morris 2014, p. 3) 
Barriers to freedom of information
In a joint submission (RSF 2014b) to the United Nations Human 
Rights Council Second Universal Periodic Review, the Auckland-
based Pacific Media Centre (PMC) and Paris-based RSF argued that 
the Constitution, described by the Fiji government as ‘coup proof’, 
still restricted freedom of the press in four particular areas (CCF 2013). 
The first criticism is that too much executive power is placed with 
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the offices of the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General, as they 
control nearly all appointments to the judiciary and independent 
commissions. The Attorney-General has far wider powers than are 
given to holders of the equivalent office in other Commonwealth 
constitutions. The Constitution does not provide the necessary 
structural protections for the judiciary to be seen to be independent. 
Secondly, the Chief Justice and President of the Court of Appeal will 
effectively be political appointments and there is a risk of abuse of 
power. Journalists are worried that the judiciary could be used by 
government officials to their own advantage. Fearing judicial reprisals 
if they criticise the government when covering its activities, many 
journalists have continued to censor themselves.
Thirdly, the Bill of Rights is weakened by ‘severe limitations on many 
rights’. For example, future governments will no longer need to justify 
before an independent court that laws which limit rights are ‘necessary 
in a free and democratic society’ (as in the abrogated 1997 Constitution). 
In what is known as the ‘claw-back clause’, they will simply need to 
show that a limitation is ‘reasonable’ (s.6.5.c). Previously there had 
been a state clampdown on independent journalists, bloggers and 
netizens (Robie 2009; Walsh 2010). This so-called claw-back clause 
makes them vulnerable to selective government pressure in the future. 
Fourthly, there are also few avenues under the Constitution for citizens 
to participate in and ensure ‘good and transparent government’. 
While there has been more vibrant debate in online commentaries and 
letters to the editors in the Fiji national press in recent months in the 
lead-up to the elections, there has nevertheless been a climate of self-
censorship that has prevailed for the past eight years. The Constitution 
does not give clear enough guarantees of freedom of expression that 
cannot later be curbed by an unscrupulous government.
The 2013 Constitution makes provision for the new national 
Parliament of Fiji to pass a law after the elections to allow members 
of the public to exercise their right to access information (s.150). 
This Freedom of Information provision is the same as in the 1997 
Constitution, except there is now no longer any requirement for 
such a law to be passed ‘as soon as practicable’. As well as Freedom 
of Information, the new Constitution provides some safeguards for 
a free press in Fiji while ‘simultaneously allow[ing]’ the curtailment 
of such rights if the government wishes. Chapter 1 proclaims the 
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values of ‘human rights, freedom and the rule of law’, but does 
not specifically declare freedom of the press. However, section 17 
under the Bill of Rights provides for the ‘right to freedom of speech, 
expression, thought, opinion and publication’, including ‘freedom of 
imagination and creativity’. It further specifically states ‘freedom of 
the press, including print, electronic and other media’ as a right. Even 
so, section 17(3) says the law ‘may limit, or authorise the limitation’ 
of these freedoms in the interests of national security, public safety, 
public order, public morality, public health and other circumstances, 
including the curbing of ‘ill will between ethnic or religious groups’. 
Under section 17(4), the right of citizens to be free of ‘hate speech’, 
whether directed against individuals or groups, is endorsed. While a 
preliminary reading of these media freedom rights may suggest conflict 
with some of the draconian provisions of the 2010 Fiji Media Industry 
Development Decree, section 17(3) may in fact be providing a legal 
cloak justifying these elements of the Decree (Fijian Government 2010).
Mixed responses by government on 
issues of media freedom 
In October 2012 the High Court in Suva ruled that the major 
daily newspaper, The Fiji Times, was in contempt of court over 
an article republished in November 2011 from a New Zealand 
national weekly newspaper, the Sunday Star-Times, that questioned 
judicial independence in Fiji. Chief editor Fred Wesley and former 
publisher Brian O’Flaherty had been found guilty but were not 
actually sentenced until February 2013. A High Court judge fined 
the newspaper FJD$300,000 (US$160,000) and ordered it to publish 
an apology within 28 days, fined publisher O’Flaherty FJD$10,000 
(US$5,300) and also sentenced editor Wesley to six months’ 
imprisonment suspended for two years. The penalties were widely 
criticised as being unreasonably harsh and condemned as politically 
inspired, The Fiji Times being unpopular with the Fiji government 
(Loanakadavu 2013).
In June 2013 a prominent Fiji Television sports editor, Satish Narayan, 
was forced to resign after he had complained on camera that the 
daughter of the country’s leader, Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama, 
was playing music too loud at an outdoor event. The high school 
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athletics event was organised by the Fiji Sports Council, whose 
chief executive was Bainimarama’s eldest daughter, Litiana Loabuka. 
The broadcaster was threatened with the loss of its licence if the editor 
did not leave (Field 2013). 
In August 2013, the executive director of the Citizens’ Constitutional 
Forum (CCF) was sentenced to three months imprisonment suspended 
for one year for contempt of court after publishing an article about 
the Fiji judiciary in the organisation’s newsletter. The article outlined 
research by the United Kingdom’s Law Society, which had reported 
that the judiciary in Fiji was not independent. Executive director 
Reverend Akuila Yabaki, who is also the newsletter’s chief editor, 
and the CFF were ordered to pay FJD$20,000 (US$10,700) in fines and 
court costs (PMW8385 2013).
This climate of intimidation over the months leading up to the elections 
hardly encouraged a vigorous and independent media. Even though 
the prosecutions had not come under the umbrella of the Media Decree, 
but rather through the Public Order Decree, the ‘chilling’ impact was 
effectively the same. The medley of decrees and regulations stifle the 
practice of ‘truly robust and critical journalism’, as Morris has argued: 
‘Sometimes you get the impression that everybody with a little power 
to exercise will unreasonably limit journalists in their work. And it’s 
not only locals doing it’ (Morris 2014, p. 4). 
The media blackout: ‘Draconian 
and unenforceable’
A total of 450 journalists and media staff were accredited to cover 
the elections—33 of them working for foreign news groups, arguably 
the largest team ever assembled to cover a Fijian general elections 
(MIDA 2014). Certainly, surprisingly, given limited media commitment 
to international and Pacific news coverage, New Zealand had the 
largest contingent, numbering 15, more than double the number of 
journalists from Australia. The largest group was from the pro-FijiFirst 
Auckland station Radio Tarana (6) and, apart from the New Zealand 
Herald, Radio New Zealand, Television New Zealand, and MediaWorks 
representatives, controversial right-wing Whale Oil blogger Cameron 
Slater was there as a freelance correspondent. The largest of the local 
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media election teams was the state-run Fiji Broadcasting Corporation 
(97  accredited staff), followed by The Fiji Times (80)—double that 
of their rival, the Fiji Sun (40). The University of the South Pacific’s 
journalism school also had 40 student journalists accredited, including 
one on assignment from New Zealand’s Auckland University of 
Technology (AUT). Another AUT student journalist was also a member 
of the Repúblika team’s eight accredited staff. Small international 
teams represented Agence France-Presse, Al Jazeera, Asahi Shimbun, 
Kyodo News, Nikkei, Nippon Hoso Kyokai and others.
The Electoral Decree imposed a two-day media blackout in Fiji just 
ahead of the general elections (Fijian Government 2014). News media 
and journalists faced jail time or fines if they provided any election 
coverage from 7.30am on Monday 15 September until close of polls at 
6pm on Wednesday 17 September. The blackout banned all political 
advertising on radio and television and required all campaign posters to 
be removed. News media were allowed to publish information provided 
by the National Electoral Office only if they submitted their reports 
to the Media Industry Development Authority (MIDA) for ‘vetting’ 
before publication. The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) 
and RSF strongly condemned this ban, with IFJ’s acting Asia-Pacific 
director Jane Worthington describing it as a ‘gross violation of the 
freedom of the media ahead of one of the most pivotal elections in Fiji’s 
history’ (IFJ 2014) and RSF’s Asia-Pacific head Benjamin Ismaïl saying 
the ban was ‘draconian and unenforceable’ (RSF 2014c). The Decree 
also applied to international journalists if their media was accessible 
to the Fijian public. As I wrote at the time on my media transparency 
weblog Café Pacific:
BLACKOUT DAY—day one of the ‘silence window’ in Fiji leading up 
to the close of polling in the general election at 6pm on Wednesday. 
And this is under the draconian threat of a $10,000 fine or five years 
in jail for breaches.
These are the penalties cited in a media briefing distributed to 
journalists covering the elections last week. But a closer reading of 
Part 4 ‘Electoral campaigns and the media’ in the Electoral Decree 
2014 reveals that there are even harsher penalties of up to $50,000 and 
10 years in jail for offenders.
And this could include social media offenders. 
(Robie 2014a).
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In an interview with Radio New Zealand Mediawatch presenter Colin 
Peacock, who has a keen interest in digital media developments, the 
Pacific Media Centre’s Thomas Carnegie was told the penalties were 
‘unduly harsh’ and would restrict political debate just when it was 
needed the most (PMC 2014). Confusion and frustration was evident 
in Suva as the global media contingent tried to get a handle on the 
full implications of the decree for their news operations. Some media 
tested the apparent boundaries.
Pacific Scoop and Radio New Zealand broadcast stories about 
a massive hoarding with an imposing image of FijiFirst leader Voreqe 
Bainimarama, which appeared to be violating the blackout. But when 
journalists challenged this apparent breach, MIDA defended the 
‘buckle up’ billboard as a road safety advertisement and part of 
ongoing ordinary government business (Anneberg 2014). 
According to the Section 118 media guidelines: 
Media must not allow any political activity, including advertisements, 
interview and political actors, and conduct debates or commentaries 
that would be deemed to be advocacy or has the potential to influence 
voters—e.g. no candidate can be interviewed on a radio talkback 
show [after] 7.30am.
Publication of all material pertaining to political activity in the 
mainstream media, including magazines, must cease at 7.30am on 
Monday. Anything published in magazines prior to the blackout 
period may remain as is.
(Fijian Government 2014)
But during this ‘silent’ period, the media were still expected to report 
on electoral ‘administration’ activity. RSF criticised the Fiji authorities 
for not explaining how the Decree would be enforced and ultimately 
nobody was reported to have been prosecuted under the provisions. 
RSF’s Benjamin Ismaïl commented:
The scale of the censorship imposed by this decree is out of 
all proportion. While restrictions on publishing opinion polls, 
projections, partial results and even political advertising are completely 
understandable, banning all political commenting for several days and 
introducing prior censorship is both draconian and unenforceable. 
(RSF 2014c)
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During the blackout, Bainimarama was also able to gain some 
political mileage on freedom for 45 Fijian peacekeeping soldiers at a 
thanksgiving ceremony at a venue next door to the election National 
Media Centre less than 24 hours before polling stations were due to 
open on 17 September. The UN peacekeepers, who had been serving 
in the Quneitra Crossing demilitarised zone between the Israel-
occupied Golan Heights and Syria, had been held captive for the two 
weeks since 28 August by Jabhat al-Nusra, a Syrian rebel group linked 
to al-Qaeda but a rival to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL), which had seized large swathes of Iraq and Syria (Vuru 2014; 
Weaver 2014). According to media reports in Israel, United Nations 
negotiators secured the release of the Fiji hostages through payment 
of a US$25 million ransom by the Qatar government. This deal 
‘made a mockery of UN and Western leaders’ rhetoric against doing 
deals with terrorists and paying ransoms for the release of hostages’ 
(Ben Zion 2014). UN and Fiji government sources have never admitted 
the truth of this claim.
The elections provided an important opportunity to change the way 
Fiji addressed human rights, stated Human Rights Watch (HRW) in an 
analysis barely a week before the elections (HRW 2014). Among key 
rights challenges raised by HRW were freedom of expression, allowing 
human rights’ defenders to carry out their peaceful work, judicial 
independence, labour rights, and constitutional reform. In  letters 
addressed to the five major parties fielding candidates, HRW appealed 
to them to ‘seriously address’ and give priority to these issues after 
the elections. None of these concerns bothered Whale Oil blogger 
Cameron Slater, who was on the ground in Fiji covering the elections 
just days before the New Zealand ballot. He reported:
Fiji has voted, and rejected racism.
SODELPA has been spanked; they stood on a platform of racism and 
lies and the electorate has resounding [sic] rejected those policies.
The early votes that came in were from traditional iTaukei areas in the 
North and even there Bainimarama was winning. That was the point 
at which I saw the smiles erupt …
Today is the start of a promising future for Fiji. The people have 
voted to reject racism and voted for progress and the vision of Frank 
Bainimarama and Fiji First for Fiji. 
(Slater 2014)
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A week after the elections were over, a senior HRW research associate, 
Shaivalini Parmar, followed up by acknowledging the credibility of 
the ballot, saying the fact that it had proceeded ‘without significant 
disruptions’ was a positive outcome (Parmar 2014). She pointed to the 
strong endorsement by international electoral monitors overseeing 
the elections as an important indicator. So too was the relatively 
quick praise from previously critical countries such as Australia, 
New Zealand and the United States, although Parmar noted they were 
overlooking Bainimarama’s ‘troubling human rights record’. 
Elections are a mandate to act and Bainimarama needs to make a 
commitment to concrete human rights reform. Real reform would 
involve bold steps to reverse a culture of impunity that has been 
a significant marker of Bainimarama’s rule.
If Bainimarama is committed to democratic change, he should create 
a 100-day plan to restore human rights and media freedom, and to 
reform laws that restrict rights. He needs to make explicit policies to 
improve the country’s human rights record after eight long years of 
military rule.
The Fiji First party should break with abusive policies that the military 
rulers long carried out, by revoking draconian laws and policies 
that restrict the media and passing other laws to ensure judicial 
independence. (Parmar 2014)
At the time of writing this chapter, the 100-day honeymoon had lapsed 
with little indication of a shift around the media laws. Shaivalini 
Parmar also referred to ‘significant barriers’ preventing the realisation 
of fundamental rights, saying that media freedom was of key concern: 
Newsrooms no longer host censors as they did at certain times in 
the post-coup period, but continuing allegations of government 
intimidation and interference with the media indicate much more 
progress is needed. (Parmar 2014)
An example of the ongoing intimidation was a statement by MIDA’s 
Ashwin Raj to the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR) in Geneva in October in which he accused Al Jazeera 
and Radio New Zealand of ‘racist, unbalanced and inaccurate’ 
reporting during the elections and claimed they had ‘apologised 
and retracted’ (PMW9034 2014b). Typically, Raj was long on 
obscure wordage but short on facts and Radio New Zealand (RNZ) 
responded with a denial. In a subsequent RNZ report claiming Raj 
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had ‘changed his tune’, chief  executive Paul Thompson stated he 
had written to the UN saying there had been no apology over the 
racism, imbalance or inaccuracy claim. Raj then withdrew the racism 
allegation and redirected it against Al Jazeera without substantiation 
(PMW9062 2014c). Accusing Raj of ‘amnesia’ over the previous eight 
years of military-backed rule, economist and media commentator 
Professor Wadan Narsey (2014) said his ready condemnation of 
Al Jazeera, Radio New Zealand International and local journalists for 
‘running alleged “hate speeches”’ and his reluctance to subject the 
Bainimarama Government to the same scrutiny ‘might suggest that 
MIDA is being used more to regulate the media in the interests of the 
Bainimarama Government’.
Ashwin Raj’s abrasive and biased style of tenure at MIDA has contrasted 
sharply with that of his low-key predecessors, professors Subramani 
and Satendra Nandan, who constantly sought a collegial approach to 
integrity and ethics, and a ‘fresh air of freedom and responsibility of 
the highest kind’ (Nandan 2014, p. 18). The founding chair of MIDA, 
Dr Nandan, an emeritus professor at the University of Canberra, 
presented a thoughtful view of freedom of expression in Repúblika 
some months prior to the elections (Nandan 2014). He argued that the 
greater the power, the greater the responsibility, referring to the news 
media faced with a recent history of coups.
In Fiji, too much damage has been done by tendentious propaganda by 
a few that has frayed the fabric of the Fijian society at so many levels 
of social harmony and political growth of a young democratic nation. 
And once a nation (and a person) suffers heart attacks, it must take care 
of its daily diet and exercise both restraint and responsibility. This is 
never more important than during an election. (Nandan 2014, p. 20)
In Nandan’s view, the 2014 general elections has made a major 
contribution to ending corrupt political and disinformation practices 
of the past. He argues that the Electoral Commission ought to be able 
to strip a party which, or a member of Parliament who, wins a seat 
on the basis of falsification of facts as a ‘deterrent to unscrupulous 
demagogues’ (p. 21). Nandan condemned an opposition political 
leader for claiming during the election campaign that native land 
tenure in Fiji was in jeopardy.
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The [native land tenure] issue has been so falsely and fallaciously used 
in Fiji for so long that it’s no longer funny: the Electoral Commission 
has the power, I think, to put an end to this kind of lurid and ludicrous 
propaganda. (Nandan 2014)
Four days before the elections, The Interpreter columnist Alex Stewart 
(2014) concluded that ‘by world standards of elections after prolonged 
military rule, Fiji is doing well’. But he added a cautionary observation 
about allegations of unbalanced media coverage, participation of 
non-government organisations in the electoral process, and issues 
surrounding candidate nominations. All three points were made 
in response to a ‘string of controversies and criticisms’ of how 
the Bainimarama Government was approaching the transition 
to independence:
[A] truly free and fair election requires more than the absence of extra 
ballots stuffed into the box. Yes, voters need to be free to make their 
choice on the day, but the process by which they reach their decision 
also needs to be fair. In a free and fair election, political parties compete 
on as level a playing field as the system can enforce. This is where the 
election process in Fiji stands on shakier ground. (Stewart 2014)
As Stewart acknowledged, there had been repeated accusations by 
rival parties that Bainimarama’s FijiFirst party had ‘received unfair 
media advantages’ (Fox 2014). ABC Radio’s Liam Fox reported as part 
of a series of news stories and commentaries prior to the elections that 
‘while opposition parties and independents battle to be heard, Frank 
Bainimarama has no such worries, with every move of his FijiFirst 
Party relayed by the media’ (Fox 2014). Stewart noted the ‘strenuous 
denials’ by both news outlets and by MIDA, adding: ‘It is always 
difficult to distinguish between legitimate editorialising and bias. 
But the fact that these claims have persisted is concerning.’
Even two experienced postgraduate student journalists from AUT’s 
Pacific Media Centre, on internship with Repúblika and Wansolwara 
as the first New Zealand-based students to cover a Pacific election, 
observed evidence of bias. Alistar Kata, an award-winning broadcast 
journalist with Ngapuhi and Cook Islands heritage, noted: ‘From my 
unbiased vantage point as a student journalist from New Zealand, 
the local Fijian media coverage of the elections could sometimes be 
biased. I was surprised, shocked, at some examples of reporting that 
were allowed to air or be published’ (Spasifik 2014, p. 18). But her 
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colleague, Mads Anneberg, an experienced Danish political journalist, 
was also impressed with an ability to make an impact with quality 
journalism: ‘When you take strict media rules and recent censorship 
out of the equation, Fiji is a dream for the nostalgic journalist; in some 
ways it reminds you of the old days, like a Pacific Hunter S. Thompson 
novel’ (Spasifik 2014, p. 17). 
At least one Fiji-based researcher carried out a systematic analysis of 
local news coverage of the elections and concluded in a paper prepared 
for the 20th anniversary of the Pacific Journalism Review ‘Political 
journalism in the Asia-Pacific’ conference in Auckland in November 
2014 that the elections were flawed with ‘recently activated political 
parties struggling to have their voices heard’ by the media. (Bhim 2015, 
p. 108). Mosmi Bhim, an academic at Fiji National University and a 
former researcher with the CCF, cited a litany of examples of where 
news media coverage had been unbalanced in favour of Bainimarama’s 
party.
In an atmosphere of lavish campaign advertisements on billboards, 
public transport vehicles and the print and television news media by 
the post-coup Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama’s political party 
FijiFirst, recently activated political parties struggled to have their 
voices heard. Two daily media companies—the Fiji Broadcasting 
Corporation and the Fiji Sun—displayed bias towards the FijiFirst 
party by providing them with excessive and preferential coverage and 
portraying other parties in a negative light; other media organisations 
attempted to give fairer coverage. (Bhim 2015, p. 109).
Referring to the Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections 
adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union Council in 1994 and using 
Fiji’s new electoral and media legislation as a yardstick, Bhim produced 
considerable evidence to support her analysis. As a result of the 
media and other flaws, she argued that elections only satisfied some 
of the international criteria for ‘free and fair elections’ as ‘all citizens 
were unable to participate freely and fully in the 2014 elections’ 
(Bhim 2015, p. 108).
Bhim cited a report on ABC News explaining how MIDA planned 
to establish an independent unit to monitor media coverage of 
the election campaign in an attempt to identify political bias 
(ABC News  2014). The  announcement was made by Raj at a media 
conference called to justify a complaint made against the ABC and 
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veteran Pacific correspondent Sean Dorney, who had been expelled by 
the Bainimarama Government in 2009. The ABC quoted Suva reporter 
Samisoni Pareti as saying: 
they [MIDA] took offence to an interview that Sean Dorney did 
some weeks back [about a Melanesian Spearhead Group summit in 
Noumea, New Caledonia]. Apparently Mr Dorney made some remarks 
concerning the freeness of the media, or otherwise, in Fiji. So they 
took that up.
Little has been reported about this ‘monitoring’ of Fiji media since.
During the election campaign, in the wake of reported death threats 
against two Fiji women journalists on 9 September, Ashwin Raj appealed 
to Fijians to refrain from using the media, including social media, to 
incite violence through use of inflammatory language to intimidate 
voters (Fiji Sun 2014; RSF 2014d). Two women journalists—Vosita 
Kotowasawasa of the Fiji Broadcasting Corporation and Jyoti Pratibha 
of the Fiji Sun—reportedly received death threats over their previous 
day’s coverage of the cancellation of a live TV debate between the 
leading contenders for the post of prime minister. Raj stated in a media 
conference: ‘The media must also remain independent, give equal 
space to all political actors, must not be seen as aiding and abetting the 
agenda of one political party over others’ (PMW8955 2014a). But as 
Bhim pointed out in her research paper, Raj made no mention of any 
inflammatory reporting by the Fiji Broadcasting Corporation or the 
Fiji Sun or against ‘their biased reporting towards the FijiFirst party’ 
(Bhim 2015, p. 117). This, argued Bhim, had led to questions being 
raised about the ‘effectiveness and impartiality’ of MIDA and whether 
such a body was actually needed.
Also speaking at the Pacific Journalism Review conference, Fijian Media 
Association president Ricardo Morris raised the issue of the ‘fear that 
hangs over journalists and their media companies—fear of breaching 
the [Media] Decree and perhaps catching a fine, which could very 
well cripple any media company’ (Morris 2015, p. 37). This threat, 
argued Morris, was even more serious for small, independent media 
operators and was omnipresent in the background during coverage 
of the election campaign. One overall outcome was that many times 
journalism ‘presented to the people of Fiji is bland and unexciting’. 
Thus ‘infotainment and puff pieces’ could be much safer and more 
profitable.
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But Morris added that not all news media in Fiji faced the fear 
of the Decree: ‘It is well-known that the Fiji Sun newspaper is 
unconditionally supportive of Bainimarama’s vision for a “new 
Fiji” and will consistently praise any policies of the government 
and denounce anybody with a differing view.’ To be branded with 
an ‘anti-Fiji’ or ‘anti-government’ label by the Fiji Sun could make 
‘life and business very difficult’ for any media group. For example, 
almost all government advertisements have been booked with the 
Sun to punish The Fiji Times, the nation’s oldest and possibly still 
most influential newspaper, for its past opposition to the government. 
Nevertheless, Morris was not entirely pessimistic about the future 
of media in Fiji. In spite of a ‘huge brain drain’ (Morris 2015, p. 36) 
within the media industry through migration of some of the country’s 
senior media workers ever since the first two coups in 1987, there 
were signs after the elections that the political and media environment 
could be improving.
We have recently begun Parliamentary sessions and for the majority 
of those involved—from the Speaker, to MPs, the Secretary-General 
and journalists covering Parliament—it is a new experience. Learning 
parliamentary procedure and understanding the Standing Orders will 
take some time to master but we are getting there. In the meantime, 
the effects of dictatorship still hang over much of the process. 
(Morris 2014, p. 4) 
The Media Industry Development Decree 
The Media Industry Development Decree has clearly had an impact on 
the news industry by promoting a climate of self-censorship following 
the military censorship under the previous 2009 Public Emergency 
Regulation (PER). According to a national survey of the Fiji media 
conducted by the Pacific Media Assistance Scheme State of the Media 
and Communication Report in 2013, power had been delegated under 
the Media Decree ‘to the Fiji Media Industry Development Authority 
(MIDA), which has an ongoing responsibility to censor material that is 
considered threatening to the public interest or order’ (PACMAS 2013).
The report added that MIDA ‘has the power to penalize journalists 
and media companies that publish content considered unsuitable’. 
However, in September 2013, then director of MIDA Matai Akauola, 
formerly general manager of the regional Pacific Islands News 
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Association, condemned Australian and New Zealand opposition 
to Fiji’s ‘homegrown solutions’. He told Pacific Media Watch in an 
interview that Australian and New Zealand media ‘try to dictate to 
us how we live our lives’ (Drageset 2013). But this is balanced by an 
acceptance that more vigorous debate has been allowed by the news 
media. In January 2014, Akauola told Radio New Zealand International: 
There is freedom of expression so anyone and everyone can come 
on board into a nationally televised discussion on issues; we’re 
talking issues and how to progress this nation rather than going back 
to the old political rivalries. (Dateline Pacific 2014)
For Bob Pratt, executive secretary of the defunct self-regulatory Fiji 
Media Council, the rulings that this body had adjudicated for a decade 
through its published code of ethics and practice, prepared by the 
Thomson Foundation, had been ‘unanimously accepted’ by all main 
media organisations. He has argued for a return to a self-regulatory 
regime (Pratt n.d.). However, because the council did not have the 
power to punish transgressors it had been labelled a ‘toothless tiger’—
and most of the complaints came from politicians. The council’s codes 
were adopted as part of the Media Decree.
Prior to the implementation of the Media Decree, government called 
a meeting of media stakeholders and explained what was proposed. 
The decree used almost word for word the Council’s code of ethics and 
practice. The main difference was the replacing of the word ‘should’ 
with the word ‘must’. In addition, it made provision for offenders to 
be fined. The fines were excessive, but they were the answer to critics 
of the Media Council. Many of those who had loudly criticised the 
failure of the Council to punish now complained just as loudly at the 
ability to punish under the decree. (Pratt n.d.)
In a discussion paper about the Decree, Pratt conceded that the main 
offender during this period had been ‘without doubt The Fiji Times—
while they played lip service to the media codes they offended 
regularly and only issued limited retractions after a lot of pressure’ 
(Pratt n.d.). However, he qualified this view:
It should be borne in mind that Fiji was not alone in facing problems 
with the Murdoch press. It was felt in some quarters that the lack 
of media freedom in Fiji stemmed from the intransigence of the old 
Fiji Times and it was believed that once the ownership changed, the 
pressure on the media would be relaxed; this, however, has proved not 
to be the case. (Pratt n.d.)
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During the UN Human Rights Council’s Second Universal Periodic 
review in October 2014, the Fiji government was presented with 39 
recommendations, which included a review of the 2013 Constitution, 
and was invited to review, amend or repeal restrictive decrees—
including the Media Decree. The Fiji government was also called on 
to ‘end intimidation and harassment of those [who] express criticism 
of the State, to change the climate of fear and self-censorship and to 
ensure that no-one is arbitrarily arrested and detained for exercising 
their rights’ (PIR 2014). Justice Minister Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum told 
the Council that the recommendations would be examined by Fiji 
and that relevant independent institutions and government agencies 
would be consulted.
Among recommendations over Freedom of Information legislation 
and the Media Decree were those by Germany (including a repeal of 
the Media Decree so that it would end intimidation and harassment 
of critics of the State) and Canada (a call for a review of the Decree 
and introduction of a Freedom of Information law that complies with 
international human rights standards to ensure respect for freedom of 
expression and protection of journalists). Also recommending a repeal 
of the Decree was the joint submission from the PMC and RSF, which 
called on the government of Fiji to:
• modify its Constitution in order to ensure independence of the 
judiciary and prevent any dissuasive effect or use of the judiciary 
to intimidate the media
• stop issuing indirect threats and refrain from any editorial 
interference
• take measures to ensure more transparency and access to information
• enact a Freedom of Information law with some urgency
• significantly encourage participation in public debate without 
hindrance
• revoke the Media Industry Development Decree and its 
draconian punitive measures against journalists, editors and 
media organisations and adopt a self-regulatory media framework 
encouraging a free press
• encourage international media reporting and scrutiny, and lift bans 
on individual journalists.
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In July 2015, there was a modest improvement in the Decree with the 
stripping of the of the Media Industry Development Tribunal’s power 
to fine individual journalists but, as critics said, this ‘did not resolve 
the issue of media censorship in the country’ (ABC Pacific Beat 2015). 
While Parliament was reported as having voted unanimously to 
remove the power of the tribunal to impose fines on journalists for 
breaching the Decree, the CCF’s programme director Ken Cokanasiga 
was quoted by the ABC’s Pacific Beat as saying ‘this doesn’t bring 
about any significant change to the restrictive media environment’. 
Conclusion: Restoring public‑good 
journalism
Two months after the Fiji post-coup general elections, the First Vice-
President of the European Union, Frans Timmermans, told a delegation 
of journalists in Brussels that sustaining quality journalism and putting 
media freedom back on track was high on his agenda. Among his 
commissioner responsibilities is a Charter of Fundamental Rights and he 
acknowledges that the crisis in the European media industry is affecting 
journalists’ rights, jobs and journalism as a public good (EFJ 2014). 
The comments by Timmermans reflect a worldwide crisis affecting 
journalism in democratic societies, which has also seriously eroded the 
quality of journalism and media pluralism in Fiji’s southern neighbours, 
Australia and New Zealand. ‘Support for professional and good quality 
journalism must go hand in hand with transparent media ownership to 
regain trust in the media’, remarked Timmermans (EFJ 2014).
My most recent book, Don’t Spoil My Beautiful Face: Media, Mayhem 
and Human Rights in the Pacific (Robie 2014b), explored issues of 
media freedom and credibility in the Asia Pacific region and argued 
for a critical development journalism approach. The book included 
Fiji in the lead-up to the elections and offered several models on how 
a more vigorous brand of journalism, tempered by responsibility 
as a public good, could be achieved. This is not an isolated plea for 
better political journalism. Other authors, such as journalism educator 
Dr Angela Romano (2010) with her edited work on case studies on 
international journalism and democracy with ‘civil engagement 
models’, and Kunda Dixit (2010) have canvased parallel concepts. 
Both  argue for the empowerment of citizens. Even in a specifically 
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Fijian context, the head of journalism at the University of the South 
Pacific, Dr Shailendra Singh, and current opposition parliamentary 
finance and media spokesman Professor Biman Prasad, have argued 
along similar lines (Singh & Prasad 2008). 
Removing the elephant in the room—the Media Decree—is not 
enough. While arguing in my book that Pacific journalists now have 
a  greater task than ever in encouraging ‘democratisation’ of the 
region, including Fiji, and seeking solutions (p. 339), I identified the 
poor education of many journalists working in Fijian newsrooms and 
the constant creaming off of university journalism graduates to more 
highly paid regional and international non-government organisation 
jobs: ‘This continual loss of staff makes it very difficult to achieve stable 
and consistent editorial standards and policies’ (Robie 2014b, p. 345).
Ricardo Morris also identifies the ‘brain drain’ of journalists since the 
coups as damaging for the media industry. ‘The majority of young 
journalists in Fiji today have never worked in a completely free media 
environment’, he laments (Morris 2015, p. 38). ‘Many have grown up 
in a dictatorship and the repressive environment that it entails for 
the media and have known nothing else.’ Now, more than ever, Fiji 
needs journalists who not only know their craft, but have the critical 
and analytical skills provided at the university-based journalism 
schools, such as the University of the South Pacific and Fiji National 
University, to have the self-confidence to be truly committed public-
good journalists in a partially revived democracy. 
In January 2015, barely four months after the elections, opposition 
National Federation Party leader Professor Biman Prasad called for an 
end to the eight-year-long ‘siege’ of the nation’s news media and for 
the contentious Media Decree to be repealed. He declared that Fiji’s 
social, economic and political future could not be guaranteed unless 
there was free expression through a ‘free, fair and credible media’. 
He also made a plea for enacting the Freedom of Information Bill.
Where is the balance and fairness government is preaching about? 
Where is the accountability? … [s. 22 which prohibits publishing 
material against the public interest or order] is like a noose around 
the media’s neck. This provision is unnecessary because offences are 
already adequately covered under [the] Crimes Decree [and] under the 
Public Order Act on racial and religious vilification, hate speech and 
economic sabotage. (PMW9104 2015)
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Three months later, Dr Prasad steered an opposition motion 
in Parliament seeking a repeal or review of the Media Decree 
(Narayan 2015). Although it was defeated 17-24, with nine abstentions, 
the motion succeeded in opening a wider national debate and 
challenging the validity of the military-backed law, which has had 
such a shackling impact on the media. Dr Prasad described the Fiji 
media in his motion speech as having been ‘under siege’ since the 2006 
coup, and the mediascape had been ‘turbulent and devastating’ since 
the imposition of the Media Decree. Except for a brief period after the 
1987 coups, the work of the media had been ‘remarkable, balanced, 
informative and impartial’. ‘The Decree is regressive and suppresses 
media freedom because it imposes restrictions and prescribes heavy 
penalties’, he said (Prasad 2015, p. 2). ‘[It] must be repealed or amended 
substantially because we believe the media should not be regulated 
by the state or any government. The restoration of democracy has 
seen little change in the behavior of large sections of our media and 
individual journalists … as a result of the severe penalties.’ 
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From the land to the sea: 
Christianity, community 




Much has changed since I left Fiji in December 2012, at a time when 
the Yash Ghai constitution was rejected by the government. A group 
led by the attorney-general, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, drew up a 
new constitution, notable for its affirmation of secularism, in 2013. 
The then president of the Methodist Church, Tuikilakila Waqairatu, 
began a review of the Methodist constitution to ensure that the 
church could not be used as a vehicle for political mobilisation, 
but passed away six months after his ordination in February 2014 
(Rasoqosoqo 2013, 2014; Tawake 2013). In the lead-up to the general 
elections, Waqairatu’s successor, Tevita Nawadra Banivanua, affirmed 
that ministers of the Methodist Church could no longer participate in 
politics without resigning from their positions (Talebula 2014). Outside 
the Methodist Church, debate about the significance of secularism 
for Fiji began to flow freely, reflected in an explosion of postings in 
the social media and Internet services, despite the restrictions on 
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the regular media. The victory by Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama and 
his FijiFirst party ensured that secularism in one of its forms was 
institutionalised, guaranteed by the Constitution.
In effect, the 2014 elections marked a threshold to a potentially 
radical transformation in the style of Fiji governance that the military 
government has developed since the 2006 coup. At the same time, 
the  leadership of the Methodist Church, a key institution in which 
ethnic and religious nationalism has flourished in the past, has 
undertaken reforms begun by Waqairatu. In this chapter, I explore 
the religious climate in which Fiji’s 2014 elections took place; and, 
in particular, I chart the relationship between the Bainimarama 
Government, the Methodist Church, and some of the other Christian 
churches to show the evolving politics of religion in Fiji. In doing so, 
I note the way the vanua (land and community) has come to be used 
in contemporary rhetoric; the continuing use of the motif of Exodus 
to describe Methodist Taukei experience, albeit in a theology that 
is shifting from the land (vanua) to the ocean (moana); and the fact 
that, although Christianity is diverse in Fiji, many Taukei Christians 
share conceptions about an active relationship between the Taukei 
community, church and the state.1
The Methodist Church of Fiji and the 
military government
At least since 1987 and until around 2009, the Methodist Church 
of Fiji represented the interests of a powerful section of the Taukei 
across most of the country. Broadly, these interests are commonly 
encapsulated in the formula known as ‘the three pillars’: lotu (denoting 
‘religion’, particularly Methodism), matanitu (government and/or 
chiefly system) and vanua (the land and community) (Niukula 1994). 
Lotu and vanua are joined in idioms such as the nationalist maxim, 
Noqu Kalou, noqu vanua (My God, my land) (Ryle 2010; Tuwere 2002). 
The connection between God and the land is entrenched in the village 
1  ‘Taukei’ and ‘Indo-Fijian’ are the terms chosen for this publication. In 2010, it was decreed 
that indigenous Fijians be referred to as iTaukei (for its implications, see Newland 2013). 
The descendants of indentured labourers and other immigrants from India have variously been 
called Indo-Fijians and Fiji Indians, and since 2010 have been considered Fijians, but all these 
terms are inconsistently used, depending on the speakers and their contexts.
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system, in which over half the Taukei population continue to live 
(Fiji Bureau of Statistics 2007).2 Saturated with associations with land, 
the concept of vanua also signifies a community unified through kin 
ties and marriage rules, and connected with the land through kava 
ceremonies, agriculture and death rites. 
From an early stage in the colonial history of Fiji, the church structure 
grew rather like a rhizome—from cell groups into districts under a 
connexional government (Baleiwaqa 2003), challenged only by the 
ancestral gods and Roman Catholicism, the latter which initially had 
little success (Kelly 1945). As the connexional government grew, 
Taukei nationalism was expressed through narratives about ancestral 
genealogies that came to be called the Kaunitoni Migration, and 
dissent from cult figures outside the church such as Navosavakadua 
and Apolosi Nawai, and their followers, who the colonial government 
frequently exiled and deported to other islands. 
The Methodist Church of Fiji remained under British and then 
Australian  administrative responsibility until the 1960s, when the 
administration was localised and the first local president appointed. 
As Taukei began to move towards the urban areas, the Methodist 
Church became the space in which politics were discussed (Halapua 
2003). At the same time, indigenisation of the church was encouraged 
to reflect Taukei values and understandings of Christianity rather 
than Australian or European interpretations and despite the fact that 
the church also had an Indian Division (Tippett 1980). Although 
this indigenisation of the church aimed towards postcolonial 
self-determination, it also created the conditions through which 
conservative and traditionalist Taukei values would come to be used 
to mobilise support for the Taukei elite.
For the 20-year period after the church’s independence in 1964, the 
presidents of the Methodist Church were moderates who endorsed 
ecumenism and multiracialism. They seemed to reflect a liberal mood 
in the church, to the extent of electing an Indo-Fijian president in 
1977 (Weir 2015, p. 66). However, influenced by the politician Sakeasi 
2  These figures are contentious given that the urban/rural divide is not clear in Fiji because 
many Taukei live in villages even within urban centres; mobility between rural villages and 
urban centres is high; local observations suggest that urbanisation has increased in the years 
since the 2007 census; and most Taukei identify themselves as belonging to the village of their 
ancestors even if they have not returned there for several generations.
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Butadroka, and legitimated largely in relation to the strengthening 
political and demographic position of the Indo-Fijian population, 
Taukei  nationalism grew increasingly strident. As has now been 
extensively documented, in 1987 Sitiveni Rabuka, a military colonel, 
overthrew the newly elected Indo-Fijian-dominated government led 
by Dr Timoci Bavadra, a Taukei commoner. Reverend Manasa Lasaro, 
a nationalist Methodist minister, led a parallel coup in the church 
and persuaded Rabuka to enact a Sunday ban that prohibited all 
commercial activities on Sundays, reflecting a transition to a particular 
kind of Christian state. Although the Sunday ban was eventually 
lifted, Rabuka became the Prime Minister of Fiji under the Constitution 
adopted in 1990 (e.g. Ernst 2004; Garrett 1990). He  governed until 
1999, when he lost the elections to the Indo-Fijian trade unionist, 
Mahendra Chaudhry. 
Nationalist Taukei concerns centred on the theme of losing the land 
and with it the Taukei community’s place in the world. The threat of 
losing the land was largely a fiction because Taukei land ownership 
was protected in the Constitution; but the idea of loss, combined with 
the two-fold meanings of vanua as land and community resonated 
deeply with many Taukei communities. Moreover, such concerns were 
preached from the pulpit in a direct analogy with the biblical teachings 
of Exodus and God’s promise of land. One investigative documentary 
of the period shows Rabuka in his role as lay preacher, preaching both 
in English and Fijian from the book of Jeremiah: 
The words of Jeremiah the prophet, Lamentations Chapter 5. 
Remember oh Lord, what has happened to us. Look at us and see our 
disgrace. Our property is in the hands of strangers. Foreigners are 
living in our homes. Our fathers have been killed by the enemy and 
now our mothers are widows. Driven hard like donkeys or camels we 
are tired but are allowed no rest. (Rabuka in Walmsley 1987)
The use of Jeremiah reinforced the connection between lotu and vanua 
in a prophecy of loss—and, although land was a central concern, the 
prophecy was also about community and its relationship with God.3 
Implicit in the suggestion of community was the sense of an upset to 
Taukei tradition involving the correct ordering of the ‘three pillars’ of 
3  Tomlinson discusses the Taukei sense of loss and diminishment in relation to the concept 
of mana on the island of Kadavu (Tomlinson 2006). In Suva, loss and diminishment has been 
associated directly with racial relations and contestation for political power and land.
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Taukei society between vanua, lotu and matanitu. This order includes 
ideas about clear hierarchies from chiefs and churchmen down to the 
husbands and fathers of households; and about the attainments of a 
masculinity linked with a romanticised notion of the physicality of the 
Taukei warrior past and expressed through the kava ceremony, rugby 
and the norms of the patriarchal Methodist family, including adult 
heterosexuality and the obedience of wives and children to husbands, 
fathers and chiefs. In Rabuka’s rhetoric, all this was threatened by 
a multiracial and multi-religious society.
A businessman, George Speight, led the next coup in 2000. While 
race was obviously a major issue, the 2000 coup also reflected the 
tensions between Taukei Christian churches, clans and institutions 
across Fiji. In response, the Methodist Church met with a number of 
Pentecostal churches after the coup to unify Fijians under an umbrella 
organisation called the Assembly of Christian Churches in Fiji (ACCF), 
with the vision of creating a Christian state (Newland 2006; 2007). 
In  the ACCF version, Fiji is represented as a possession of God that 
would be treasured if ACCF members honoured and glorified Him 
by uniting and living in a correct relationship with Him (which is 
perceived in terms of loving and fearing God and being prepared to 
reconcile with each other) (Newland 2007, p. 306). Those who were 
not Christians were to be tolerated, providing they also lived by 
Christian values and acknowledged that they were guests in a Taukei 
country. Two implications of this theology stand out: the idea that the 
vanua was no longer simply a network of kin in a specific geographical 
area but was now considered concomitant with the nation-state of 
Fiji; and the legitimation of a racial hierarchy within Fiji in which 
Taukei continued to have paramountcy. Despite a greater tolerance of 
other races than was expressed in 1987, the ACCF leadership did not 
aspire towards any form of equity or equality with Hindu and Muslim 
Indo-Fijians, many of whom descended from the indentured labourers 
brought out from India in the 19th century. Likewise, secularism was 
not viewed as neutral because it challenged the Taukei nationalist 
ideas of paramountcy. This was legitimated by the notion that, if 
society is secular, God is absent (cf. Weir 2015). 
In 2009, the Constitution was abrogated for the third time in 20 years, 
ostensibly to make way for the military’s large-scale political, economic 
and social transformations. Three years later, a constitution commission 
led by academic Professor Yash Ghai wrote a draft constitution based 
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on submissions from across Fiji.4 While moderate Taukei argued for 
the retention of a Christian identity that tolerated others, many of 
the Taukei submissions showed a desire for a Christian state based 
on the patriarchal family form and on the continuation of Taukei 
paramountcy within the nation-state (Newland 2013). Although this 
was clearly an aggravation for Bainimarama and his government, the 
reasons the draft constitution ultimately proved unacceptable were 
because it required the Bainimarama Government to step down six 
months before the elections, it did not grant full and unconditional 
immunity, and court proceedings begun before interference from the 
regime could be revived (Narsey 2013).
In the meantime, the Bainimarama Government had begun court 
proceedings against the Methodist leaders, including the then 
president Tuikilakila Waqairatu and three former presidents well 
known for their ethno-religious nationalist inclinations: Ame Tugawe, 
Tomasi Kanailagi and Manasa Lasaro. They were charged for holding 
a meeting allegedly in breach of the Public Emergency Regulation in 
2009. Where the position of various leaders of the Methodist Church 
had been ambiguous throughout 2012, Waqairatu realised that he 
had to counter the repressive tactics of the Bainimarama Government 
to avoid the church being deregistered. He began a review of the 
Methodist Church’s constitution, which included the conditions that 
ministers must resign in order to contest elections and that no support 
for any coup would be tolerated (Rasoqosoqo 2013). From then 
on, Banivanua appeared in the media regularly to confirm that the 
Methodist Church would no longer play a political role or be aligned 
to any political party but would focus on the spiritual life of its 
members, family support groups and education. The church circuits 
were directed to avoid politics and to uphold the principle that church 
members had the right to join any political party. Church ministers 
who wanted to stand at the elections would be asked to resign but 
could reapply if they did not succeed at the elections (e.g. Bolatiki 
2013; Tawake 2013). This attempt to engineer a massive top-down shift 
in Methodist nationalist thought failed to halt the court case, which 
was still in process in 2014 when Waqairatu passed away (Kate 2014). 
4  For a discussion of this Constitution, see Kant & Rakuita 2014.
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Although the church appeared to fully concede to the military 
government’s demands, it was reported that ‘while the church would 
be apolitical, they would make comments on some political decisions 
that affect the church’ (Bolatiki 2013). In the lead-up to the 2014 
elections, Banivanua confirmed in an interview that the church had 
to accept that Fiji was now defined as a secular state, but stated that 
they would continue to pursue their Christian principles in relation 
to the way that they viewed the governing of Fiji (Radio New Zealand 
2014). These comments show that, despite the move away from direct 
political action, the leaders of the Methodist Church in Fiji continue to 
regard themselves as legitimate voices of ‘the people’ and in particular 
their congregations (which are predominantly Taukei), and therefore 
that they have a role in representing them in the political domain. On 
this point, the Methodist Church does not stand alone. As will become 
evident, many Christian churches share this idea. In fact, elsewhere, 
particularly among the priests and ministers who follow liberation 
theology from the Roman Catholic Church and the Presbyterian 
Church, it is termed ‘the prophetic voice’ (Newland 2006).
Religious advice to voters
In the lead-up to the 2014 elections, several churches in very different 
relationships with the government and representing very different 
interpretations of Christianity were reported as advising their 
congregations on how to vote, including the Roman Catholic Church 
in Fiji, the New Methodist Church, and the Seventh Day Adventists 
(SDA). The leaders of the first two of these churches had close 
relationships with the Bainimarama Government in the first three years 
or so after the coup, although for very different reasons (see Newland 
2009, 2012). By contrast, in 2005 the general secretary of the SDA, 
Usaia Baravi, explained to me that the SDA remained completely 
separate from issues of the state (Newland 2006)—which was possibly 
a strategy to distance the church from George Speight, the leader of 
the 2000 coup and a member of SDA. Yet all these churches wanted 
their adherents to vote for a ‘godly’ government that would make 
decisions on the basis of the scriptures—despite the fact that each 
interprets the scriptures very differently and accords certain parts of 
the scriptures more important than others.
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After the coup in 2006, the Roman Catholic Church in Fiji supported 
the military government and participated in its Charter in the hope 
that this was an opportunity to overturn deep-seated structures in 
Fijian society: in particular, to neutralise the racist aspects of Taukei 
religious ethno-nationalism, and to reduce exploitation and poverty, 
especially for Indo-Fijians who had faced mass expulsion from the 
land at the end of their tenancies or who made up a significant portion 
of the working poor (Newland 2009). This focus is consistent with the 
church’s interest in liberation theology, a theology in which political 
activity is considered justified if it overturns exploitative structures 
in favour of the poor. However, the church faced some difficult 
moments when social justice appeared to become expedient to other 
interests in government decisions, which has given rise to a number of 
misunderstandings. Within the first year of his ordination, Archbishop 
Peter Loy Chong showed misgivings about the way the secularism of 
the Constitution was described in terms of ensuring that religion was a 
private matter (Chandar 2013). In the lead-up to the 2014 elections, he 
urged ‘Catholics to make informed voting decisions for the betterment 
of the country’ (Swami 2014). According to Chong, the church should 
be apolitical but also has the responsibility of informing its members 
to help them make wise decisions ‘based on the Scriptures and the 
teachings of the Church’ (Swami 2014). Clearly, Chong was concerned 
about the balance between church and state; and, in particular, any 
limitations that might affect Catholic religious practice. 
Another church that had taken the stage from 2008 to 2009 was the 
New Methodist Church, a breakaway from the Methodist Church 
that quickly became Pentecostal in style. Due largely to the fact that 
the head of the New Methodist Church, Atunaisa Vulaono, was the 
brother of the then head of the police force, Esala Teleni, this church 
became aligned with the state in an attempt to convert the police 
force to Christianity as part of the fight against crime. For the military 
government, supporting this church had the advantage of undermining 
the hegemonic presence and public centrality of the Methodist 
Church. However, tensions rose over the New Methodist’s evangelical 
activities, such as requiring police to perform on stage as part of its 
community outreach regardless of whether they were Christian or 
Hindu, the weekly evangelical sermons in the centre of Suva city, and 
the fact that a significant amount of the community policing budget 
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was spent on these activities. Finally, the New Methodists fell out of 
favour with the government, but they continue to rally support from 
the youth (Newland 2012).
In April 2014, the New Methodists held a rally in Labasa that attracted 
1,200 members drawn primarily from nine youth groups around the 
northern islands of Fiji. Vulaono gave a sermon, reminding ‘church 
members of God’s place in the September elections’ (Taleitaki 2014). 
The report quotes him as saying:
‘We need God before the upcoming elections; every district, province 
and the nation needs God’s judgement as He alone knows best.’ 
He further said the general election needed God’s intervention as 
He alone knew the future and what was good and best for Fiji. 
The nation, he said, needed people to take the nation to greener 
pastures for the betterment of its people. (Taleitaki 2014)
Vulaono’s statement clearly goes much further than asking its 
adherents to make a decision about voting for political candidates 
based on whether their policies are consistent with the teachings of 
the scriptures: it reflects the idea that God stands above the processes 
of democracy—in a way that does not sound very different from that 
promoted by the Assembly of Christian Churches in Fiji from 2001 
to 2006 (Newland 2007). With God represented as guide and judge, 
Taukei are likened to the biblical Jews; but, here, God’s intervention 
is required not for personal salvation but to save the nation. Given the 
intensity of the New Methodist Church’s evangelical activity, it is 
clear that they do not envisage a multi-religious nation-state but one 
that is wholly converted to Christianity.
The Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) brought 150 female leaders 
together at a meeting in Suva to offer advice about voting. After being 
divided into small groups to pray, the women were read a letter from 
the church head, advising them against voting for relatives or for 
candidates on the basis of their or their party’s work, but rather for 
the candidate who can champion God’s will and ensure God’s will is 
done on earth (FijiLive 2014). They were told to vote according to 
eight principles, which included striving to elect leaders who are 
led by God. Candidates who violated biblical commands about life, 
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family, marriage and faith should be avoided. All members should 
vote in order to promote, protect and preserve godly government 
(FijiLive 2014). The letter continued:
In our day and age, there are many who want to drive the name and 
message of Christ completely out of the public arena. Voting is an 
opportunity to promote, protect, and preserve godly government. 
Passing up that opportunity means letting those who would denigrate 
the name of Christ have their way in our lives. (FijiLive 2014)
Although SDA is a very different church from the New Methodists 
and has sought to separate its activities from politics, it is clear that 
they also seek a government that would promote the presence of 
Christianity in government, without which the people of Fiji would 
face a moral void.
While all three churches were advising their members to vote 
according to the scriptures, their intentions were very different. 
In the Catholic Church in Fiji, the scriptures were being interpreted 
from the perspective of liberation theology in an attempt to bring just 
social structures to the poor without racial prejudice. Secularism was 
a threat only if it limited the capacity of the church membership to 
publicly express their religion. By contrast, Vulaono’s vision of Fiji 
is about making Fiji entirely Christian, therefore guaranteeing Taukei 
privilege—a vision very similar to that of the ACCF. Secularism 
would inhibit the capacity to evangelise and convert others. The SDA 
provides a third contrast because, as noted above, it has attempted to 
avoid any relationship with politics in the past, viewing it as a likely 
arena for the final deception of Satan (Newland 2006). However, in the 
lead-up to the 2014 elections, the SDA leadership was clearly seeking 
a champion of Christianity to reject secularism because it implied 
a moral void. Although these three visions are very different, the 
fact that they and possibly many more Christian churches in Fiji do 
distribute advice on voting shows that they view their churches as 
a space through which to reflect upon the government under which 
they live, and are actively working towards a government that reflects 
the values of these church communities as closely as possible. 
Indeed, the Methodist Church was also, rather belatedly, reported as 
attempting to influence its adherents. After Bainimarama’s government 
won the elections, the Fiji Sun—known to be the mouthpiece for the 
Bainimarama Government—claimed that a letter had been circulated 
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to the divisions of the Methodist Church (with the exception of the 
Republic of Fiji Military Forces) circuit only a fortnight before the 
elections, instructing congregations to vote for the predominantly 
Taukei SODELPA (Social Democratic Liberal Party). According to this 
report, Iliesa Naivalu, the secretary of the Department of Christian 
Citizenship and Social Services of the Methodist Church, wrote the 
letter in Fijian asking the leaders of the division to advise members 
to ‘think before you vote. Don’t be swayed by the look of the party 
and the candidates. Don’t be swayed also by the developments carried 
out and the promises made on what they would do if elected to 
govern’ (Bolatiki 2014). The letter strongly opposed Fiji becoming a 
secular state instead of a Christian state and asked for the return of 
the Ghai constitution, which it considered as the voice of the people. 
It also claimed the church was concerned with the deterioration of 
the Taukei position in state bureaucracy, including the weakening 
of Taukei Affairs, the cessation of the Great Council of Chiefs, and 
changes in leadership and representatives on the Taukei Affairs Board 
and, finally, the redistribution of scholarships. As many of these issues 
were the same as those in SODELPA’s manifesto, the other major party 
contesting the elections, Bainimarama accused SODELPA of lying and 
dictating to congregations what they should believe in (Bolatiki 2014). 
Banivanua, now the President of the Methodist Church, responded 
not by publishing the letter but by posting an open letter on the 
church’s blogsite.5 Explaining that he was unaware of the letter’s 
contents until the media response, Banivanua pointed out that the 
Department of Christian Citizenship and Social Issues was established 
to provide members with information about the church’s position on 
current issues. The issues raised in the letter were based on resolutions 
that had been deliberated and voted on at the 2014 Methodist Annual 
Conference. They needed to be disseminated so that members could 
reflect on them before they voted. Banivanua further explained that, 
although Naivalu was writing in a theological context rather than a 
political and adversarial one, an internal policy for communication 
5  Rather strangely to the outsider, the letter begins by welcoming Jewish and Hindu 
adherents and their festivals. There are very few Jews in Fiji, although a number of Christian 
sects claim they are descended directly from the Lost Tribes of Israel and many Taukei certainly 
view the Israelites romantically (see, e.g. Karavaki 2014). The inclusion of both Jews and Hindus 
in the same welcome suggests that he was welcoming both Taukei and Indians.
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would be introduced (Banivanua 2014a).6 He then noted that a policy 
on multi-faith worship had not yet been developed as the church 
did not want to compromise on doctrinal beliefs and tradition. 
He finished with: 
The Church is beginning her new exodus, our LakoYani Vou 
[new Exodus], just as our nation is embarking on a new democracy. 
Just as we pray for our nation and our government, we seek your 
prayers for us. (Banivanua 2014a) 
By drawing on Exodus and Jeremiah, who also spoke of a new exodus 
or covenant, Banivanua depicted a new order in which church and state 
have been separated and in which the leaders and their communities 
had to find their own ways.
The letter was also posted on Facebook, to which Nikotemo Sopepa, 
Moderator of the Presbyterian Church of Fiji, replied:
This time-round the church should not be intimidated by the State 
but speak what is true, what is democratic (voices of the people). 
I believe the State also needs to be educated on the role of the church 
in the community. We attend not only to the spiritual welfare of the 
community we serve, but also the whole sphere of their living (political 
included). If the church fails to do this, it will lose its calling to serve 
the community. I agree that Church and State must be separated, but 
i [sic] totally disagree with the State trying to intimidate the church 
through/by coercive means – that is not democracy. (Sopepa 2014)
This comment was ‘liked’ by Pacific Youth Council and Pacific 
Conference of Churches, among others, and reflects the idea that 
Christian churches have a role to play as representatives of their 
communities is widespread among Taukei. Moreover, this role is 
viewed to be necessarily political, whether that is represented in 
terms of social justice for the many (the Roman Catholic view) or 
the legitimation of the moral right of an indigenous community 
(the nationalist Methodist view).
6  The Methodist leadership had declined an invitation to an Interfaith Thanksgiving Service 
organised by the PM’s Office on the release of the 45 Fijian UN peacekeepers who had been held 
hostage by an al Qaeda-related organisation. Banivanua explained that, as this service was to 
be held on the day before the elections, Methodist leaders were concerned because it ‘may be 
construed as a political event’ (Banivanua, 2014a). 
121
6. FROM THE LAND TO THE SEA
However, of concern to any government that attempts to promote 
a  plural society in Fiji, the call for a Christian state or a godly 
government or even a government based exclusively on Christian 
principles is also a call for the state to be run by the Taukei and not 
Hindu or Muslim Indo-Fijians. That almost all Taukei are Christian, 
that Taukei are a majority in Fiji, and that this Christian message was 
propagated throughout the Christian churches suggests that this is 
more than a passing concern. 
SODELPA, Christianity and the elections
Although the leaders of the Methodist Church of Fiji knew that their 
public face had to be apolitical and that they could not be seen to be 
aligned with any one political party, political parties did not necessarily 
share the idea that church and state should be separate. SODELPA, 
headed by Ro Teimumu Kepa,7 represented itself as the legitimate 
successor of SDL (Soqosoqo Duavata ni Levenivanua or United Fiji 
Party)—the party that was elected and ousted from government in 
2006 (SODELPA 2014a, p. 45). SDL had been sympathetic to the notion 
that Fiji should be a Christian state and that the Taukei should retain 
a privileged position in the governance of the state, and SODELPA 
retained these ideas, although with some contestation from younger 
members.
In fact, there were at least two contrasting positions on the ideal 
relationship between church and state in Fiji, both of which have 
been published on SODELPA’s Facebook page. The first, which 
appeared on 18 July 2014, has been shared and remains there still. In 
it was a set of bullet points that noted the 2013 Constitution declared 
Fiji a secular state, which therefore signified the Constitution is a 
godless Constitution that has ignored the role of Christianity in the 
development of Fiji (SODELPA 2014b). SODELPA was concerned with 
the teaching and practice of religious faiths in schools and especially 
about school prayer and similar controversies about religious devotions 
during government functions (SODELPA 2014b). When this statement 
was posted it attracted 24 ‘likes’ and it received another 61 ‘likes’ 
7  Ro Teimumu Kepa was Deputy Prime Minister for the SDL government prior to the 2006 
coup. She is also paramount chief of the Burebasaga confederacy and Catholic, but retains strong 
links with the Methodist Church.
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on a shared version. Almost all appeared to be from Taukei. A small 
number commented that the secular state was the thin end of the 
wedge and would lead to legalising same sex marriage; that, under 
Sayed-Khaiyum’s influence, the state was becoming Muslim; and 
that Fiji’s situation could be likened to biblical Israel when Muslims 
demolished the holy temple of Jerusalem. All of these comments reflect 
views associated with nationalist Taukei Methodism.
A second posting on 22 August reflected a very different perspective. 
In this posting, the argument made was that:
SODELPA constitution and Manifesto do not call for a Christian State. 
What we say is that as a government, we will conduct ourselves based 
on Christian principles and values. These are values shared by all the 
world’s great religions. We are commanded to love our neighbours 
and do to others as we would have them do to us. We are required to 
forgive and to be merciful. We must care for the poor, the sick, the 
homeless, the forgotten and those in need. We must seek truth and 
social justice. These are the principles and values by which we shall 
govern. (SODELPA 2014c)
The posting goes on to say that all religious groups should be free to 
practice their faith without fear or intimidation and that the Christian 
values of the party makes it more sensitive to respecting the values 
of others, thus reflecting the idea that Fiji draws its strength from the 
rich variety of traditions, languages and cultures of its communities 
(SODELPA 2014c). This post received 79 ‘likes’. Evidently, this posting 
suggests some diversity in the views of the SODELPA membership, 
albeit, perhaps too liberal for the mainstay of the party as it no longer 
appears on the official SODELPA Facebook page. The views espoused 
here match the first part of the SODELPA manifesto (also available 
online), which claims it will guarantee:
• The freedom, equality and dignity of all individuals as fellow 
citizens, 
• The freedom and dignity of all religions and religious 
denominations; 
• The equality and dignity of all communities, their freedom 
to promote their languages and customary practices, and the 
protection through appropriate legislation of their cultural heritage 
and intellectual property … (SODELPA 2014a, p. 5).
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However, the second part of the manifesto reverts to strongly 
nationalist Taukei interests, revealing a desire to reinstate the Great 
Council of Chiefs and the institutions for Taukei land. Clearly, the 
SODELPA leaders intended to focus on attaining the support of the 
nationalist Christian Taukei, but knew that would not be enough to 
win the elections.
As a government supporter, the Fiji Sun is known to be a vigilant critic 
of nationalist Taukei values. For instance, it reported that SODELPA 
member Semesa Karavaki proposed in Parliament that government 
should fund the teaching of the Ten Commandments in school, which, 
he argued, would end crime and all other social ills (Tuwere 2014).8 
On the one hand, although reminiscent of the New Right in the USA, 
the notion of teaching the Ten Commandments in school is not terribly 
extreme for Taukei Christians, because meetings in government 
departments in Fiji have often begun with Christian prayers. On the 
other hand, if the secular state might choose to remove prayers and 
religious teaching from schools, there was another issue of concern for 
SODELPA. Many Taukei schools in Fiji are private, religious schools 
(Methodist, Catholic, SDA, Pentecostal, etc.). If the government 
enforced the secular state, it was feared that the government would 
also then enforce a secular curriculum in these religious schools 
(SODELPA 2014a), to which SODELPA was unequivocally opposed. 
If SODELPA seemed to be promoting the nationalist Taukei vision of 
a Christian Fiji, members of the Bainimarama Government have also 
attracted accusations of religious and communal favouritism, contrary 
to its aim of providing equal opportunities across social and ethnic 
division. Allegations have included the question of whether the 
Attorney-General, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, took out massive loans to 
support his brother’s move to head the Fiji Broadcasting Corporation 
(Lal 2012). Rumours also targeted Muslim businessmen, alleging they 
had roles in the coup (Bola-Bari 2014). Certainly, the government’s 
8 A further example of the extent to which Karavaki identifies with such values can be found 
in his video on YouTube, Noqu Kalou, Noqu Vanua, which opens with a graphic showing a 
red line being drawn from Israel directly to Fiji (Karavaki 2014), a reference to the narrative of 
the Kaunitoni Migration that claims Taukei travelled from somewhere in Africa, possibly from 
the Holy Lands, to Fiji by canoe, and which suggests that Karavaki identifies strongly with 
nationalist Taukei Methodism.
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post-election gift of FJD$12,000 towards a Muslim priest’s house in 
Labasa (Drauna 2015) ignored the way that public perception might 
construe such a gift in terms of religious and therefore racial bias. 
In this way, the intention to increase the distance between church and 
state in Fiji has been fraught with difficulties because not only do many 
people share the view that religious institutions should represent their 
adherents but also because government representatives frequently 
belong to religious communities they feel obliged to support in patron–
client styles of relationship, or at least are represented as doing so. 
Where the land ends and the sea begins …
Two years before the elections, the Fiji National Rugby League posted 
a message to Facebook that showed the extent to which the old maxims 
had retained their power. Simply by translating Noqu Kalou, Noqu 
Vanua as ‘My God, my country’ (Fiji National Rugby League 2012), 
the conception of the vanua was being used in such a way that its 
meaning had expanded from the description of a kin group the size 
of several villages to the borders of the nation-state. 
Yet, the fact that SODELPA attracted less than 50 per cent of the 
Taukei vote in 2014 (Ratuva, this volume) suggests that the nationalist 
voice had been neutralised on the national stage quite effectively. 
Were  Taukei voters turning away from SODELPA because of its 
support for Taukei institutions such as the Great Council of Chiefs and 
the protection of Taukei land, which is indicative of this nationalism? 
Certainly, the suggestion that increasing numbers of Taukei are 
rejecting nationalism has been posited as a reason for the Methodist 
Church of Fiji losing adherents (Weir 2015), but it is difficult to verify. 
The decline in Methodist Church numbers made the agenda of the 
2014 conference, where it was recorded that membership had declined 
by 1,788 people in the year from 2013 to 2014 (Methodist Church 
in Fiji 2014). Although this is only a decline of 0.9 per cent (from 
200,565 to 198,777), it appears that the Methodist Church is losing 
ground to other Christian denominations (Weir 2015). Yet, although 
Pentecostal churches offer profoundly different theologies to those of 
the Methodist Church, many retain conceptions of the paramountcy 
of the Taukei in the Fiji nation-state, Christianity’s role in state 
affairs, and conservative forms of male leadership, Christian marriage 
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and family. Therefore, conversion to Pentecostal Christianity is not 
by itself a convincing indicator that Taukei are rejecting the values 
underpinning nationalism.
A more likely reason for SODELPA’s failure at the elections was that 
it reflected its failure to appeal to a broad section of the electorate. 
The manifesto Reclaiming Fiji attempts to channel and mobilise 
the resentments of all those who had been threatened and coerced 
since the military’s takeover in 2006, including nationalist Taukei, 
Catholics, pro-democracy supporters, and feminist activists. However, 
this was a difficult, perhaps impossible, challenge because ultimately 
SODELPA’s central party focus was to support the Taukei institutions 
of governance and land, which lie in opposition to other interests 
motivated by democracy and/or women’s rights. Despite claims to 
the contrary, the nationalist vision excludes other races and other 
religious persuasions from holding full rights as equal citizens in 
nationhood. In addition, in spite of the fact that SODELPA’s leader is a 
woman, the nationalist vision positions women without chiefly titles 
structurally as second to men at work and in their marital homes, and 
excludes homosexuals and transgender citizens. Further, even within 
the Taukei community that espouses nationalism, there are tensions 
about exactly what the ideal relationship between the vanua, lotu and 
matanitu should be (cf. Ryle 2010).
Taukei nationalism, whether in SODELPA or the Methodist Church, 
sits in opposition to what Weir calls ‘universalism’ (which, I would 
argue, refers to a liberal set of values, most of which originated in 
so-called Western countries) (Weir 2015). The inconsistencies in the 
SODELPA manifesto reflect the struggle among and between village-
level notions of Methodism and international ideas of Methodism as 
they play out at the national level. However easy it is to support one 
side of the debate over the other, any solution for the Taukei community 
must lie, not in repression of the other side, but in a synthesis between 
indigenous and international ideas (in all their diversities) in a style 
particular to Fiji. 
This is perhaps one of the undercurrents of a distinctive turn in current 
Methodist theology, away from the vanua and towards the moana, the 
ocean. From Epeli Hau’ofa’s recasting of the Pacific Islands from specks 
in the sea to ‘a sea of islands’ (Hau’ofa 2008) to a rising interest in the 
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Pacific-designed and built double-hulled sailing boat or drua,9 and 
the realisation that Pacific Islanders must face the destruction created 
by rising sea levels and climate change (Halapua 2008), theologians 
from many of the Pacific mainline churches are now turning to 
remembrances of the early sailors and their navigation of the ocean for 
new possibilities of hope and pride.
The new Exodus of the Methodist 
Church of Fiji
Central to the nationalist rhetoric was the notion that Fijians were 
like the Hebrews cast from their lands as depicted in Exodus and 
Jeremiah.10 As President-elect of the Methodist Church of Fiji, 
Banivanua continued using these ideas, but central to his conception 
of the new Exodus facing the Methodist Church of Fiji is a sense of 
reflection:
Moses speaks to the people of Israel as they prepare to enter the 
‘Promised Land’ and asks them to look back at their 40-year journey 
through the wilderness and from being a rag-tag group of oppressed 
people to becoming a nation on the move, people who have made a 
collective covenant with God. (Banivanua 2014b)
After taking office as the President of the Methodist Church of Fiji 
in January 2015, Banivanua’s ideas about the church’s new exodus, 
Na Lako Yani Vou, were further elaborated at a meeting a couple 
of months later:
For me one of the main questions that we should ask was: Why did 
God allow this to happen to a church that God had called to bring 
Christianity to this land in 1835?
Like that pre-Exodus time, the Israelites were going through very 
difficult times at the hands of the Egyptians. Likewise in the pre-
Babylonian exile period the Jewish people went through some very 
difficult times as well. Both these events were going on without the 
full knowledge of the Israelites of God’s intention.
9  For example, seven drua were built in Auckland, New Zealand, for different trusts around 
the Pacific to encourage Pacific Islanders to continue or to revive their traditional boatbuilding 
and navigational skills (Pacific Voyagers n.d.)
10  See Newland 2015 for the development of this rhetoric.
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I believe that the same situation, faced by Israelites in the Exodus 
and after the Exile, is now faced by the Methodist Church in Fiji. 
(Baghwan 2015)
Here, Banivanua is appealing to the same community who felt they 
were losing their place in the nation-state in 1987 and 2000, but 
he consistently uses the notion of Exodus to reflect on the changes 
that need to come about in the Methodist Church, saying, ‘the time 
had come to do some reordering of society and help people called 
Methodists in Fiji to renew, recreate, reinvent and rebuild, God’s 
church’ (Baghwan 2015). Central to this vision is ecumenism between 
Christian churches and building relationships with the Hindu and 
Muslim communities. He focuses on restoring ‘a right relationship 
between us and God, a relationship based on love. The Methodist 
Church’s building of relationships is part and parcel of our new 
journey, the Lako Yani Vou. It is part of our calling’ (Baghwan 2015).
As part of this revised rhetoric, Banivanua introduces a new concept 
of an inclusive vanua:
In this process of rebuilding relationships, the church’s relationship 
with the vanua continues to be one we value and need to strengthen …
At the same time we are called to practise love in a radical way that 
impacts the vanua. As Christian Fijians we need to be inclusive our 
understanding of the vanua to include all the other ethnic groups that 
live in the vanua.
My vision is that the Methodist Church’s relationship-building process 
must be one that engages not only with government or a certain 
community but engages with everybody in Fiji. (Baghwan 2015)
In adapting some of the nationalist language to his own rhetoric, 
Banivanua is attempting to write over previous ideas of exclusiveness, 
to appropriate nationalist language in a different direction while 
(re-)creating a vision that Methodist adherents can identify with. 
At the same time, it is a more inclusive vision that attempts to unify 
the rural, the urban and the international notions of Methodism. 
While Banivanua’s vision of the new Exodus redefines the vanua as 
multiracial and multi-religious, extending beyond the Taukei, the 
vanua is still grounded firmly in Taukei conceptions of the world. 
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However, it is a stride away from the ethno-religious nationalism of 
the coups in 1987 and 2000, and of the government’s policies prior 
to the 2006 coup. 
How convincing Banivanua is to the adherents of the Methodist Church 
of Fiji is yet to be seen. Given the postings on the Methodist Church’s 
blogsite, there remain tensions within the church about teachings with 
regard to homosexuality and family form. This indicates that, although 
it might appear that the Methodist Church has been transformed, 
coming to a consensus on how the church community can suitably 
relate to the wider world may be more complicated. The new Exodus, 
then, is a fragile process.
In another shift in theology, if the land is still in sight, it is no longer 
the place from which decisions are made: 
The drua is ready, the map is ready, the winds are blowing. All that is 
needed now is for the crew to commit to the journey and follow their 
captain in this bold journey. (Baghwan 2015)
Again, the use of old images and language in this way is a tentative 
one. While drawing on the romance of the drua, the ocean-based 
journey has been used by nationalist Methodist clans in the Kaunitoni 
Migration, the narratives that talk of ancestors arriving from foreign 
lands by sea in canoes. Can the redeployment of this imagery erase 
and/or redirect the old meanings? Is a theology of the ocean already 
too reminiscent of other interests or does it represent the hope of new 
directions?
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Native land policy 
in the 2014 elections
Sefanaia Sakai
Introduction
One of the most debated issues prior to the September 2014 elections 
in Fiji was the security of Taukei land. This resulted from uncertainty 
about the implications of the many changes the Bainimarama 
Government had introduced since it took control of the government 
after the 2006 coup. In response, the political parties included policies 
on land issues in their manifestos. This chapter begins by examining 
the way in which land issues were addressed by the two major parties: 
the Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA) and the FijiFirst Party. 
SODELPA promised to roll back Bainimarama’s reforms, while FijiFirst 
proposed to further improve access to and utilisation of native land. 
The other political parties adopted a moderate position on land in 
the hope that the contradictory views espoused by the two major 
parties would be to their advantage. The chapter aims to analyse the 
extent to which the land issue, and the rhetoric of the leading parties, 
was a factor in the election result. 
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The 2014 general elections
After eight years of political uncertainty, the 2014 September elections 
restored democratic rule in Fiji, much to the relief of the people of Fiji 
as well as others in the region. Despite some criticisms,1 the elections 
were labelled as free and fair by the Multinational Observer Group 
(MOG). FijiFirst won a landslide victory, polling 59.2 per cent of the 
total votes, dispelling any hope of a coalition government expected by 
some political analysts. The voting age was reduced from 21 to 18 years, 
and 84.6 per cent of Fiji’s 591,101 registered voters participated in the 
2014 general elections (Fijian Elections Office 2014). 
There had been much speculation by various observers about the 
possible outcome of the elections, although former vice president 
and high court judge Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi noted the difficulty 
of knowing what voters were actually thinking ahead of the polls. 
The fact that the elections were being held under a new constitution, 
and with new parties competing for the first time, together with the 
fact that it had been eight years since the last elections, made it almost 
impossible to use past trends as a basis for judging the outcome in 
September 2014. Even so, land had been a particularly sensitive issue 
in all elections since independence in 1970, and it was reasonable to 
expect that the radical changes made to Taukei land policy under the 
Bainimarama regime prior to the elections might result in a backlash 
against FijiFirst among Taukei voters, with SODELPA as the main 
beneficiary. SODELPA certainly promoted the view that the changes 
to native land laws would bring social, economic and cultural disaster 
to the Taukei. 
At least part of the problem surrounding the election hype over land 
issues was due to ignorance on the part of Taukei landowners regarding 
their legal rights, which made them easy prey to fearmongering 
propaganda, as had occurred in previous elections. As Lal (1988, 
p. 81) noted, the Alliance Party, which had formed the government in 
Fiji since independence, exploited ‘the land fear strategy’ against the 
newly formed Fiji Labour Party in the 1987 general elections. 
1  See 2014 Electoral Commission Report. One of its recommendations concerns the need 
for changes to relevant sections of the 2013 Constitution, the Electoral Decree and the Political 
Parties Decree to allow good governance in the election process. 
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Chiefs, custom and land
Official records show the Taukei owned about 91 per cent of the land 
while freehold and crown land made up approximately 6 and 3 per cent 
of the remaining land respectively (TLTB 2014, p.8). A significant 
difference between customary Taukei land tenure compared to western 
systems is its communal ownership, which is held in accordance with 
customs and traditions. Individual Taukei do not have legal title to 
native land but each individual is registered under a mataqali (clan) 
which is the legal land owning unit, as stated in the Native Land 
Act 1961. The mataqali can neither sell land to outsiders nor grant 
private property rights to individual members. In practice, each 
mataqali is entitled to a share of the land that constitutes the vanua or 
village. In pre-contact time, however, all land belonged to groups of 
Taukei, although land tenure systems varied throughout the islands. 
The Tukutuku Raraba2 recorded by various Native Land Commissions 
(NLCs) demonstrated that precolonial customs were far from 
homogeneous. Various groups of Taukei were frequently displaced, 
their composition was fluid, and hierarchy varied considerably by 
region (France 1969; Nayacakalou 1975; Ravuvu 1998). 
Customary views on land transcend the tangible representation of 
resources. This contributed to the Taukei’s resolve to protect their 
land from alienation. Like other Taukei scholars, Tuwere (2002, p. 36) 
reaffirms that for Taukei, land, spirit and people are integral to the 
vanua,3 and the components are inseparable. Thus the vanua is seen 
as a ‘social fact’ that holds the Taukei together and gives it meaning 
(Tuwere 2002). This view incorporates a host of spiritual values as 
well as more practical aspects of land ownership and use. In earlier 
periods, the idea of a sacred tie was often emphasised by the spokesmen 
representing their vanua when giving evidence to the Native Land 
Commission (NLC) on landownership and occupation (France 1969, 
p. 10). Narration would include tribal origins linked to a known 
god in a given area. Consequently, Taukei land tenure practices were 
2 Oral traditions of the landowning units and individuals regarding historical accounts such 
as initial land settlement, ownership, distribution and occupation.
3  The vanua, for Taukei, literally means ‘land’, but it encompasses a holistic meaning attached 
to it which includes the Taukeis’ identity, resources, culture and spiritual being.
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formulated in what Malinowski referred to as ‘codification of belief’ 
(cited in France 1969, p. 10). It is because of the strength of this value 
system that land is not seen as a commodity (Boydell 2005). 
Although traditional land tenure systems were varied and flexible, 
colonial order required a certain uniformity throughout the islands 
and so Sir Arthur Gordon, the first colonial governor, instituted a 
formal native land tenure system that could be applied in all parts 
of the island group. In addition to introducing a certain degree 
of uniformity where it had not previously existed, the system was 
designed to protect indigenous land and the way of life from the greed 
of white settlers (France 1969, p. 107). However, some scholars have 
argued, and rightly so, that the colonial policy of protecting Taukei 
also impeded their socioeconomic progress (Boydell 2005; Lawson 
1996; Nayacakalou 1975). 
Another important point to note is that although Taukei land was 
protected, the need to develop a plantation economy required some 
flexibility, some modifications in the system, and so the leasing of 
native land for agricultural purposes was introduced. In 1936, Ratu Sir 
Lala Sukuna, the first indigenous Native Land Commissioner, together 
with the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) determined that all land not 
required for the sustenance of Fijian owners was to be made available 
for national development through native land leases. A Native Land 
Trust Board (NLTB) was established in 1940 to administer and protect 
native land. In the process, chiefs recommended to the colonial 
administration that land policies not only safeguarded land ownership 
but also secured their positions in a changing society. As a result, 
chiefly control became an integral part of the colonial native land 
tenure system, which included the distribution of wealth from land 
development. 
Fijian chiefs, who were regarded as anointed by God, obviously 
occupied a special position in traditional Fijian society, being given 
precedence, loyalty, obedience, authority, privilege and respect 
(Nayacakalou 1975, p. 81). But their primary role was to look after 
the welfare of the people and to safeguard resources and ensure 
distribution, such that every member of the group had access to land. 
Surprisingly, historical records show that prominent chiefs actually 
sold large areas of land, thereby contravening their traditional roles 
as custodians of ancestral land. For instance, Derrick (1968, p. 185) 
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writes that in Vanua Levu, the second largest island of the Fiji group, 
land sales were assumed to be the prerogative of the high chiefs and 
few dared to question them. 
As with the land tenure system, the role of chiefly authority was 
reconfigured and codified by the colonial government. Under the 
separate Fijian Affairs Board, Taukei were made to live as a communal 
group under traditional leaders whose privileges and status were 
increased and secured, while the land rights of individuals and small 
groups were submerged in mataqali groups, restricting the free transfer 
of land between groups and individual in times of need (Tupouniua, 
Crocombe & Slatter 1980, p. 33). Ravuvu (1998, p. 129) explains 
that land which was once considered by the people of the village to 
provide them with various needs for their daily lives had been made 
sole property of a particular mataqali. The method of allocating land 
rights introduced by the colonial government were, as noted above, 
much more rigid and as a consequence often failed to meet the needs 
of village life (Ravuvu 1998).
As for the high chiefs, their positions were firmly entrenched during 
colonial rule through the Native Regulations. This was very unlike pre-
contact times, when inefficient leaders could be wiped out by stronger 
and more efficient leaders, especially during tribal wars (Tupouniua, 
Crocombe & Slatter 1980, p. 33). Consequently, Fijian individuality 
was suppressed under many self-serving traditional leaders whose 
claim to office rested on nothing more than the accident of birth. 
Any attempt to break away from this bondage was firmly suppressed 
under the new powers given to chiefs under the Native Regulations.
Fiji’s history also shows lack of commitment by Taukei political leaders 
to implement positive legislative changes to meet the changing needs 
of society. Nayacakalou (1975, p. 5) discussed the dilemma facing 
Fijian leaders regarding the preservation of Fijian culture, including 
the system of land tenure and management. If any advocated radical 
change they could attract accusations of being anti-Taukei; on the other 
hand, if they emphasised the importance of maintaining traditional 
(or neo-traditional) ways, they were accused of being reactionary. 
This dilemma remained a serious problem in the post-independence 
period, especially whenever issues concerning Indo-Fijian farmers 
and their need for secure leases were raised. The chiefs represented 
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themselves as the only ones capable of ensuring that Indo-Fijians did 
not take over Taukei land altogether, although this was never a real 
possibility, either legally or politically. This was in addition to the 
constant emphasis on the notion that there is a sacred, unbreakable 
connection between land, chiefs and the vanua. These notions were 
featured prominently in post-independence election rhetoric aimed 
at Taukei voters. In the 1987 elections, for instance, a prominent 
Alliance politician of chiefly status blamed the Labour–National 
Federation Party coalition for trying to meddle with the scared ties 
between the turaga (chiefs) and the vanua. A warning was issued 
concerning the dire consequences for the future of Taukei (Lawson 
1996, p. 50). One chief stated that ‘the Turaga and the Vanua were one 
– one could not exist without the other – the chiefs were a bulwark of 
security for all and the custodians of Taukei identity, land and culture’ 
(Lawson 1996).
The political triumphs and failures of the architect of the 1987 coups, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, were tied to how Taukei regarded 
him as protector of Taukei interests, including land. In the aftermath 
of the 1987 coups, he was seen as the champion of Taukei rights in 
the face of alleged threats to land, identity and the entire edifice of 
Taukei tradition (Lal 2000; Lawson 1996). But this was to change when 
Fiji returned to democratic rule. Lal (2000, p. 326) notes that when 
Rabuka’s Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) party went into 
coalition with the largely Fiji-Indian National Federation Party to form 
a coalition prior to the 1999 general elections, many Taukei voters 
deserted him and his party because he was seen as betraying Taukei 
interests and Taukei political control. 
With respect to the 2000 coup, Boydell’s (2005) analysis suggests 
that one reason for the 2000 civilian coup was a growing concern 
among Taukei about land security under the Chaudhry Government, 
especially when it appeared that the government wanted to legislate 
to allow access to unused native land for development without 
considering the welfare of Taukei landowners. With these factors in 
mind, the issue of Taukei insecurity (whether based on real threats or 
fabrications) needs careful analysis and understanding, especially by 
non-Taukei, for many Taukei will view them with suspicion in matters 
concerning land. 
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Land security issues in the 2014 elections
Given this background, it is no surprise that the issue of land was 
one of the most contested campaign issues prior to the 2014 elections, 
as evident in the party manifestos, opinion polls, policies and land 
decrees. The SODELPA and FijiFirst manifestos, as set out in Table 1, 
reflect contrasting positions on land protection and land innovation, 
although both claimed to be advocating both objectives.
Table 1: SODELPA and FijiFirst manifestos on native land
SODELPA FijiFirst
Land Policies Uphold Native Land Act 1997 
Constitution entrenchment provision 
on Native Land Act. Revise the 
equal distribution policy. Abolish 
the Land Use Decree. Revise the 
Surfing Decree. Land protection as 
in the 1997 Constitution.
Uphold Native Land Act 2013 
Constitution. Continue with Land Use 
Decree and equal distribution policy. 
Uphold the Surfing Decree. Land 
Protection as in the 2013 Constitution. 
FJD$10 million to help Land Owning 
Unit (LOU) develop land.
great Council 
of Chiefs
Re-establish the gCC. Abolish the gCC 
Secular State Secular state gives lesser value 
towards Christian role in Fiji.
Support secular state as part of 
equal citizenship.
Constitution Revise 2013 Constitution with 
inclusion of the 1997 Constitution.
Uphold the 2013 Constitution.
iTaukei Land 
Trust Board
Restructure and keep as the 
legal custodian of native land as 
institution. 
Restructure and drive for economic 




Provide affordable housing. Squatters on native land given 
residential 99-year leases with LOU 
approval.
Source: Derived from the manifestos of SODELPA and FijiFirst, 2014.
On land policy, SODELPA promised to facilitate consultation regarding 
the 2010 Leases and Licences Regulations amendment and to immediately 
abolish the 2010 Land Use Decree if elected to government. It also said 
it would uphold the ILO (International Labor Organization) Convention 
169 and the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples4 
to strengthen opposition to the 2013 Constitution.
4  This declaration, while accepting the fundamental equality of all peoples, nevertheles notes 
that many indigenous peoples the world over have suffered marginalisation through colonialism, 
and recognises the need to respect and promote the rights of indigenous peoples affirmed in 
historical treaties and other agreements with the state. 
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FijiFirst’s manifesto built on their existing policies, which they claimed 
fostered inclusive growth for all Fijians. As for land issues, the party 
pledged to uphold the Land Use Decree and provide financial support 
for Land Owning Units (LOUs) who wished to develop their land. 
Additionally, they promised to provide a 99-year residential lease to 
squatters residing on native land with the approval of LOUs. Other 
parties such as the National Federation Party (NFP)5 and the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) adopted a balanced approach regarding 
changes to native land legislations, arguing that proper mechanisms 
should be followed and native land ownership should be protected. 
The NFP for instance, pledged to include the entrenchment clause 
in the 2013 Constitution for native land legislation and would not 
exercise the power of ‘compulsory acquisition’ of native land as 
stated under Section 27 of the 2013 Constitution (NFP 2014, p. 19). 
The party clearly supported SODELPA’s stance that land issues and 
Taukei institutions needed wider consultation rather than the non-
consultative approach taken by the regime.
The Tebbutt opinion poll in August 2014 showed that 74 per cent 
and 16 per cent of registered voters considered land issues as very 
important and quite important respectively.6 This was across all 
age groups, both genders and all ethnicities in both the Central and 
Western divisions of Fiji. Interestingly, only 25 per cent said they 
understood land issues quite well, while 83 per cent said they would 
like to know more about the subject (Vakacolo 2014). As noted above, 
native land protection is extremely important for indigenous people 
for a variety of reasons; not least, because in a competitive world 
it is the only resource that provides a sense of social, political and 
economic security. However, Taukei land rights are in fact protected 
under the 2013 Constitution as well as under two sets of native land 
legislation introduced by the Bainimarama regime in 2010. These will 
now be examined in greater detail.
5  The National Federation Party is the longest-surviving Indo-Fijian dominant party since 
independence and, like SODELPA, would adopt a consultative approach regarding land issues 
and reinstatement of the GCC if it won the elections. 
6  Tebutt poll conducted on 1,047 registered voters between 4 and 6 August. The poll asked: 
‘How important is the land ownership issue to the nation? How well would you say that you 
understand the current land ownership issues that are being discussed? And how interested are 
you to learn more about land ownership issues?’
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In 2010, the Bainimarama Government amended the Leases and 
Licenses Regulations of the Native Land Act to ensure equal 
distribution of lease money to mataqali members. The amendment 
was introduced in line with a government policy of inclusiveness and 
designed to address inequality among Taukei landowners. Wealth 
from the use of Taukei land through leasing has been substantial, but 
had not been distributed on an equal basis. According to the iTaukei 
Land Trust Board (TLTB, formerly the Native Land Trust Board 
or NLTB), the total lease income distributed to LOUs has increased 
from FJD$24 million in 2000 to FJD$64 million in 2014 (TLTB 2014, 
p. 11). For  the first time, under the new equal distribution policy, 
chiefs and commoners within a mataqali would share the economic 
gains from the use of their mataqali land equally (see hypothetical 
scenario Figure 1). Before the amendment, the TLTB usually deducted 
25 per  cent as an administration fee and also to assist the TLTB to 
generate development projects on Taukei land. There were also three 
categories of chiefs who received the largest share of the lease money 
under the old distribution system: turaga ni vanua (village chief) 
received 5 per cent, turaga ni yavusa (tribal chief) received 10 per 
cent, and turaga ni mataqali (clan chief) received 15 per cent. Often 
a single chief would receive the full 30 per cent entitlement because 
he was holder of all three titles and belonged to the clan whose land 
was leased for development. The remaining 45 per cent was shared by 
the rest of the mataqali members. In 2013, the Bainimarama regime 
also reduced the TLTB share from 25 per cent to 10 per cent, putting 
an emphasis on the TLTB self-funding its own operation rather than 
relying so heavily on deductions from lease money. 
The equal distribution policy has also contributed to the reduction in 
the number of registered disputes over chiefly titles in the country in 
2013 and 2014. For example, the Native Lands Commission received 
three chiefly titles dispute cases in 2014 compared to 13 recorded 
cases in 2013. The commissioner attributed this decline to the 
implementation of the equal distribution policy by the Bainimarama 
Government (FBC 2014). However, the validity of this analysis could 
be substantiated only after in-depth research on the issue of equal 
distribution and titles disputes. 
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Figure 1: Old distribution policy FJD$760,000: A hypothetical 
scenario
Source: Sakai 2014, presentation at Tahiti PIPSA conference.
Returning now to the responses by political parties: SODELPA 
portrayed these reforms as detrimental to the livelihoods of Taukei 
and a violation of indigenous rights. From the outset, it must be 
noted that SODELPA had attempted to use land security issues and 
also the abolition of the GCC in 2012 (through the Taukei Affairs 
Revocation Regulation), which put an end to the GCC’s 136 years of 
existence, as a trump card to attract Taukei voters in its 2014 election 
campaign (Fraenkel 2014, p. 2). Bainimarama had questioned the 
GCC’s relevance to the country’s contemporary political structure 
and criticised the institution as being not only highly politicised but 
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also irrelevant in an era that championed the equality of Fiji’s citizens 
(Gonedua 2012). Another issue for SODELPA was the ban placed on 
the Methodist Church’s annual national conference under the Public 
Emergency Regulations. SODELPA, in opposing the restrictions on 
church activities, attempted to appeal to the largely Methodist Taukei 
voters. Indeed, many Methodist Church followers had previously 
formed a substantial part of the support base of SODELPA’s immediate 
predecessor, the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party, which 
had been overthrown while in government in 2006 (see Newland, this 
volume). Finally, in early 2013 the Bainimarama Government withdrew 
all ethnic-based scholarships, including the Fijian Affairs Scholarship, 
which had served to promote education for Taukei students at the 
expense of other ethnic groups.
With respect to land policy, SODELPA claimed that the equal 
distribution of lease monies was not conducive to the traditional 
livelihood of Taukei. SODELPA leader Ro Teimumu Kepa, a high chief 
and beneficiary of the previous system of distribution, explained that 
chiefs, as heads of the mataqali and yavusa, had responsibilities to 
the vanua and their larger shares would cater for major obligations. 
Deposed SDL Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, while campaigning for 
SODELPA, invented his own version of redistribution when replying 
to a question that the author posed during the SODELPA campaign in 
Wainivula, Suva. He said that the party would let the provincial council 
decide on the fate of the equal distribution policy in consultation with 
the people. This was clearly different from Ro Teimumu’s position that 
SODELPA would revert to the old system. 
These contradictory views became counterproductive to the party’s 
campaign before the elections.7 First, in advocating the old distribution 
system, Ro Teimumu was condoning inequality among Taukei, using 
facile cultural justification. What the party overlooked was that 
many chiefs in Fiji did not receive lease money yet still fulfilled their 
obligations to the vanua successfully because communalism and 
reciprocity were crucial values of Taukei culture. 
7  SODELPA, through Qarase, had given a few contradictory views such as on land and the 
interpretation of the secular state during the 2014 election campaign, which may have dissuaded 
people from voting for the party.
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The old distribution policy actually contributed to inequality and the 
marginalisation of ordinary Taukei in their traditional villages; and 
they never questioned it because of the belief that it was an essential 
part of Taukei culture. It must be noted that the chief’s lease allocation 
was a private entitlement and he was not obliged by law to spend or 
redistribute his share of lease monies on traditional obligations. Those 
chiefs in receipt of land monies had benefited from a land policy that 
had its origins in the colonial order, which contributed to some chiefs 
becoming individualistic and very wealthy while ordinary Taukei 
remained disadvantaged despite also being owners of an important 
communal resource. 
In advocating a policy of equal citizenship, Bainimarama criticised 
the chiefly institution as promoting inequality amongst the Taukei 
community by holding on to privileges bestowed, not by tradition, 
but by colonial laws. In the past several decades, neither the GCC nor 
political leaders had taken any steps to reform land policies to benefit 
all Taukei. Despite promises by previous Taukei-led governments such 
as the SVT and SDL to improve Taukei welfare, the socioeconomic 
situation of most Taukei continued to deteriorate.8 Narsey (2008, p. vii) 
suggests that the proportion of Taukei living in poverty in 2000 was 
about 49 per cent in early 2000, although that could have increased 
after the 2006 coup because of the initial economic downturn. 
It can be argued that to change something that benefits the majority 
of Taukei landowners through fair distribution would be unethical. 
In the hypothetical scenario illustrated in Figure 2, for instance, under 
the equal distribution policy, the FJD$760,000 revenue from the leased 
land is distributed to two recipient groups, the TLTB (FJD$76,000) 
and mataqali (FJD$684,000), with the latter figure being distributed 
equally to all members. Thus if the mataqali has 300 members, each one 
will receive FJD$2,280, including women and children. It is then the 
prerogative of the landowners to decide what to do with the income. 
For instance, even with the new policy in place, some landowning 
units may have a consensual agreement that the heads of vanua, 
mataqali and tokatoka continue to receive their normal shares, or at 
least a higher proportion than other mataqali members, as a reward 
for good leadership prior to the amendment. However, governance at 
8  See Scarr 1999.
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village level is not necessarily inclusive and the consensus reached 
may not take into account the views of women and youth, who usually 









Figure 2: New equal distribution share FJD$760,000: 
A hypothetical scenario
Source: Sakai 2014, presentation at the Tahiti PIPSA conference.
Following the reforms, there has been no major resistance to the 
changes made by the Banimarama government, except from SODELPA. 
However, silence on these matters does not mean acceptance of 
the policy changes. Many Taukei feel constrained in articulating 
their views publicly on many political issues for cultural reasons 
(Madraiwiwi 2014; Nabobo et al. 2005). While silence is part of custom, 
Taukei support for the interim government may have also contributed 
to a subdued response. 
Another contested issue prior to the elections was the 2010 Land 
Use Decree, a policy framework that aims to facilitate productivity 
of unused native and crown land. Under the decree, unused native 
land would be deposited in a Land Bank provided that 60 per cent 
of the mataqali members consent. Once the land is designated and 
deposited, the government would find potential investors who would 
be sub-lessees and would develop the land according to the provisions 
of the lease agreement. SODELPA had publicly campaigned against 
the decree, arguing once again that it would erode Taukei rights. 
SODELPA pointed out that there was one clause in the decree that 
removed the right of native land owners to seek redress in a court or 
THE PEOPLE HAVE SPOkEN
148
tribunal. The party had mainly used a Fiji-based study and its own 
legal expertise to highlight the weaknesses of the decree. This study 
(see Dodd 2012) provided a detailed analysis of the legal implications 
of allocating Taukei land under the Land Use Unit, which included 
unchallenged legal power allocated to government to control native 
land for the duration of lease.9 It is argued that the Land Use Decree 
would weaken the LOU’s decision-making process and dispute-
settlement capacity once the land was designated and the negotiation 
grace period of five years had lapsed, giving the government and 
investors total control of native land. 
In its media release on the issue, SODELPA noted its reservations 
regarding the process of achieving majority consent and the confusion 
between individual rights and group rights regarding native land 
protection under the Land Use Decree.10 The party also noted that 
the decree did not protect Taukei land from alienation as in other 
past constitutions and its real intention was to allow foreign investors 
easy access to native land on 99-year lease terms, and this effectively 
alienated the land for up to four generations.
In paving the way for this decree one necessary step had been the 
abrogation of the 1997 Constitution, which allowed the Bainimarama 
regime to abolish the GCC. Under the 1997 Constitution, the GCC 
had constitutional power to stop any amendments regarding any 
parliamentary proposal that might lead to possible alienation of Taukei 
land. An additional measure was the weakening of the structure of 
the TLTB board,11 to which, under the 1997 Constitution, the GCC 
appointed the majority of members.
It is indeed possible that the Land Use Decree will facilitate land 
alienation  because the LOU, once the lease has expired, may not have 
the financial capacity required to compensate investors for any general 
improvement to the land that has occurred during the leasing period. 
On another issue related to land use, SODELPA argued that the 2010 
Surfing Decree did not obligate any investors to compensate the relevant 
LOU for the use of traditionally owned fishing grounds belonging to 
Taukei for leisure activities such as surfing, therefore removing potential 
9  See clause 15(1) of the 2010 Land Use Decree. 
10  See SODELPA 2013. 
11  The prime minister becomes board chair and appoints at least three members of the board. 
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revenue sources for Taukei landowners. Another general criticism that 
could be made of the Bainimarama regime’s approach with respect to all 
these policies is that good governance processes, which include public 
participation and consultation, were not followed. 
The controversial land decree, in particular, provided the basis for a 
political agenda for SODELPA to launch its election campaign against 
FijiFirst, despite the latter’s popularity in many provinces around the 
country. The party’s strategy focused on the need to protect native land 
and other Taukei institutions in its effort to appeal to Taukei voters, 
who make up around 58 per cent of the population. Unfortunately, the 
ethnic approach employed by SODELPA backfired, as many undecided 
voters from all ethnicities found FijiFirst’s liberal manifesto more 
appealing than SODELPA’s conservative approach. For many people it 
seemed that what mattered was the ‘real’ development approach taken 
by the Bainimarama Government for those who needed it most—
the poor, women and children, and rural dwellers. The issue of land 
insecurity was cushioned by the fact that the Bainimarama campaign 
seemed to convince many Taukei voters that their land was effectively 
secured under the 2013 Constitution. In fact, the Land Use Decree was 
an alternative lease arrangement available for LOUs to utilise unused 
land, with landowners receiving 100 per cent of the lease revenue. 
These policy changes, however, still needed wider national 
consultations to prevent confusion and possible confrontation amongst 
landowners. Furthermore, the debate about the Land Use Decree 
did cause uneasiness amongst many Taukei because of the vague 
and selective explanations offered by both SODELPA and FijiFirst. 
The  common response from FijiFirst to questions about native land 
was simply that Taukei land was protected by the Constitution. On the 
other hand, SOLDELPA emphasised the notion of land alienation and 
raised the spectre of Taukei becoming landless in their own country. 
The debate therefore left many Taukei voters confused and feeling 
that ‘we don’t know who is telling the truth’. Even so, it is clear that 
most ultimately placed their trust in FijiFirst. 
Part of the problem was that among candidates of both parties there 
was a lack of understanding about the details of the new land decree, 
with FijiFirst candidates simply declaring in response to questions 
that ‘Taukei land is safe’. In Wainivula, Suva, a FijiFirst candidate 
responded abusively when he was questioned by the author about 
the detailed provisions in the Land Use Decree and the possibility 
THE PEOPLE HAVE SPOkEN
150
that it might lead to a de facto alienation of native land. As a result, 
this candidate was expelled from representing the party. Two other 
candidates and current ministers in the then interim government 
were present but could not answer the questions either. In Nasole, 
Suva, a FijiFirst candidate could not answer the question regarding 
a Land Use Decree provision concerning a landowner’s right to take 
the government to court in the event of a dispute. The answer to this 
question, according to Bainimarama, is that the government may be 
challenged in court if fewer than 60 per cent of the LOU members 
consented to allocating the land under the Land Bank (FBC TV 2014). 
The 2014 elections results
Issues concerning land insecurity, which should have been SODELPA’s 
political trump card, appear to have failed to gain much appeal during 
the 2014 elections, even though the party got the great majority of 
its votes from among Taukei. For ordinary Taukei, acquiring basic 
needs and making progress were more important and many believed 
that their customary land was safe. The 2014 general elections results 
indicated that voters in many of the 14 provinces of Fiji supported 
FijiFirst, except for Lomaiviti, Kadavu, Lau and Rewa, which voted 
predominantly for SODELPA (see Figure 3). 
The official result shows 56.5 per cent of the total rural votes went 
to FijiFirst, with a majority of votes from key provinces such as Ba, 
Ra, Nadroga-Navosa and Natasiri. These provinces constituted major 
areas of native leased land for commercial agriculture, tourism, mining 
and housing. In Ba province alone, the total number of tourism leases 
on native land by foreign investors is 41, three times more than 
other provinces (TLTB 2012, slide 7). More generally, Bainimarama’s 
popularity stretched nationwide, accounting for 202,459 votes. 
In Yasawa for instance, 29 per cent of the 46 per cent vote for FijiFirst 
went to Bainimarama personally (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 3: Rural party votes according to province: Fiji 2014 
national elections
Source: Nakagawa 2014.
Given these results, it is evident that Taukei voters favoured the 
changes initiated by Bainimarama for the benefits they appear to have 
delivered to ordinary LOU members. Ethnic-based voting seemed 
to have lost its appeal, although whether this remains the case in 
future voting behaviour remains to be seen. Traditional ties among 
chiefly families between the provinces remain an important factor in 
Taukei voting behaviour, as demonstrated in the provinces of Rewa, 
Cakaudrove and Namosi in 2014. Given that their paramount chiefs 
were SODELPA candidates, and all won seats in the elections, these 
provinces remain a stronghold for SODELPA. Lau province, home to 
some of Fiji’s most important statesmen including Fiji’s longest-serving 
prime minster, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara—a close relative of SODELPA 
leader Ro Teimumu Kepa—saw some of the highest voting figures for 
SODELPA (74.2 per cent). 












Figure 4: Total votes (%) in Yasawa by political parties
Source: Nakagawa 2014.
All Fijians will no doubt assess FijiFirst’s performance over the next 
four years, but for Taukei one focus will be on how matters develop 
in relation to land, especially how the new land use decree is applied. 
Land is a highly sensitive issue and has the potential to inflame passions 
and tensions. In its current form, the decree may prove problematic, 
as it does not provide an avenue for redress of land issues. 
Conclusion
Land issues may have had some impact on the results of the 2014 
elections, but the concerns expressed by SODELPA in their campaign 
were not sufficiently persuasive among Taukei, let alone other 
communities, to give SODELPA victory in the elections. It seems 
that Taukei voters, who outnumber all other ethnic groups in terms 
of voting power, considered other basic matters such as education, 
water, electricity and other infrastructure as more important than 
land. In addition, the equal distribution policy gave FijiFirst an 
advantage, as many LOU members whose lands are leased received 
economic benefits denied under the old system. In the shorter term, 
this policy can deliver positive benefits to many more Taukei because 
it alleviates marginalisation and inequality within the Taukei social 
structure and potentially can improve the standard of living for all 
Taukei—rural and urban dwellers alike—if the proceeds are better 
utilised. It has also contributed to the reduction in the number of 
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registered disputes over chiefly titles in the period 2013–14. These 
improvements may therefore alleviate the perceived insecurities and 
fear of land alienation that has caused so much political instability in 
the past. At the same time, perceptions concerning the possibility of 
future Taukei land alienation need to be clarified. There is also a need 
to change the current use of newly earned revenue from land from 
mainly basic consumption to long-term investments to sustain Taukei 
livelihoods while avoiding land insecurity in the future. 
The Land Use Decree offers an alternative lease tenure system for 
Taukei to develop their land to earn good returns. It encourages 
innovative land utilisation for the Taukei themselves apart from 
leasing it to non-Taukei enterprises. It facilitates use of idle Taukei 
lands for commercial revenue-generating purposes and provides 
secure access to land to non-Taukei entrepreneurs over a longer period 
of time. Under this decree, the government also provides technical and 
financial support for LOUs that allocate their land under the newly 
created Land Bank to encourage Taukei entrepreneurship. However, 
the issue of control specifically awarded to the Prime Minister as well 
as the Minister of Lands within this legislation needs to be rethought 
to allow LOUs to make their own decisions. This will also help alleviate 
fears concerning possible alienation. 
Finally, what more needs to be done regarding land issues for Taukei 
in Fiji and their impacts on future general elections? There needs 
to be wider consultation on the land decrees and policies regarding 
native land. Awareness about indigenous rights regarding land and 
innovative commercial programmes to increase productivity benefiting 
the communities also needs attention and support. The provision of 
relevant infrastructural and financial support for land development 
is crucial. The adoption of new methods for commercial ventures 
for Taukei, such as being core partners in business rather than just 
being recipients of lease money, needs to be encouraged. By the same 
token, effective commercial partnerships with non-Taukei entities 
with business acumen should be sought, built and maintained for the 
success of any Taukei entrepreneurship; and all such efforts need to be 
sustained until Taukei can operate independently. Taukei landowners 
will achieve a greater sense of security once they comprehend the 
implications of land legislation and feel the tangible benefits flowing 
from the use of their land. Well-informed Taukei will also not be 
misguided by fabricated threats frequently used by politicians in 
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the past to generate fears about land insecurity. Even so, there may 
well be ongoing debates regarding traditional social structures and 
identity, especially with respect to chiefly institutions. The greater 
equality now enjoyed by Taukei under the new policies may well 
serve to undermine the traditional social structure and its place in 
contemporary Taukei society. 
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Fiji elections and the 




The 2013 Constitution, particularly its provision reducing the voting 
age to 18 years, helped propel young people into the political limelight. 
Traditionally and historically, young people in Fiji have often been 
left out of structures of political decision-making at the local and 
national levels (Vakaoti 2013). During the September 2014 general 
elections, young people between the ages of 18 to 35 years constituted 
about 40 per cent of the electorate (Round 2014b). As a result, political 
commentators asserted that young people held the balance of power. 
Given the absence of relevant voter information, the influence of 
young voters on the election outcome is difficult to establish. This is 
complicated by the fact that young people are not a homogenous group. 
It is evident that the majority of registered young voters exercised 
their right and voted in the 17 September 2014 elections, embracing 
the democratic opportunity to elect parliamentary representatives.
Given the dearth of published sources on young people’s democratic 
participation, specifically voting in Fiji, the discussion in this 
chapter uses as a backdrop the Citizen’s Constitutional Forum’s (CCF) 
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2014  report, ‘Young People and Democratic Participation in Fiji’ 
(Vakaoti 2014). The report, hereafter referred to as the CCF Youth 
Democratic Participation survey, uses the concept of generation to 
explore young people’s understanding of democratic participation 
and the influences on their political involvement in the lead-up to the 
17 September general elections. Of particular interest for this chapter 
are the findings of the report relating to young people and electoral 
and constitutional reform, which looked specifically at young people’s 
responses to questions on political parties, politics and voting. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section explores the 
rationale for reducing the voting age to 18 years and makes the point 
that voting is only one part of active citizenship. The second section 
looks at the support provided to young people by the government, 
political parties, civil society organisations (CSOs) and the media. 
The  third section considers the impact of the youth vote, with the 
fourth section suggesting ways youth stakeholders discussed in section 
two can support young people’s democratic participation that extends 
beyond voting. The chapter concludes with a caution to stakeholders, 
particularly the government, about its promise to accord young people 
equal civil and political rights. 
Engaging young people: 2013 Constitution 
The reduction of the voting age from 21 to 18 years was one of the non-
negotiable principles1 of the 2013 Constitution. This decision appeared 
to align with the minimum voting age of 18 years in countries like 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.2 In Fiji, reasons for 
the reduction in the voting age are vaguely expressed in government 
statements such as ‘Government has recognized the need to empower 
and involve youths in decision making and has reduced the voting age 
to 18 [years]’ (Fiji Government Online 2014) and ‘Fiji’s Constitution 
… provides for greater civil and political rights to youths through 
reduction of the voting age from 21 to 18 years ensuring their say in 
1  Other non-negotiable principles and values include a common and equal citizenry; 
a secular state; the removal of systematic corruption; an independent judiciary; elimination of 
discrimination; good and transparent governance; social justice; one person, one vote, one value; 
the elimination of ethnic voting and proportional representation.
2  This criteria is assessed with other criteria, particularly that around residency status.
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the political life of the nation’ (Fiji Government Online 2013). It could 
be argued that this position reflects the government’s mantra of ‘a 
common and equal citizenry, a common identity and a level playing 
field on which every citizen can excel’ (Online Editor 2014). 
The reduction in the voting age was received with mixed reactions. 
Political parties like the Fiji Labour Party (FLP), People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP) and the Social Liberal Democratic Party (SODELPA) 
welcomed this change (Gibson 2014b; Baines 2013; Round 2014a). 
Fifty-four per cent of respondents in the CCF Youth Democratic 
Participation survey also supported this change, with the view that 
young people at 18 years are mature enough to vote. On the other hand, 
41 per cent of young people in the survey believed that the voting age 
should be retained at 21 years. The main contention was that young 
people were not consulted about this decision. According to Vakaoti 
(2014, p. 37) focus group participants in the survey argued that:
young people are being manipulated, a government tactic to generate 
support given its knowledge about the significance of the youth vote 
… [Focus group participants] in Nadi argued that the government 
was drawing from developed countries where many young people are 
independent. They added that the Fiji situation is different as many 
young people continue to depend on their parents who at the same 
time can influence a young person’s voting behavior. 
Despite this contention, young people actively and excitedly took to 
the polls. This was evident in the CCF Youth Democratic Participation 
survey, where 67 per cent of participants were identified as having 
registered to vote, 61 per cent of whom intended to vote (Vakaoti 2014). 
This suggests that many young people were excited by the prospect 
of voting, many for the first time (Ewart 2014). The nature of young 
people’s political participation in the lead-up to the elections can be 
examined based on their engagement in political party campaigning, 
CSOs voter awareness and training and media engagement.
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Young people and the elections: 
Preparedness and support
According to Esser (2007, p. 1195), ‘voting is still the most basic and 
arguably most important democratic act … it is an essential part of 
political socialization, a cornerstone of democratic stability …’. 
The importance of voting assumes that as a result of preparedness 
and education, voters will make an informed decision on Election 
Day. In Fiji’s case, this was questionable. The CCF Youth Democratic 
Participation survey identified that only 29 per cent of young people 
felt they ‘most probably’ understood the voting system, whilst 
40 per cent stated they had ‘no understanding’ at all. This limited 
understanding raises questions about young people having the ability 
to make informed choices. The majority of those who felt they had 
‘no understanding’ were between the ages of 17 and 23 years and 
were first-time voters (Vakaoti 2014). This lack of understanding and 
awareness demonstrates the underpreparedness of young voters. 
This is of concern because it was considered that the young people’s 
votes held the ‘balance of power’. 
In the lead-up to the elections the government, through the Fiji 
Elections Office (FEO), CSOs, political parties and the media, engaged 
in voter education and awareness. This section discusses activities 
directed at young people by the various stakeholders. 
Ministry of Youth and Sports and youth voter 
awareness
The government’s role in supporting young and first-time voters was 
restricted to awareness of the electoral process. Whilst the Ministry 
of Youth and Sports pledged to support young voters, its assistance 
was guided by what was provided by the FEO (Vukailagi 2014a). 
The FEO was commended for this role and its conduct of the elections 
resulted in the Multinational Observer Group endorsing the polls as 
being credible (Radio New Zealand International 2014). In June 2014, 
the government, through the Ministry of Youth and Sports, convened 
a youth conference for over 500 young people from across Fiji. 
Participants discussed ‘issues relating to health, the environment, 
sports and human rights’ (Fiji One 2014). It is unclear whether, 
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even if the intention was to have a multiplier effect, gatherings such 
as this are enough to assist young people critically engage with issues 
that affect their lives.
Political parties: Attracting the youth vote
Political parties and, particularly, independent candidate Roshika 
Deo3 were actively seen to include young people in the election 
process. The National Federation Party (NFP), hosted three youth-
specific mini conferences and a national conference to deliberate on 
issues to be considered in the party manifesto (Vukailagi 2014b). 
In addition, the party’s youth wing president was a member of the 
party’s management board. The party also fielded young candidates 
in the general elections. The FLP, despite its historical rivalry with 
the NFP, did not appear to have an active engagement with young 
people; its party president, Mahendra Chaudhry, was also the ‘youth’ 
spokesperson (Anthony  2014). However, the FLP nominated Laisa 
Bale as its official youth candidate. 
The SODELPA, although dominated by seasoned Taukei politicians 
and adults, courted young supporters. The SODELPA Youth Council 
president expressed the following view: ‘we feel that all political parties 
have started working with young people … that’s an important shift in 
terms of party politics and it’s important that they incorporate young 
people into their work’ (Tokalau 2014). The involvement of young 
people in the SODELPA party, either as volunteers and campaigners 
or as executive members, was magnified because of the use of social 
media. The SODELPA National Youth Council Forum (SODELPA 
Youth) manages a Facebook page4 where it posts and generates 
conversation about social and political issues it deems significant. 
The party manifesto dedicates a section to young people. The content 
was derived from a youth vote survey coordinated by SODELPA Youth 
(Swami 2014). The party fielded some young candidates, one of whom, 
Mosese Bulitavu, is a current parliamentarian.
3  The 17 September elections were contested between seven political parties and two 
independent candidates, Umesh Chand and Roshika Deo.
4  For a detailed view of SODELPA Youth activities see www.facebook.com/sodelpayouth.
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Newer parties, such as the PDP and One Fiji Party (OFP), also appealed 
to young people during the build-up to the elections. The  PDP 
president, Lynda Tabuya, who self-identified as a young person, 
labelled her party as offering a ‘new brand of politics’, particularly 
for women, young people and minority groups (Doviverata 2014). 
The PDP, in supporting young people’s direct involvement in the 
party, had them represented in its management board and also had 
a mandated 30 per cent representation of women and young people 
on its branch committees. OFP, led by an articulate lawyer and 
young aspiring politician, Filimoni Vosarogo, released thematic social 
contracts or manifestos, one of which focused specifically on ‘igniting 
young people’.5 The influence of OFP on young people is unknown; 
however, their policies proposed to support the future participation of 
young people through life skills training and the convening of a Youth 
Parliament, a popular structure for youth deliberation and debate 
in the past. 
‘Be the Change Campaign’, the movement behind independent 
candidate Roshika Deo, was the only political entity that ran a youth-
led and youth-focused election campaign. Roshika Deo mobilised her 
supporters predominantly via political discussions on Facebook and, 
in the lead-up to the elections, organised pocket meetings. Limited 
funding hindered her goal of visiting as many geographical locations 
as possible. ‘Be the Change’ ran a successful campaign influencing 
and including young people in its membership drives, community 
visits and pocket meetings (Gibson 2014a). Unlike political parties, 
Roshika Deo concentrated on developing young people’s political 
consciousness and addressing structural barriers like patriarchy, 
ageism and gender inequality. In Fiji, this campaign approach, 
although necessary, is up against well-resourced parties campaigning 
on addressing developmental issues and providing for a secure future.
FijiFirst (FF), the party of the incumbent Bainimarama Government, 
which had governed Fiji since 2006, did not appear to have specific 
policies targeted at young people. Instead, it employed the discourse 
of inclusivity, hosting ‘family fun days’ in Fiji’s main centres and 
advertising its pragmatic developmental approach during the campaign 
period (Tolley 2014). The rhetoric of equal citizenry and developmental 
5  For more details on One Fiji Party’s manifesto see www.onefiji.org.fj/.
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assistance in the form of infrastructure development, free schooling 
and school bus fares, scholarships and subsidised electricity and 
water won favour with adults and young people alike.6 For young 
people concerned about completing school and finding employment, 
FijiFirst offered an element of stability and continuity, even if their 
track record of adherence to democratic principles was questionable. 
It could be argued that the reduction of the voting age to 18 years was 
a calculated decision, given the Bainimarama Government’s appeal for 
a new brand of politics and the many policies and forms of assistance 
that directly impacted on first-time voters. Whilst the influence of 
FF on young people is real, it is imperative that young people are 
supported as active citizens and not used as a political ploy in between 
elections and during the next elections.
Civil society organisations and youth 
engagement 
CSOs also played a role in preparing and supporting young people’s 
democratic participation. Local CSOs like the CCF, Fiji Women’s Rights 
Movement (FWRM) and the Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre (FWCC), 
which were critical of the government, banded together under the 
Fiji NGO Coalition for Human Rights. Despite working in a restrictive 
environment, these organisations persisted with their human rights 
and democratisation work in communities. Many young people 
became directly or indirectly involved in these activities.
The government’s decision to commence constitutional consultations 
and eventually to hold elections was welcomed by CSOs. The CCF 
supported communities with constitutional consultation submissions 
and an awareness on the 2013 Constitution. The FWRM was 
instrumental in the formation of the Fiji Young Women’s Forum 
(FYWF),7 which worked to help young women with minimal or no 
understanding of democracy realise their responsibility as citizens 
and what this means in practice. The FYWF hosted two forums 
6  For details of FijiFirst’s manifesto see fijifirst.com/our-manifesto/#toggle-id-7.
7  The forum was co-convened by the FWRM, the Emerging Leaders Forum Alumni (ELFA), 
Generation Next (GenNext), the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) and the Diverse 
Voices for Action (DIVA). 
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with an ensuing outcome statement and declaration,8 and produced 
a publication entitled ‘My Guide to Voting’. The outcome statement, 
declaration and the guide to voting booklet addressed the passivity 
that characterised the spaces of young people’s involvement. 
Through these activities, the FYWF critically connected its members 
to their lived realities and the importance of aligning this with the 
democratic structure and leadership the young women wish to see in 
post-election Fiji.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), through its 
Strengthening Capacities for Peace and Development (CPAD) project, 
complemented the work of CSOs during the constitution consultation 
process. The CPAD project was intended to ‘generate interest in the 
constitution making process and enhance understanding of why 
the constitution is important to the everyday lives of all Fijians’ 
(Saune  &  Murdock 2013, p. 3). The project provided assistance 
through funding and support of other capacity-building strategies 
that allowed communities to openly and safely discuss issues they 
wanted reflected in the Constitution. Of the 146 funding applications 
received, 114 groups and organisations received funding. A notable 
number of these were youth groups or organisations that worked with 
specific youth-based interest groups (Saune & Murdock 2013). 
The project found that despite the challenges of working with 
marginalised groups like women and young people, many organisations 
succeeded in developing participatory spaces specifically for them. 
As a result, many youth groups were able to make submissions on the 
Constitution, some using creative mediums. This exercise offered young 
people the opportunity to be meaningfully engaged and to understand 
the issues experienced in their communities (Saune & Murdock 2013). 
This awareness was intended to assist young people make an informed 
choice at the polls. 
8  For details of the outcome statement and declaration see www.fwrm.org.fj/index.php/news/
media-releases/2013/318-fiji-young-women-s-forum and www.fwrm.org.fj/index.php/news/media- 
releases/2014/330-young-women-s-declaration.
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The media and young voters
The media, both traditional outlets and the Internet, were also active 
in the lead-up to the elections. Traditional media (radio, television 
and newspapers) continued to be the main sources of political 
information, a view supported by respondents in the CCF Youth 
Democratic Participation survey. The Internet is gaining popularity 
and as access increases many people, particularly the young, will opt 
for the Internet as their source of information. In the lead-up to the 
elections, social media was labelled the ‘Fiji election battleground’ 
(Round 2014b), because political parties and politicians took to social 
media as an alternative campaign strategy. Social media was used to 
address time and resource constraints as well as young people’s lack 
of engagement in traditional party politics. Social media became 
particularly useful for young activists and politically conscious young 
people in an environment where the traditional media was restricted. 
Active political engagement on social media became the domain of 
urban, educated young people, perhaps those who needed the least 
convincing when it came to voting. The extent to which social media 
influenced the election outcome is unknown because it is highly likely 
that family and friends would have been influential, particularly for 
undecided young voters. 
Did the youth vote matter?
In the lead-up to the 17 September elections, confident sentiments were 
expressed about young people’s influence on the election outcomes. 
The May issue of the Republika magazine had the headline ‘Fiji votes: 
youth hold the balance of power’ on its cover. In its feature article, 
Kelvin Anthony, a youth activist, wrote, ‘when the counting of votes 
is completed after Wednesday 17 September elections, a lot will hinge 
on the contributions of young people who form the majority of the 
voters’ (2014, p. 17). Similar sentiments were echoed until the eve of 
the elections. Days away from the elections, academic Steven Ratuva 
asserted that young people’s votes would decide the election outcomes 
(Wilson 2014). Did young people’s votes actually decide the election 
outcomes?
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This question is difficult to answer because the elections office 
provided neither figures nor analysis on voting characteristics, apart 
from the total votes cast at polling stations and total votes attained by 
political parties, party candidates and independents. One observation 
was clear: young people were not voting for young candidates. 
As an example, independent candidate Roshika Deo, who ran an 
overwhelmingly youth-centred campaign, attracted only 1,005 votes,9 
far fewer than the over 14,000 likes on her Facebook campaign page 
and the required minimum threshold for a seat in parliament. Whilst 
this demonstrated that virtual support does not necessarily translate 
into actual votes, it also showed that young people exist as a diverse 
group and thus voted accordingly. 
In an election where young people’s votes were the centre of discourse 
within government, non-government and media circles, exit polls 
would have been useful to offer indications of voter demographic 
characteristics. Available analysis of voter behaviour has been 
limited to understanding voting along ethnic lines (Ratuva 2014). 
The  characteristics of votes by young people are subsumed within 
these analyses. Given the overwhelming support for FF, which 
campaigned mostly on development and ‘bread and butter’ issues, 
it is not difficult to suggest that the majority of young people voted 
on the basis of securing their well-being. This is fairly consistent with 
the results of the CCF Youth Democratic Participation survey, in which 
most of young people identified, in order of priority, employment 
(43  per cent), education (37 per cent) and transport (11 per cent) 
as issues that would influence their vote (Vakaoti 2014).
Ethnic analysis of voter behaviour in the elections is useful, and in the 
absence of comprehensive demographic voter behaviour information 
young people are easily included in this analytical frame. Whilst this 
approach reflects the government’s position on doing away with ethnic 
compartmentalisation, it fails to give due consideration to young people 
and their priorities and preferences. If the pre-government rhetoric of 
doing away with ‘old politicians and politics’ should become reality, 
it could ensure that voting behaviour is transparent, particularly 
for understanding young people, whose generational influences 
9  For detailed election results see the Supervisor of Elections report available at www.electionsfiji.
gov.fj/.
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are markedly different from those of their parents and other elders. 
Despite this reality, a bigger challenge lies with sustaining democratic 
support for young people into the post-election period and beyond. 
Supporting active citizenship for young 
people
Voting is just one way of demonstrating active participation. 
The challenge for Fiji lies in supporting democratic structures at every 
level of society that meaningfully include young people. Whilst there 
are many structural and historical barriers, Fiji’s return to parliamentary 
democracy offers hope that Fijians are aware of the future they want. 
Young people will significantly contribute to building on this vision 
and must be accorded an equal opportunity and provision of resources 
to do so. Stakeholders are equally critical in this process. 
The role of government
Whilst it is difficult to assess the government’s role in supporting 
the democratic participation of young people before the elections, 
performing this role in the post-election period is critical. 
The  Ministry of Youth and Sports has the necessary structure and 
geographical reach to achieve this. Perhaps what is required is a 
reorientation of its focus from one of futurity and governmentality 
to one that considers the diverse realities and needs of young people 
(Vakaoti 2012). A national youth conference like that which was held 
in June 2014 could be made an annual event. In addition, the Ministry 
should consider reintroducing a national youth parliament as a way of 
connecting potential young leaders to decision makers and structures 
that facilitate their work. 
Government has at its disposal the education system, where active 
and democratic citizenship could be introduced into the curriculum. 
It is imperative that Fiji’s young people understand the country’s 
socioeconomic and political history in order to make critical and 
informed decisions about their future. Discussion on topics like 
voting and the Constitution should be introduced in both primary 
and secondary schools. Participants in the CCF Youth Democratic 
Participation survey suggested that the best way of receiving political 
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information in the future would be through citizen education in 
schools. Doing this will ensure ‘a seamless transition from learning 
about democracy to putting such knowledge into practice’ by the time 
one is 18 years of age (Youth Citizenship Commission 2008, p. 17). 
Universities would be expected to continue with this tradition, though 
this would be somewhat challenging given the recent experience 
where the University of the South Pacific in the period following the 
December 2006 coup had political debates and free thinking restricted 
as a result of a ‘culture of political convulsion’ (Lal 2004; Vakaoti 
2012). Given Fiji’s return to ‘democracy’ and healthy competition 
between the three universities in Fiji, there is optimism that critical 
young minds will continue to be cultivated at these institutions. 
The role of political parties
Historically, the involvement of young people in party politics has 
been minimal. Results of the CCF Youth Democratic Participation 
survey reflects this reality. Of the 201 young people who participated 
in the survey, 90 per cent stated that they did not belong to a political 
party. This could in part be explained by the absence of party politics 
since 2006 and to the historical tendency of political parties to exclude 
young people from party machinery and processes. Young people’s 
involvement in youth wings of the now disbanded Alliance Party, 
the waning FLP and the rejuvenated NFP were often regarded as 
tokenistic.10
The test of young people’s sustained involvement in political parties 
will be seen in the period between elections. Parties like the NFP, PDP 
and SODELPA should continue to support the representation of young 
people on their management board, ensuring that their interests are 
considered and discussed at the decision-making level. This might 
be a point for consideration by parties that currently do not have 
such representation. It is also important that there are clear pathways 
within political parties for young people who aspire to move beyond 
being mere members, campaigners and volunteers. Parties serve 
10  There are isolated cases where youth wings have been meaningfully involved and 
influential. Prior to 2006, the FLP’s National Council, comprising 42 members, included a youth 
representative (Pareti & Frankel 2007). It is likely that a lone youth individual would have little 
influence on party deliberations and decisions (Vakaoti 2012). Lal (2010), writing about Jai Ram 
Reddy, alluded to the influence of the NFP Youth Wing in the removal of the party leader in the 
mid-1980s.
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as  ideal breeding grounds for future election candidates, politicians 
and leaders. Senior party officials and leaders could act as mentors to 
support this process. The members of the young people’s Fiji Youth for 
Democracy (FYD) movement echo similar sentiments:
FYD believes that political parties are crucial for the long-term 
development in transitioning societies like Fiji … Without well-
functioning parties, governments and legislatures will have little 
chance of representing the wider society in a meaningful and effective 
way. Parties form a bridge between government and society, both in 
the ways they translate society’s demands into political ideas and 
programs and in the way they hold government to account on society’s 
behalf. (Scoop 2014)
The role of civil society organisations 
Between 2006 and 2014, CSOs provided the ‘voice of reason’ in an 
environment devoid of basic democratic activities and processes. 
This  role should continue into the post-election period. It is 
encouraging  that the FYWF organised its third forum in November 
2014 to discuss lessons learned from young women’s political 
participation during elections and strategise for effective ongoing 
lobbying of decision makers. It is likely that other CSOs have plans 
of this nature in place for the future. The role of CSOs in this area 
need to be supported because they are effective spaces where young 
people can pursue issue-based interests and have direct experiences of 
different aspects of democratic participation.
Youth-led initiatives
Fiji is beginning to see an increase in youth-led organisations, active 
in the areas of mental health, gender discrimination and the creative 
arts (Vakaoti 2012). The lead-up to the 17 September elections brought 
to the fore young political activists like Roshika Deo of ‘Be the Change 
Campaign’ and youth-led organisations like the FYWF. The FYD 
movement, another youth-led organisation, was established in early 
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2013 by a group of youth activists. The focus of FYD has been to 
generate critical conversations around the constitutional development 
process and related democratic issues.11 
A noticeable trend with youth activists and organisations is their 
use of social media. Whilst the use of social media appeals to 
technologically savvy young people, it also addresses issues related 
to limited funding and technical assistance required to support the 
work of these organisations. Alternatively, it could be just that as 
members of this generation young people find that social networking 
and social media better serve their purpose. The FYD, for instance, 
exists as a virtual organisation with an active Facebook page12 and 
Twitter account.13 Given that Internet penetration in Fiji stands at 
about 30 per cent, it is likely that the group is able to garner support 
only in areas with Internet accessibility, most certainly in urban areas. 
Whilst the confidence of these young people and their social media 
strategies ought to be noted, their connection to the wider youth 
audience is yet to be realised. As Fiji transitions into democracy and 
the media environment progressively becomes free, young people will 
perhaps be able to complement their virtual activism in bolder and 
more visible ways.
Conclusion
The elections brought a semblance of democracy to Fiji. The polls 
were declared to be credible by the Multinational Observer Group, 
a  government was sworn in and parliament is back in session 
following an absence of seven-and-a-half years. Fiji has returned to 
the fold, reinvited into the Pacific Islands Forum and readmitted into 
the Commonwealth; and in November 2014 hosted the Indian Prime 
Minister, Narendra Modi, and the Chinese President, Xi Jinping. 
These visits and developments signal that Fiji is well on its transitional 
path to democracy. 
11  In 2013, the FYD organised four panel discussions at the University of the South Pacific on 
the Constitution, democracy, reflections on the 26th anniversary of the first coup in 1987 and 
extractive industries and livelihoods. 
12  See www.facebook.com/FijiYouthForDemocracy.
13  See twitter.com/FijiYouth.
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Whilst government institutions appear to be fully functioning and 
diplomatic relations have been re-established, the government must 
deliver on its promise of granting young people greater civil and 
political rights. It must ensure that it has mechanisms and structures 
in place to consolidate the different ways in which young people 
participate and become involved in politics. The government’s policy 
of generating a knowledge-based society must also include supporting 
young citizens to develop the critical ability to relate their issues and 
circumstances to decision-making structures at both the local and 
national level. CSOs also play a significant role in this process and 
must be encouraged to enter into dialogue with relevant government 
departments to deliver this opportunity for young people.
Young people from the age of 18 years were accorded the right to vote 
in the elections. Political parties and CSOs were active in this process. 
Community-based organisations supported the voter registration and 
awareness and education process, whilst political parties engaged 
young people directly as campaigners and volunteers, as members 
of management committees and as election candidates. Apart from 
traditional political campaigning and pocket meetings, social 
media became a vital part of engaging young voters with Internet 
connectivity. The influence of social media on voters, let alone young 
voters, is variable. A knowledge gap exists in relation to the use of 
social media for active political engagement and influence in Fiji. 
An  understanding of this would assist those intending to digitally 
engage young voters in the next elections.
Regardless of intentions and speculations about the reduction of the 
voting age, young voters as active citizens must not rest on their laurels. 
They should, both in their youth sub-groups and as a collective, 
hold the government accountable to its promise of inclusivity and 
equality. Engaging in this process will give a sense of purpose to their 
vote on 17 September. Their collective strength, perhaps missing in 
the 2014 elections, could possibly be realised in the 2018 elections. 
A government that ignores the concerns of Fiji’s growing and engaged 
population of young people does so at its peril.
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The role of the military in Fiji’s politics over the last 27 years has 
been decisive. Four military coups followed by democratic elections 
have indelibly shaped Fiji’s political landscape. Held under the 
2013 Constitution imposed on Fiji by the Bainimarama regime, Fiji’s 
September 2014 elections were hailed by the coordinator of the 
Multinational Observer Group as ‘broadly reflecting the will of the 
people’ (Goledzinowski 2014). The readiness of the international 
community to sanction the polls after eight years of authoritarian rule 
underscores the pragmatism of realpolitik as also shown by the people 
of Fiji,1 whose acquiescence to military intervention is now a hallmark 
of politics in the country. At the October 2014 swearing in of the new 
parliament after eight years of dictatorship, the 10 democratically 
elected former military officers, including several other members of 
FijiFirst (FF), all wore regimental neckties. In a sense, this  display 
1  In projecting forward the 2007 census percentages to September 2014, indigenous Fijians 
would make up 62 per cent and Indo-Fijians 34 per cent of the 591,101 registered voters.
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of solidarity symbolised the pervasiveness of the Fiji military’s political 
power.2 Against this broad background, this chapter analyses the role 
of the military and its impact on the election outcome. 
The most likely scenario is that former coup leader, and now elected 
Prime Minister, Frank Bainimarama, will be around for another four 
years until the 2018 elections—a total of 12 years in power. But the 
military is likewise destined to remain close to the centre of power. 
Bainimarama has certainly learnt from the past political mistakes of his 
military predecessors, Sitiveni Rabuka and Epeli Ganilau. Both former 
commanders made the miscalculation; it seems, of relinquishing their 
military command and basing their political ambitions on civilian 
political institutions. Rabuka used the Great Council of Chiefs to 
patronise his political party, the Soqosoqo ni Lewe ni Vanua iTaukei 
(SVT), and sanction his nationalist agenda. Insidious Taukei infighting 
involving its elite and fringe nationalist groups during Rabuka’s prime 
ministership led to his downfall and the dismantling of the SVT. 
Ganilau, with the patronage of president and father-in-law Ratu Sir 
Kamisese Mara and Methodist reformists, formed the Veitokani Lewe 
ni Vanua Party (VLV) in 1999 and later in 2006, with business elites, 
cobbled together the moderate National Alliance Party. Both parties 
failed to draw mainstream Indo-Fijian or Taukei support. In Fiji’s 
polarised ethnic politics Ganilau’s elitist moderate alignment probably 
led to his demise and later falling out with Bainimarama. Ironically 
Ganilau, on venturing into politics, had chosen Bainimarama as 
his successor. Ever since, many senior officers have been purged or 
compelled to resign due to the personalised and political orientation 
of the commander. 
Military’s ethnic paradox
At the outset, the Achilles heel of Bainimarama and his officer elite’s 
policy to reform Fiji’s divisive communal society into an all-inclusive 
state based on civic nationalism lay in the exclusive ethnic makeup of 
2  The 10 former military officers that make up the 33-member FijiFirst Party parliamentary 
members in government are V Bainimarama, T Natuva, J Konrote, P Tikoduadua, I Tuitubou, 
I Seruiratu, J Cawaki, N Rika, S Vunivalu and S Korolavesau. Incidentally, the opposition 
SOPDELPA Party has five former military officers in I Tikoca, V Tagivetaua, S Matanitobua, 
K Kiliraki and J Dulaki, accentuating the influence of the military in national politics as a whole.
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the military. After eight years of espousing the values of multiracialism 
over ethno-nationalism, the military remains overwhelmingly 
an indigenous Fijian institution, with all its Taukei shibboleths. 
The  reason for this ethnic disparity perhaps is historical, but the 
fact that the military regime overlooks this national political paradox 
whilst simultaneously dismantling other Taukei institutions is an 
oddity. Given Fiji’s vanua politics, it is arguable that Bainimarama has 
created a super fourth Taukei confederacy using the military, which 
sits above the three neo-traditional confederacies. Perhaps herein 
also lies the inherent institutional character flaw that apparently 
triggers the military to intervene in Fiji’s ethnically based politics. 
I suggest that the ethnic homogeneity of the Fijian military, unlike the 
heterogeneous makeup of its Melanesian counterpart in Papua New 
Guinea, is decisive in fostering the coup phenomenon. 
Bainimarama has openly engaged in national politics, using the 
advantages of his military position. He later rationalised his actions by 
claiming that ‘only the military can bring about real political change’. 
This became a political mantra that appears to have gone down well 
among youthful voters who, in spite of numerous claims against the 
regime of human rights abuse, see in Bainimarama’s strongman persona 
the necessary political catalyst for bringing about a multiracial Fiji. 
His muzzling of nationalist elements within the Methodist Church 
has also proved effective in dampening ethno-nationalist fervour 
and engendering a more universalist orientation in the Methodist 
hierarchy (Weir 2014).
By cleverly co-opting receptive serving military officers, Bainimarama 
enticed a clique of officers with accelerated promotion and handsome 
salary increases that have enabled him to build a strong political 
base while using the military as a nation-building institution. 
This developmental face of the military, spearheaded by the Engineer 
Rural Development Unit, Trade Training School and National School 
cadetship program, have been effectively propagandised by the 
Ministry of Information and its proxy media outlets such as the 
Fiji Sun newspaper and FBC TV to great effect. On the darker side, 
Bainimarama has used the institution as a coercive political tool to great 
effect and, with his protégé Brigadier Mosese Tikoitoga, continues to 
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do so subtly.3 This patron–client relationship is the mainstay of the 
FF in spite of Tikoitoga’s assurance that in future the military will 
be strictly ‘politically neutral’. Hence the big question remains: will 
Fiji’s third transition to democracy follow the Burmese model, where 
the military remains entrenched in the new democratic government, 
or evolve similarly to the Indonesian model where military influence 
is increasingly precluded in place of civilian democratic rule? I argue 
that the military’s role as rationalised by the 2013 Constitution leaves 
the door ajar for further political intervention in the new democratic 
Fiji. This ambiguity in the military’s constitutional role points 
ominously to a military that will remain a political force for at least 
the next decade.
Open List Proportional Representation 
and the advantage of incumbency 
With an 84 per cent voter turnout on Election Day, the newly instituted 
open list proportional representative system, on the face of the polling 
results, favoured Bainimarama and his incumbent military regime’s 
FF, which won 59.2 per cent of the popular votes. In a post-election 
review, Fraenkel (2014) stated that some of the major characteristics 
of the new electoral system were: 
a. the reduction of the voting age from 21 to 18 years, which accounted 
for some 28 per cent of registered voters;
b. the eligibility of dual nationality and overseas permanent residence 
registered voters, which accounted for 7,186 votes or 1.4 per cent 
of the total votes cast;
c. the 5 per cent threshold of votes to gain a parliamentary seat, 
thus handicapping smaller parties and independent candidates;
d. the abolishing of communal constituencies; and 
e. a single national constituency.
3  Master Joseva Bilitaki’s much publicised allegation of being assaulted by military 
intelligence officers after sending angry text messages to Bainimarama around election time was 
dropped by the Director of Public Prosecutions for lack of evidence.
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Invariably, the pre-election advantage of incumbency favoured 
Bainimarama’s FF. The persecution of the opposition, especially 
former prime ministers Laisenia Qarase and Mahendra Chaudhry, 
the exorbitant civil servant pay rises and the vote-buying manifesto 
promises effectively foiled the opposition democratic front’s late 
run in mustering voter support. Bainimarama’s provoking rhetoric, 
bordering on political blackmail of ‘you vote for me and there will be 
no coup’, had its marked effect on voters. Furthermore, with half the 
population hovering on or beneath the poverty line, many voters were 
swayed by bread and butter issues as exemplified in the FF manifesto’s 
promises of ‘free water and milk’. 
When all is said and done, the elections were the essential first step 
towards parliamentary democracy and the opening up of the political 
space that had been muted by draconian decrees in the previous 
eight years. Sceptics had serious doubts, given Bainimarama’s track 
record, that the elections would eventuate. That it did take place on 
a relatively free and fair basis is a credit to the much maligned Fiji 
Elections Office and the Supervisor of Elections, although in the week 
before the elections Bainimarama’s bombastic ‘Suva will not burn 
again’ statement, alluding to the 2000 Speight crisis, was political 
‘dog whistling’ at best. In addition, the military’s highly visible ‘public 
exercises’ in the week leading up to the elections almost certainly 
influenced undecided and impressionable youth voters as to who was 
the ultimate guarantor of public safety. 
In military parlance, the Bainimarama regime had fought its opponents 
‘on ground of its own choosing’. The shaping of the 2014 elections 
‘battlefield’ was cleverly executed, as in any well-constructed military-
based process. The opposition parties were ‘fixed’ and ‘channelled’ 
by the obstacles on the ‘killing ground’ well before the battle began. 
The high hurdles set by the election decree for political parties and 
candidates ensured an uneven playing field in the pre-election period. 
Scott MacWilliam, an election observer, had even suggested that 
a bigger victory margin would have been achieved by FijiFirst if a 
48-hour election media blackout had not been decreed. This is because 
of the party’s huge undeclared donor-funding from businesses, which 
could have been deployed to ramp up its propaganda until polling 
hour, especially as the regime was well in control of the media industry.
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Prior to the elections, Brigadier Tikoitoga’s odd public comments further 
compounded the public’s fears that the military would not remain 
neutral should Bainimarama lose the elections. The spectre of ethno-
nationalism was incessantly invoked by Bainimarama while Tikoitoga 
harked back to the 2000 coup, thus subtly reminding the public of 
Bainimarama’s artfully airbrushed ‘saviour’ role. Interestingly, among 
coup-prone states, only Fiji‘s military have conducted coups to avert 
perceived ethnic conflict. In Fiji’s case, the contentious anti-ethno-
nationalism rhetoric effectively justifies and may prolong the military’s 
role in politics. With an ethno-nationalist Social Liberal Democratic 
Party as the principal opposition, Bainimarama can further strengthen 
the justification for the military’s hardnosed approach via its proxy—
FijiFirst. 
The ethnic Gordian knot and the 
‘Glorious Revolution’?
Has the past eight years of Bainimarama’s military authoritarian 
rule, as symbolised by the abolition of communal constituencies, 
cut through the Gordian knot of ‘old’ ethnic politics and its multi-
complex issues? Coup apologist Graham Davis (2014), like many of 
his ilk, was enthralled with the result and went so far as to proclaim 
Bainimarama’s decisive election victory as a ‘glorious revolution’ in 
which ‘he took a sledge hammer to the entire political edifice, smashed 
it to smithereens and then set about rebuilding Fiji into a modern 
nation-state that has been transformed almost at every level’. 
In spite of Davis’s enthusiastic endorsement, Bainimarama’s legacy 
and performance as Prime Minister and Minister of Finance remains 
debatable. One serious concern has been highlighted by members of 
the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), meeting in October 2014, 
who found the 2013 Constitution seriously flawed and recommended 
a commission to undertake its comprehensive review. There were 137 
other recommendations that were brought to the attention of Fiji’s 
high-powered delegation of eight senior government members to 
Geneva, headed by Attorney General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum. Robert 
Jackman, in comparing the performance of military regimes, had 
found that ‘military governments have no unique effects on social 
change, regardless of level of economic development’ (quoted in 
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Perlmutter 1981, p. 118). The Auditor General’s report from 2007–13 
tabled in parliament stated that ‘it has become abundantly clear there 
has been widespread abuse of public funds and blatant disregard of 
fundamental financial procedures’. Independent economist Professor 
Biman Prasad puts economic growth annually from 2006–13 on 
average at a paltry 0.1 per cent GDP. Furthermore, Janowitz states 
that in measuring overall economic development, the experience of 
military regimes is hardly impressive (Janowitz 1964, p. 79). The lack 
of public transparency and accountability in the last eight years due 
to authoritarian rule has indeed produced a society numbed by false 
‘feel good’ propaganda churned out by a controlled and muted media 
industry. 
Outspoken economist Professor Waden Narsey conservatively 
puts the total loss of potential GDP from 1987 to 2010 at close to 
FJD$10 billion as a result of Fiji’s coups. The revelation of the released 
Auditor General’s report is damning on the regime, and indeed the 
military, under Bainimarama. During the 2006–07 budget period, an 
unauthorised FJD$45.5 million was incurred by the military. What 
has played a major role in the survival of the Bainimarama regime has 
been the political support of superpower China. In the eight years of 
its authoritarian rule, in spite of the economic and political sanctions 
imposed by the West, the Bainimarama regime was able to resist the 
call for a prompt return to democracy because of Chinese economic aid 
and trade (Radio NZ 2014b). Indeed, much self-praise was generated by 
the Bainimarama regime due to its public infrastructure development 
record. Furthermore, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Fiji after 
the elections, where he also met with leaders of Samoa, Vanuatu, 
Niue, Tonga, Federated States of Micronesia, Cook Islands and Papua 
New Guinea, underscores Beijing’s backing of Fiji’s new standing in 
the region. 
Perlmutter, writing in the Cold War era prior to the rise of China, 
asserted that ‘many observers may have been mistaken in attributing 
unique political skills to the military, whether directed toward 
progressive or conservative ends’ (Perlmutter 1981, p. 117). Given 
that there are seven handpicked former senior military officers in 
Bainimarama’s cabinet, it will be a challenge for them to display the 
independent and rigorous thinking vital to a transparent democratic 
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society.4 The optimistic prognosis of a progressive military promoting 
social change does not stand up to empirical analysis either. In their 
examination of whether policies that favour the military reduce the 
risk of coups, Collier and Hoeffler ‘have found if anything, their effect 
was perverse: high military spending may even increase the risk of 
coups’ (Collier & Hoeffler 2005, p. 2). The Fiji military’s overspending 
record and expansion in non-core defence roles since the first coup in 
1987, and after the coups of 2000 and 2006, verifies this assessment. By 
2005, Bainimarama had developed a political agenda. This was clearly 
evident in Bainimarama’s opposition to the Qarase government’s 
National Security White Paper of that year. Obviously, the Qarase 
government saw the insolent military commander as a thorn in its 
side and was trying to get rid of him in early 2004 at the end of his 
contract. Bainimarama was adamant that any reform under the Qarase 
government would weaken the institution through a reduction in 
budget, retrenchment and more civilian control of the military. Under 
pressure from Bainimarama, the paper was shelved. The military’s 
corporate power had won out.
A key question arising from this is how has this corporate identity 
developed over the years? Former vice president Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, 
at a recent post-election symposium, warned that any dialogue with 
Bainimarama or the military as to its future role will have to be handled 
very carefully for obvious reasons (Radio NZ 2014a). As argued in a 
previous analysis (Baledrokadroka 2012a, p. 105), Fiji’s participation 
in UN peacekeeping since 1978 has given the military an inflated 
corporate image that is now manifest in its perceived role of political 
conflict mediator.
Fijian peacekeepers in the UNDOF Golan 
Heights hostage crisis
In the lead-up to the elections, a number of Fijian soldiers serving 
with the UN Disengagement Observer Forces (UNDOF) were captured 
and held hostage by the jihadist al-Nusra group on the Golan Heights. 
This threatened to undermine Bainimarama’s political campaign and 
split military solidarity. Questions were raised as to the wisdom of 
4  The seven former RFMF officers included in the 20-member FF cabinet are V Bainimarama, 
T Natuva, J Konrote, P Tikoduadua, I Tuitubou, I Seruiratu and J Cawaki.
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deploying Fijian soldiers to the Golan when other nations such as 
Austria, Japan, Croatia and the Philippines were withdrawing their 
contingents due to the highly dangerous civil war in Syria that had 
spilled onto the Golan. As argued earlier (Baledrokadroka 2012b, 
p.  105), Fiji’s international peacekeeping has become a determining 
factor, with unintended consequences for the internal stability of the 
nation. This role has justified an oversized military with a similarly 
disproportionate share of the national budget. Even though the 
soldiers were released unharmed on the eve of the elections through 
the diplomatic  negotiations of Qatar, Fiji’s proud international 
peacekeeping image was tarnished. Arguably, Fiji’s policy of providing 
soldiers on demand for UN peacekeeping missions unwittingly provides 
the military with its expanded political role. At the time of writing, 
1,100 or a third of the military’s 3,300 regular forces soldiers are on 
active duty with international peacekeeping forces.5 An additional 
force of 5,000 active territorial and reservist soldiers, topped up by 
an annual recruitment of 300, provide peacekeeping replacements 
on six-monthly rotations. Hence, many youths see the military as a 
means of highly rewarding overseas employment. In spite of criticism 
during the Golan hostage crisis, Brigadier Tikoitoga revealed that Fiji 
was being invited by the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations 
(UNDPKO) to provide more peacekeepers for UNDOF. After the Golan 
hostage crisis, the purchase of six 105 mm howitzers to upgrade 
obsolete artillery is also seen as a call by UNDPKO for Fiji to upscale 
its peacekeeping force protection armaments, given the high risk 
level in the volatile Southern Syrian border region with Israel. 
This  FJD$10.2 million acquisition was carried out on the unilateral 
authority of Bainimarama as Minister of Finance.
Coup culture calculus
The National Federation Party leader, Tupou Draunidalo, has asserted:
The coups in our country do not occur as an extension of widespread 
and sustained public disaffection. They occur after private and secretive 
consultations amongst private individuals, who then find the requisite 
personality in the military to carry out the coup. (Draunidalo 2014)
5  This consists of 339 all ranks with MFO Sinai, 270 all ranks with UNAMI Iraq and 500 all 
ranks with UNDOF Golan Heights.
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This resonates with Samuel Finer’s disposition/opportunity calculus 
to explain military intervention in Fiji’s politics (Finer 1962, p. 140). 
Finer identifies the disposition of the military elite, which is bound 
to its corporate and individual interests, as the push factor. The pull 
factor is the military’s opportunity to intervene when a weakening of 
public support for government has occurred. In applying the calculus 
in the Fiji coups context, it can be seen that these push-pull factors of 
political forces were present. The coalescence of the political Taukei 
Movement with Rabuka prior to the 1987 coup, and with Speight 
and Taukei political elites prior to the 2000 overthrow of the coalition 
government led by the Fiji Labour Party’s Mahendra Chaudhry, and 
Commodore Bainimarama’s plotting with politicians, community 
leaders and legal experts prior to the 2006 coup, substantiates Finer’s 
coup theory. 
Unfortunately, the role of the military as set out in the 2013 Constitution 
does not promote a coup-free future, thus raising questions about the 
political intentions behind it. The document states that ‘[t]he role of 
the Republic of Fiji Military Forces is to ensure at all times the security, 
defence and well-being of Fiji and all its residents’. This clause can 
be used by the military to justify intervention in a political crisis. 
The appointment of the commander of the Republic of Fiji Military 
Forces by the Prime Minister, as prescribed in the Constitution, may 
encourage partiality in what should essentially be a politically neutral 
office. 
Conclusion
According to renowned Chinese strategist Sun Tzu: ‘He will win 
who, prepared, takes his opponents unprepared’. Bainimarama 
had boasted before the elections that his FijiFirst party would win 
50  seats. While the military regime and its proxy political party 
enjoyed the advantages of incumbency, the opposition parties were 
hobbled by unrealistic deadlines and decrees. Other tactics deployed 
by Bainimarama included handouts and civil service pay increases on 
the one hand and threatening rhetoric on the other. These factors, 
combined with the new national single constituency system, clearly 
favoured FijiFirst. Fraenkel (2014) also contends that the new open 
list system handicapped opposition parties, as candidates were also 
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competing against each other for votes to ensure a seat in parliament. 
He further suggests that the ethnic cleavage of the past was still a 
feature of the 2014 elections. Even though the new electoral system 
was designed to eradicate this colonial legacy, old habits of thought 
and political behaviour die hard and it will take at least another 
generation for ethnic politics to be expunged, if they ever are. 
While some, such as Madraiwiwi, see the election outcome as a 
significant step to a coup-free future despite these problems (Radio NZ 
2014a), others are convinced that the legitimation of Bainimarama’s 
party through the polls means that the coup culture remains firmly 
embedded. Draunidalo (2014) rightly contends that ‘it would now 
appear to military personnel back home that Fiji likes to endorse coup 
makers and/or their proxies at the polls. Crime and treason certainly 
pays’. In explaining how civilian support coalesces around coup makers 
in Fiji, Draunidalo is critical of coup apologists, especially legalists 
and academics. She echoes Finer’s coup theory, in which opportunists 
unite with the military, as brashly stated by another 18th-century 
military commander: ‘I begin by taking. I shall find scholars later to 
demonstrate my perfect right’ (quoted in Draunidalo 2014). 
In summary, this chapter has addressed, if not answered, two sets of 
key questions. First, has the election result under the new Constitution 
finally eradicated Fiji’s coup culture, or does it provide encouragement 
for future extra-legal political putsches? Second, will the military in 
Fiji hold to its constitutionalised political role, or will it retreat from 
politics and adopt a neutral philosophy as promised by Brigadier 
Tikoitoga? Certainly, the ethos of an essentially apolitical role needs to 
be strongly inculcated into the military officer corps. The arrival after 
the elections of British Army officers to conduct training in military 
leadership and other subjects seems to auger well for a return by the 
RFMF to its core professional role. Furthermore, balancing the ethnic 
makeup of the military with Indo-Fijians will also send a signal that the 
FijiFirst government is genuine in creating an all-inclusive multiracial 
state. This is part of the equation for a stable democracy. The other part 
of the equation is to ensure that political elites do not coalesce with 
the military elite at critical junctures of political tension. Meanwhile, 
in the transition to democracy post elections, Professor Brij Lal’s 
quip that the ‘military will remain the unseen elephant in the room’ 
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is quite apt. The absurdity of the military as both agent and client of 
its patron, Bainimarama’s FijiFirst government, whilst claiming to be 
the final guarantor of national security, remains a paradox. 
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The genesis of the Social 
Democratic Liberal Party: 
A struggle against the odds
Pio Tabaiwalu
Introduction
Fiji’s political landscape has been shaped along a fractured fault line 
between the country’s two main communities: indigenous Fijians and 
Indo-Fijians. This legacy of Fiji’s colonial past has dogged the country 
since independence in 1970. The Indo-Fijians are descendants of 
Indians brought to the colony as indentured labourers by Britain, the 
then colonial power, to develop a plantation economy. Indo-Fijians 
came to dominate the economy, arousing resentment from indigenous 
Fijians. There was increasing fear amongst indigenous Fijians, many 
of whom lived in semi-subsistence communities, that the Indo-Fijians 
would ultimately acquire political dominance as well.
This difficult relationship has been the cause of much political 
upheaval, beginning with the military coup d’état of 14 May 1987 that 
resulted in the overthrow of the elected government of Prime Minister 
Timoci Bavadra, the deposition of Elizabeth II as Queen of Fiji, and the 
declaration of a republic, ending the monarch’s reign in Fiji. This was 
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followed by a second coup on 28 September 1987. Both military 
actions were led by Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, then third in 
command of the Royal Fiji Military Forces. 
The Fiji coup of 2000 was a complicated affair involving a civilian, 
George Speight, backed by hard line indigenous Fijian nationalists 
against the elected government of Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry 
on 19 May 2000. 
The latest coup was carried out by military commander Commodore 
Frank Bainimarama, who seized power on 5 December 2006 from 
elected Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase.
Overview of the conflict
The 2006 military coup had its origins in the coup of 2000 led by 
civilian George Speight. The 2000 coup was aimed at the multiethnic 
government led by Mahendra Chaudhry. After Bainimarama declared 
martial law and resolved the crisis by force, an interim government was 
sworn in, headed Laisenia Qarase. Laisenia Qarase and his colleagues 
in the interim government went on to form the Soqosoqo Duavata ni 
Lewenivanua (SDL) party and won the elections in 2001 and 2006. 
Commodore Bainimarama had often said that forming a political party 
was not part of his ‘understanding’ with members of the Interim 
Civilian Government when they were installed. Many commentators 
have cited this as the beginning of the falling out between Qarase’s SDL 
party and Bainimarama. The SDL had also introduced parliamentary 
bills that provoked the displeasure of the military.
Three were three bills that were especially contentious to the military 
and opponents of the SDL government: the Reconciliation Tolerance 
and Unity Bill (RTU), the Qoliqoli Bill and the Land Tribunal Bill. 
Perhaps the most significant of these was the RTU bill, which would 
grant an amnesty to some of those involved in or being investigated 
for involvement in the coup of 2000.
Relations between the Qarase Government and the Republic of Fiji 
Military Forces (RFMF) deteriorated from then on. Qarase and his 
ministers made several attempts to remove the Commander from office: 
by offering him a diplomatic posting in 2001 and later by resisting 
the renewal of his contract, and finally by advising the president to 
remove him. None of these attempts succeeded.
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Political commentators have pointed out that the 2006 military coup 
was the culmination of the personal ambition of Bainimarama for 
political leadership. Coupled with this was his attempt to suppress 
allegations of the misuse of military regimental funds, and his role in 
the deaths of Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit (CRW) soldiers who 
were involved in a mutiny against him in November 2000. Fiji’s former 
police chief, Andrew Hughes, had also launched an investigation into 
Commodore Bainimarama for alleged sedition after he threatened to 
overthrow the elected government of Qarase. All these precipitated 
Commodore Bainimarama’s actions against Qarase and his government.
The 2006 general elections once again illustrated historical voting 
patterns along ethnic lines, with over 80 per cent of the popular vote 
and all 23 seats reserved for indigenous Fijians going to the SDL, and 
a similar percentage and all 19 seats reserved for Indo-Fijians going 
to the Fiji Labour Party (FLP). Overall, the SDL won 36 seats, the 
FLP won 31 seats and the remaining seats were shared by the United 
People’s Party and independent candidates. The SDL victory must 
have intensified Bainimarama’s resolve to carry out the military coup.
Commodore Bainimarama carried out his coup on 5 December 2006 
after months of public vilification of Prime Minister Qarase and of the 
SDL government.
Bainimarama had supposedly invoked special powers under the 
Constitution and was using them to dismiss Qarase. On 4 January 
2007, executive authority was returned to the President Ratu Josefa 
Iloilo and Dr Senilagakali resigned as interim prime minister. Ratu 
Josefa declared his support for the military takeover although he 
had earlier condemned it as illegal. He then appointed Bainimarama 
as interim prime minister and also announced the formation of an 
interim government to lead the country to fresh elections. 
The genesis of the Social Democratic 
Liberal Party
Under the Political Parties (Registration, Conduct, Funding and 
Disclosures) Decree 4 2013, the previously registered political parties 
had 28 days to re-register. Each political party had to collect 5,000 
signatures with allocations from Fiji’s Central, Western, Northern and 
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Eastern administrative divisions. Previously a party only required 
180 members to become registered. The membership threshold was a 
major challenge to the SDL Party.
The more sinister provision of the decree was a requirement that 
all political parties be named in English rather than Fijian. The SDL 
Party was keenly aware that the regime wanted to eradicate the party, 
evidenced by Bainimarama’s strong disapproval of SDL policies and a 
personal falling out with the ousted prime minister, Laisenia Qarase. 
The provision of the decree to change the name of all parties into 
English was seen by the party as a direct means to deregister the SDL.
The party hierarchy had initially made a decision to contest the 
elections as a practical means of moving the country to democratic 
rule. Rather than changing its name, the SDL Party wound itself up 
and reformed as the Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA) in 
order to retain the SDL acronym. However, a subsequent amendment 
to the Political Parties Decree banned the use of the acronyms of 
deregistered parties. It was evident that the regime did not want the 
SDL to exist even as an acronym. However, the decree allowed the use 
of abbreviations; the party resorted to the abbreviation SODELPA to 
register as the Social Democratic Liberal Party. The party applied for 
registration on 26 February 2013, and was registered on 3 May 2013. 
But the regime had achieved its aim to deregister the SDL Party.
The party was led by Ro Teimumu Kepa as its president and drew up 
a new constitution. Its stated vision was based on the following: 
• commitment to the promotion of peace, stability and economic 
prosperity and to pursue a policy of dialogue and negotiation at all 
times to achieve peaceful solutions to Fiji’s challenges;
• totally rejecting the notion that such solutions can be reached 
through acts of violence, force, intimidation and illegality;
• that Fiji’s progress must be founded on the rule of law, parliamentary 
democracy, equity, and social justice for all our people; and
• that the strength of the nation comes from the strength of its 
component communities and individuals (SODELPA 2013a, p. 2).
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There was a strong commitment from party officials to state 
categorically in its Constitution the principles of good governance and 
transparency and to assure all communities that the party embraced 
and respected the basic rights and freedoms of other communities. 
It has the following in its aims and objectives:
• to establish a peaceful, caring and prosperous nation;
• to unite the citizens of Fiji and to represent them and their interests 
fully and with integrity;
• to uphold Christian values and principles and to respect the beliefs 
and values of other religious faiths;
• to protect, enhance and promote the economic, social and human 
development of all communities and to secure their future in the 
Fiji Islands;
• to associate with and/or collaborate with other political parties 
in order to create an association/alliance for national unity and to 
promote nation-building;
• to provide the nation with good, honest, dedicated, transparent 
and competent government and to serve it with devotion;
• to provide policies that prevent all corrupt practices and 
behaviour; and
• to facilitate and foster positive economic and social development, 
sustained economic growth and development of all our communities 
(SODELPA 2013a, p. 2).
From its inception, SODELPA had striven to be attractive to other 
communities than the Taukei only, knowing that the future of any 
major political party depended on its cross-ethnic national appeal. 
This proved to be very difficult, as many perceived SODELPA as just 
a reincarnation of the SDL and its ethno-nationalist policies. This also 
became a rallying point for Bainimarama, who frequently referred to 
party officials as ‘old politicians with the same old ideas’.
An important objective of the SODELPA Constitution was the protection 
and enhancement of the rights of indigenous Fijians, as contained in 
the United Nation Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) and the International Labour Organization Convention 
No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. This generated strident 
views within the party as a consequence of provisions in the 2013 
Constitution and specific decrees that were perceived as deliberate 
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attempts by the regime to weaken the rights of indigenous Fijians, 
especially their group rights to their ancestral land. This was best 
illustrated in the party manifesto as follows:
To the indigenous Fijians land is not just an economic commodity. It is 
part of culture, kinship and group identity. That is why the Fijians 
cling so fiercely to their land ownership. The Bainimarama-Khaiyum 
constitution does not reflect this indigenous attachment to their land.
Their claim that Fijian land has greater protection than before is a lie. 
Its protection has been weakened. In fact there was no reference at 
all to native land in the first draft of their constitution. It was left out 
completely. This caused great fear and uncertainty among landowners. 
It was only when supporters of SODELPA began to speak out that 
Bainimarama-Khaiyum decided to include specific reference to native 
land in their constitution. Without the SODELPA protests they would 
likely have enacted their supreme law with no special reference to 
native land. (SODELPA 2013b, p. 89)
The draft constitution by the Yash Ghai Commission that was scrapped 
by the regime also included a list of protected laws: iTaukei Lands 
Act (Cap 133), iTaukei Land Trust Act (Cap 134), Rotuma Lands Act 
(Cap 138), Banaban Lands Act (Cap 124) and Agricultural Landlord and 
Tenant Act (Cap 270). All these safeguards were not in the constitution 
drafted by the Bainimarama regime. Instead, in the 2013 Constitution 
indigenous Fijian land ownership was simply placed alongside a list 
of provisions in the Bill of Rights. However, section 6 of the Bill of 
Rights permits rights to be limited and therefore changed. All these 
rights listed can be subjected to limitations. These developments were 
of grave concern to traditional stalwarts of the party, who feared a 
gradual deterioration of the entrenched rights of indigenous Fijians. 
Furthermore, since the coup of 2006 the military regime had 
systematically dismantled and weakened the native Fijian 
Administration (Matanitu Taukei) and the laws that govern it, which 
has caused further disaffection among indigenous Fijians. This is 
clearly reflected in the following decrees:
• the Fijian Affairs Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) Regulation Decree 
of 2007 to suspend the GCC;
• the GCC Amendment Decree of 2008 to terminate GCC nominees to 
the Fijian Affairs Board, to be replaced by government appointees;
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• the Fijian Affairs (Provincial Councils) amendment regulation 
of 2008 to terminate attendance at Provincial Councils of educated 
urban indigenous Fijians;
• the Fijian Trust Fund (Amendment) (No. 2) Decree 2009 to remove 
authority of the chiefs from appointing members to the Fijian Trust 
Fund Board and substituting it with government appointees;
• the Native Land Trust Act (Amendment) (No. 31) Decree 2009 
to amend Section 3 of that Act to remove the appointing authority 
of the chiefs to the Native Land Trust Board and its replacement by 
the government appointees;
• the Native Land Trust (Amendment) Regulation of 2010 that 
terminated the share of royalty income for the chiefs;
• the Mahogany Industry Development Decree (No. 16) of 2010 that 
terminated iTaukei Land Trust Board’s (TLTB) power and authority 
over mahogany leases on native land and the power to negotiate 
financial return on mahogany plantations and its replacement by 
a Mahogany Industry Council headed by Prime Minister Voreqe 
Bainimarama;
• the Regulation of Surfing Areas Decree (No. 35) of 2010 that 
terminated control of surfing areas by iTaukei and their trustee 
TLTB, vesting all rights in the government;
• the Native Land Trust Act (Amendment) (No. 31) Decree 2010 
to  terminate reference to indigenous ‘Fijians’ to be replaced 
by the label ‘iTaukei’ and application of the label ‘Fijian’ to all 
citizens of Fiji without consideration of the views, and consent of, 
the indigenous Fijian;
• the Native Land Trust (Amendment) (No. 32) Decree 2010 to amend 
Section 3 of that Act to vest control of that institution in the 
minister, who replaces the president as representative of the chiefs 
and customary landowners; and removing chiefly representation 
to the board, replacing it with the government and prime minister 
as sole appointing authority;
• the iTaukei Land Trust (Amendment) (No. 20) Decree 2012 to amend 
Section 19 of that Act to remove the GCC as authority to determine 
customary ownership and its replacement with government 
authority;
• the iTaukei Affairs (Amendment) (No. 22) Decree 2012 to amend 
Part 2 of that Act to remove and terminate the existence of the GCC;
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• the iTaukei Trust Fund (Amendment) Decree (No. 23) of 2012 that 
terminated the GCC administrative power of the Fijian Trust Fund;
• the Land Use Decree (No. 36) of 2010 that gave to the prime minister 
unfettered power to designate native land to a land bank, to be 
administered by the Land Use Unit and Director of Lands;
• the Native Land Trust (Amendment) Decree (No. 20) of 2010 that 
terminated the GCC’s authority over extinct mataqali land; 
• the Native Land Trust (Amendment) Decree (No. 20) of 2012 
that terminated the power of the GCC to determine customary 
ownership of extinct mataqali land; 
• the iTaukei Trust Fund (Amendment) (No. 23) Decree 2012 
to remove any reference to the GCC and the need to provide for its 
financial autonomy;
• the Unit Title (Amendment) Decree (No. 38) of 2013 that removed 
the restriction of that Act on native land.
The 2013 Constitution had further weakened indigenous Fijian group 
rights; there is no reference to the Deed of Cession and its historical 
significance, as in the 1997 Constitution. The Deed of Cession was for 
many indigenous Fijians the basis on which they could rightly claim 
their inheritance as first inhabitants, including their inalienable rights 
to their traditional lands and resources. 
Moreover, the 1970 and 1997 Constitution had special entrenched 
provisions, providing extremely strong safeguards for indigenous 
Fijian, Rotuman and Banaban landownership. These constitutional 
provisions laid down very detailed and entrenched procedures for 
altering the following: the Fijian Affairs Act; Fijian Development 
Act; Native Lands Act; Native Lands Trust Act; Rotuma Act; Rotuma 
Lands Act; Banaban Lands Act; and the Banaban Settlement Act. 
These entrenched provisions are no longer in the 2013 Constitution.
There is also no provision in the 2013 Constitution on customary law 
and customary rights, which were provided for in the 1997 Constitution 
as group rights. This would have allowed the application of such laws 
in the proper maintenance and observance of customary practices.
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The 1997 Constitution stated as follows:
Customary laws and customary rights
186. (1) The Parliament must make provision for the application 
of customary laws and for dispute resolution in accordance with 
traditional Fijian processes.
(2) In doing so, the Parliament must have regard to the customs, 
traditions, usages, values and aspirations of the Fijian and Rotuman 
people.
(3) The Parliament must make provision granting to the owners of land 
or of registered customary fishing rights an equitable share of royalties 
or other moneys paid to the State in respect of the grant by the State of 
rights to extract minerals from the land or the seabed
(Fiji Constitution 1997, Section 186)
Coupled with the above, the military regimes took control of 
all companies established under Fiji’s semi-autonomous native 
administration (Matanitu Taukei), including Fijian Holdings Limited 
and the Native Land Trust Board, the government agency that 
administers native land (SODELPA 2013b, p. 38).
The above actions by the regime were perceived by SODELPA as a 
deliberate attempt by the regime to regress indigenous rights. This 
suppression of the communal group rights of indigenous Fijians, 
for the creation of a progressive nation-state, is clearly espoused by 
the military regime’s Attorney General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum in his 
unpublished thesis. In his conclusion Khaiyum states as follows:
Therefore cultural autonomy must have a sunset clause. Its prolonged 
continuation will place a stranglehold on the very members it seeks to 
protect and it will concomitantly disallow the critical cultural space 
in which a just, vibrant and coherent nation-state can flourish while 
embracing diversity. (Sayed-Khaiyum 2002, p. 69)
But such impositions will not create a stable and lasting solution to Fiji’s 
long-term stability as a multicultural nation. As Jon Fraenkel states, 
‘It  is inconceivable that an assault on the institutions of indigenous 
Fijian post-colonial rule will yield a viable future for that country’ 
(Fraenkel 2014, p. 1).
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This will be a major challenge in the years ahead as SODELPA tries 
to reconcile its traditional base voters, who perceive the threat to the 
deterioration of their rights as indigenous people on the one hand, 
and the need to address the social and economic needs of a new, more 
urbanised voter on the other. 
In addition, the voting age was reduced to 18 years, which has its own 
political dynamic. Many young voters will have not voted before and 
many are divorced from the traditional sentiments about indigenous 
concerns such as the GCC or land rights. For them, bread and butter 
issues, access to education and job opportunities are critical factors. 
As Jon Fraenkel states:
The main opposition party, SODELPA, chose to campaign—as Laisenia 
Qarase did in 2001 and 2006—by appealing mainly to the indigenous 
Fijian community on issues such as hostility to the dissolution of 
the Great Council of Chiefs and threats to indigenous Fijian land 
ownership. These issues struck a chord amongst older ethnic Fijian 
voters, but they carried little weight among the younger generation. 
With the voting age reduced to 18, these voters held sway in 2014. 
(Fraenkel 2014, p. 1)
In examining the new voting system and the demographic 
distribution, SODELPA party officials were always aware that they 
could not win the elections alone. They needed the other opposition 
parties to win some of the seats, with the intention of going into a 
coalition to form a government. Contrary to Fraenkel’s observation, 
SODELPA also had economic, social, governance and bread and butter 
issues in its manifesto. The pliant media had become a propaganda 
tool for the regime and SODELPA could not get its other progressive 
messages across.
The restrictive political environment
Although Voreqe Bainimarama stepped down eventually from 
leadership of the army, before the general elections it was evident 
that Fiji was still governed by a military-backed dictatorship. 
The promulgation of restrictive decrees placed severe limitations on 
the ability of political parties to launch their political campaigns.
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For instance, the Political Parties Decree stated that a person who had 
been convicted and imprisoned for an offence for a period of six months 
or more in the last five years cannot be a party official. This effectively 
ruled out Qarase, who had served a year-long prison sentence after he 
was convicted for offences committed before he was prime minister. 
The same provision later ruled out Mahendra Chaudhry, the FLP 
leader. The decree also banned trade union officials from being 
political party officials; many commentators believed this provision 
targeted union officials like Felix Anthony (National Secretary of the 
Fiji Trades Union Congress) and Attar Singh (General Secretary of 
the Communications, Mining and General Workers Union), who had 
shown keen interest in contesting the elections. An amendment to 
the decree also nullified the candidacy of Anare Jale, a strong and 
popular candidate for SODELPA, and unfairly disqualified some 
opposition party candidates because they had been overseas for more 
than 18 months prior to the writ of elections. The party perceived all 
these restrictive sections of the decree as an attempt by the regime to 
weaken prominent opposition figures at the polls.
Increasingly, within the regime decisions were made by a few, there 
was no consultation with political parties and information was 
published through the pliable media. Repressive and undemocratic 
decrees were promulgated, such as the State Services (Amendment) 
Decree 2000; Public Order Amendment Decree 2012; the Media 
Industry Development Decree 2010; the Political Parties (Registration, 
Conduct, Funding and Disclosures) Decree 4 2013; the anti-worker 
and anti-union Essential National Industry (Employment) Decree 
2011; Regulation of Pension and Retirement Allowances Decree 2009; 
and the Compulsory Registration of Customers for Telephone Services 
Decree 2010. These decrees placed severe limitations on activities that 
would provide for more transparent democratic processes to ensure 
free and fair elections.
The muzzling of the media 
The media industry had been under severe censorship since the 
military  coup of December 2006. The people saw for themselves 
the pervasive damaging influence of the Media Decree on the 
quality and content of what was reported. Many journalists spoke 
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of the self-censorship in the newsroom. The net effect is that what 
eventually came out as news was heavily truncated and edited by 
regime lackeys. There were many complaints lodged with the Media 
Industry Development Authority (MIDA) by concerned citizens and 
SODELPA party officials, but nothing eventuated. There was also 
growing unease that MIDA may have been unduly influenced by the 
regime due to its lack of response to the pro-regime propaganda and 
the suppression of opposition views. 
Section 22 of the Media Industry Development Decree states that 
content must not include material, which is (a) against the public 
interest or order; (b) against the national interest; or (c) creates 
communal discord. This provision effectively regulated how the media 
generated its news and in many instances was selectively interpreted 
by the regime.
The heavy penalties for a breach of the decree also placed undue 
pressure on the media to exercise self-censorship. Upon conviction 
for any breaches of the media code, a media organisation could be 
fined FJD$100,000; a publisher/editor FJD$25,000 and/or two years 
imprisonment; and a journalist or media FJD$1,000 and/or two years 
imprisonment. 
A free and fair media without the restrictive and selective interpretations 
of the Media and MIDA Decrees was essential to balanced reporting 
in terms of the opposition parties getting their views and opinions to 
the general public. 
This lack of media coverage proved to be a crucial factor in the overall 
performance of the opposition parties at the polls, including SODELPA. 
They were simply shut out of the media, and with less visibility and 
coverage it was always going to be an uphill battle for them.
A system of elections to suit the 
FijiFirst Party
It became quite clear to SODELPA that the system of elections that was 
imposed on the country by the regime would favour Bainimarama’s 
FijiFirst. The system of voting is prescribed in the 2013 Fiji Constitution 
as follows:
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53. (1) The election of members of Parliament is by a multi-member 
open list system of proportional representation, under which each 
voter has one vote, with each vote being of equal value, in a single 
national electoral roll comprising all the registered voters and 
 (3) A political party or an independent candidate shall not qualify for 
any seat in Parliament unless the political party or the independent 
candidate receives at least 5% of the total number of votes cast. 
(Fiji Government 2013)
SODELPA was supportive of a multiple constituency system that would 
allow representations in specific constituencies and allow voters to 
cast their votes along party lines. But the regime had chosen a single 
national electoral roll—a system that would ultimately benefit it. 
Furthermore, the rejection by Bainimarama of the Yash Ghai draft 
should be seen in the context of the overall election strategy of FijiFirst 
and its performance at the polls. As explained by Wadan Narsey: 
First, the Ghai draft electoral system had four constituencies 
(the  divisions), apparently a trivial difference, but it would have 
limited Bainimarama to appear on the ballot paper for only one 
constituency and hence strictly limited his personal vote appeal. 
All other FF candidates in the other three constituencies would have 
had to struggle for votes against other competitors, instead of riding 
on Bainimarama’s coat-tails.
Second, the Bainimarama government would have had to resign six 
months before the election. This would have prevented Bainimarama 
and his ministers from using taxpayers’ funds and donor-funded 
projects, right up to polling day, in blatant and very successful vote 
buying.
Third, Bainimarama would not have had the complete control over 
the media through their restrictive media decrees (including the 
Media Industry Development Authority – MIDA) to obtain maximum 
political mileage for themselves, while criticising and ruthlessly 
suppressing opposition parties.
Fourth, to obtain immunity, Bainimarama and his coup collaborators 
would have had to express remorse for specific actions for which they 
wanted immunity, with clearly negative consequence for their image 
with voters. (Narsey 2004, p. 1)
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Apparently, the Yash Ghai draft constitution was discarded and a new 
one manufactured to put in place the most conducive electoral system 
to win the elections for Bainimarama’s intended party.
The electoral decree came out in March 2014, although the regime 
had earlier promised that it would be ready by December 2013. 
The lateness of the electoral decree, which took an inordinately long 
time to draft, was another ploy by the regime to restrict the time for 
other political parties to prepare for elections. 
The decree also had provisions that were clearly against free and fair 
elections. SODELPA had conveyed the following issues to the Electoral 
Commission:
• party symbols to be part of the ballot paper and candidates be 
grouped together under their respective party symbol instead 
of just having the numbers of the candidates;
• adequate training to be provided for party officials and agents;
• examination of the role of media and their self-induced censorship 
as a consequence of the restrictive provisions of the Media Industry 
Development Decree;
• allow more public political rallies, the number of which was limited 
by the Public Order Amendment Decree;
• allow a more diverse group of observers for the elections, especially 
local NGOs who were prevented from observing the elections 
by the Electoral Decree 2014;
• the Commission to take a more proactive role in the build-up to the 
elections to engender public confidence in the neutrality of the 
process;
• the excessive penalty for any person who contravened the Electoral 
Decree, who would be liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding 
FJD$10,000 or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years, or 
to both; and
• to amend the provisions in the Electoral Decree 2014 that allowed 
the Supervisor of Elections and his staff indemnity from court 
actions as a result of decisions they undertake.
The Electoral Decree stated that the ballot paper was to have only 
numbers, with no names, no photos and no party symbols. SODELPA, 
with other political parties, made many representations to the 
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Commission to seek changes to the ballot paper, particularly the need 
to have party symbols to assist voters. This eventually culminated 
in the production of a handbook that had the names, photos and 
numbers of candidates, which could be consulted by voters before 
placing a tick on the number of the candidate of their choice on the 
ballot paper. But this made little difference, as the ballot paper only 
had the number and was clearly to the advantage of FijiFirst, which 
was promoting just one number. 
It is abundantly clear now that the entire electoral system and electoral 
decree was cunningly designed to suit the Bainimarama campaign for 
voters to remember only one number (279) while ignoring all other 
candidates. (Narsey 2014)
It was quite apparent that the FijiFirst strategy was to ask voters to 
vote for just the one number representing Bainimarama, and this was 
heavily advertised through the media and campaign material. The large 
number of votes for Bainimarama hauled in many of his FijiFirst 
colleagues with fewer votes than those for SODELPA candidates who 
did not get into Parliament. Many will question whether this was a 
‘democratic’ representation of voters and the validity of the mantra of 
‘one man, one vote, one value’.
The electoral system had also imposed a 5 per cent threshold rule that 
disadvantaged small parties and independents. The total votes lost 
due to the very high threshold resulted in FijiFirst getting 3 extra 
seats. This was another gain to the regime’s party that was foreseen 
and written into the relevant decree.
The elections authorities
To ensure control over the process of elections, the Bainimarama 
regime chose as the Minister of Elections its own Attorney General 
(Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum), who was also the secretary-general of FijiFirst 
Party. This was a blatant exposition of political control to ensure an 
election that was in all ways and means to their advantage.
In addition, the Supervisor of Elections, Electoral Commission 
members, and the MIDA chairman were all seen by the party as pawns 
in the build-up to elections, as most of them were well known regime 
sympathisers.
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The Electoral Decree also deemed: 
it shall be unlawful for any person, entity or organization that 
receives any funding or assistance from a foreign government, inter-
governmental or non-governmental organization or multilateral 
agency to engage in, participate in or conduct any campaign 
(including organizing debates, public forum, meetings, interviews, 
panel discussions, or publishing any material) that is related to the 
election or any election issue or matter. (Fiji Government 2014)
This provision barred local NGOs from educational activities related 
to the elections and effectively restricted the boundaries for free and 
fair elections. The Electoral Commission was going to conduct all the 
training and from the party’s perspective that was inadequately done.
There was also the decision by the Minister for Elections and secretary 
of the FijiFirst Party that while international observers of his choice 
would be allowed to monitor the elections, no local observers would 
be allowed, although it was clear that local observers would have had 
a better understanding of local issues and possible discrepancies in 
the process.
It was abundantly clear that after numerous efforts by SODELPA for a 
level playing field, the election authorities were doing very little to try 
to make the elections genuinely ‘free and fair’, despite the restrictive 
Electoral Decree and the compromised media environment.
SODELPA at the polls
The SODELPA party executives were well aware that it was going 
to be a hard-fought battle at the polls. The base voters of the party 
would have to be the iTaukei, with a total of 297,818 votes comprising 
nearly 60 per cent of the total votes of 496,364. The party had to win 
52 per  cent of the total national votes to get the 26 seats required 
to govern on its own. This meant that if it wanted to target just the 
iTaukei then it had to win over 80 per cent of their votes. This was a 
near impossible task.
The strategy was to go after the iTaukei votes with the hope that 
the other two major political parties, the National Federation Party 
(NFP) and the Fiji Labour Party (FLP), would win enough seats 
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to form a  coalition government. This was first articulated by party 
leader Ro  Teimumu Kepa in his maiden speech as party leader of 
SODELPA, where he invited other opposition parties to be part 
of a grand coalition. This was the only feasible strategy in the face of 
overwhelming odds, given that FijiFirst had been in power for nearly 
eight years and controlled the media and the rules for elections.
SODELPA won 139,857 votes, which translated into 15 seats in 
Parliament; and with NFP winning three seats and the FLP winning 
none the party fell short of the targeted 26 seats.
FijiFirst also had the advantage over other parties in terms of resources 
and the fact that they were in power in the form of the post-coup 
regime and had control over the political and coercive means to 
restrict the media and freedom of association and was in control of 
development projects which it marketed effectively to voters.
Eight years of authoritarian rule and unrivalled hegemony entrenched 
their visibility, familiarity and relevance in the consciousness of 
voters. (Ratuva 2014)
Although SODELPA could not form government as a coalition as 
intended, the result was positively considered as a first step towards 
parliamentary democracy.
Conclusion
The triumph of coup perpetrator Bainimarama and his FijiFirst 
Party illustrates how a military commander treasonably deposed a 
lawfully elected government and yet managed to become legitimised 
as an elected prime minister. All it took was a systematic approach to 
controlling the election boundaries and the decrees that were, for all 
intents and purposes, engineered to give him victory at the polls.
Bainimarama has frequently stated that the coup’s objective was to 
bring about a more united Fiji, with a new vision of statehood. But as 
Jon Fraenkel observes:
Surveying the international experience of coups aimed at bridging 
ethnic divisions, it is striking how few cases give credence to that 
objective. West African military coups after independence were 
frequently depicted as efforts to counter tribalism or tackle civilian 
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corruption, but almost invariably proved to be instruments for the 
triumph of militarised ethnocracy. Coups aimed at countering ethnic 
polarisation tend to morph quickly into vehicles for the ascendancy of 
one or the other group. (Fraenkel 2009)
Another chapter could be written on the continuation of military 
dictatorship under the guise of parliamentary democracy; while 
the country boasts a democratically elected government, Frank 
Bainimarama and Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum’s modus operandi for the past 
eight years has not changed. Some claimed that the country merely 
transitioned to a parliamentary dictatorship.
For the SODELPA party, winning 15 seats was a consolation of sorts 
after eight long years of a military regime. The party fielded 48 
candidates, with the strategy of getting as many votes as possible 
and to cover a wider geographical area. Many observers stated that 
SODELPA should have done better, but with the cards stacked high 
against it the party was always realistic that without the support of 
other parties, it would be extremely difficult to be in government on 
its own.
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‘Not with a bang but a 




At the 2014 elections, the Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA), 
the party representing Fiji’s chiefly aristocracy and indigenous 
commercial buccaneers (see below), gained more than one quarter 
of the popular vote and seats. Under a constitution designed by 
the military regime headed by Prime Minister Voreqe (Frank) 
Bainimarama, SODELPA was forced to compete in conditions that 
favoured the regime’s own newly founded party, FijiFirst. In such 
circumstances, the outcome might seem as if SODELPA’s achievement 
was both against the odds and substantial. A closer examination, 
however, suggests otherwise and raises the question: Has the political 
and commercial alliance clustered under the party’s banner reached a 
terminal condition in Fiji’s political economy? To reframe a line from 
TS Eliot’s poem The Hollow Men, is this ‘the way the world ends’ for 
the aristocracy and the buccaneers? Is a further extra-parliamentary 
attempt to capture state power, along the lines of the 1987 coup and 
the 2000 revolt in the name of indigenous rights, the only means by 
which they can regain office?
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This chapter commences with a consideration of the wider 
constitutional and electoral terms under which SODELPA fought to 
secure votes. It then examines the strategy employed by the party, 
emphasising how playing to the strengths of the party’s appeal and 
candidates was the best alternative possible but also highlighted its 
weaknesses. The final section develops the conclusion that the party’s 
achievement was probably as successful as could be expected in 
electoral and parliamentary terms, but that its prospects for improving 
on this in the future are doubtful. 
The electoral arena 
In order to consider the ‘best case’ scenario for SODELPA’s future, 
it  is  necessary to examine how the 2013 Constitution and changes 
to Fiji’s political economy operated to affect the party’s strategy and 
electoral chances. Some fairly obvious changes had occurred since 
the May 2006 elections, which was won by SODELPA’s precursor, the 
Laisenia Qarase-led Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL), which 
had subsequently absorbed an even more nationalistic Conservative 
Alliance Matanitu Vanua (CAMV). Not only did SDL figures lose their 
hold on state power in the coup of December 2006, they were also 
marginalised by the military regime’s deliberate strategy of inserting 
senior officers and reliable allies into the most important administrative 
departments in the government bureaucracy. The media had been 
muzzled, with the ownership of one leading paper localised and the 
other becoming little more than a government mouthpiece. Under 
Rupert Murdoch’s ownership, The Fiji Times had been a staunch 
SDL supporter and military regime critic, but with the change of 
ownership to a local businessman in 2010, the paper meticulously 
avoided controversy and punitive regime action. By comparison, 
the other national English-language newspaper, Fiji Sun, became an 
uncritical supporter of the military regime and consistently backed 
FijiFirst’s election campaign. Although there had been some relaxing 
of repression prior to the elections, campaigning nonetheless occurred 
in a highly constrained atmosphere.
Under the 1997 Constitution, the 1999, 2001 and 2006 elections 
had been conducted on the basis of a single member electorate 
arrangement under the alternative voting system, with constituencies 
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grossly malapportioned in favour of rural areas (see Ratuva, 
this  volume). In addition, seats were divided between ‘open’ or 
non-race based electorates and the more numerous race-based or 
‘communal’ electorates, and were weighted in favour of rural voters. 
These arrangements therefore favoured parties which had strong rural 
support, the Soqosoqo Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), precursor to the 
SDL–CAMV alliance in 2001, and the Fiji Labour Party (FLP), with 
its strong support among Indo-Fijian cane farmers, rural workers 
and newly urbanised former farmers. The communal electoral system 
also underpinned the continuing parliamentary dominance of the 
chiefly aristocracy and further advances by the Taukei bourgeoisie 
(MacWilliam 2001; MacWilliam with Daveta 2003; MacWilliam 
2014). The 2013 Constitution and associated decrees removed single-
member electorates, instituted ‘one person, one vote, one value’, set a 
minimum figure for obtaining a seat on a proportional basis, abolished 
compulsory voting, and lowered the voting age to 18.1 In short, the 
changes in constitutional and associated electoral rules negated the 
main advantages that SODELPA’s predecessors had enjoyed under the 
previous arrangements. 
There remained other important barriers to electoral success for 
SODELPA in 2014 in addition to those embodied in the new Constitution 
and associated decrees. Despite continuing disputes among candidates 
for high chiefly office, the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) had become 
a political and ideological organising centre for opposition to the 
military regime. The abolition of the GCC, and therefore its removal 
from any constitutional role, placed SODELPA, the party home of 
some of the more important and ultra-nationalist chiefs, at a further 
disadvantage. So too did the attacks against commercial supporters 
who had previously backed the SDL party. The most prominent of 
these, Laisenia Qarase, who had been prevented from running as a 
candidate due to conviction for corruption, spent a considerable 
amount of time overseas during the final stages of the campaign. 
The rules that formally limited candidate expenditure on campaigning 
1  It has been asserted that by establishing a formula for calculating the minimum number of 
votes that a party needed to obtain to gain a seat, the ‘one vote, one value’ principle was not 
followed, since it acted against minor parties. None of these obtained a seat at the September 
2014 elections, although the National Federation Party, which won three seats, could be regarded 
as a minor party, having won no seats in the previous three elections. In any case, the expression 
‘one vote, one value’ is not usually used to refer to the allocation of seats after the votes are cast 
but to the relative weight of votes in the voting system.  
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and fundraising overseas were more honoured in the breach than in 
the observance, but posed a potential threat to opposition parties and 
other organisations. FijiFirst raised more money than all the other 
parties, and this was converted into a clear dominance of advertising 
in the press, TV and other media.
The regime had also put a targeted effort into bringing some chiefs 
onside, providing infrastructure and natural disaster relief efforts in 
their areas. With what seemed to be equivalent to a marginal seats 
strategy, Prime Minister Bainimarama, Attorney General Aiyaz 
Sayed-Khaiyum and other ministers travelled constantly around the 
country touting government activities. They were backed by the 
military, which was especially prominent in relief efforts whenever 
a major natural disaster struck rural areas in particular. Even if there 
were no longer individual electorates to be wooed, because of the 
change to one national constituency, these activities, together with 
continuous attention to roads, bridges, schools and health centres, 
were part of a lengthy campaign to bolster the government’s and then 
FijiFirst’s position. Once party propaganda was removed during the 
two-day embargo on campaigning immediately prior to the elections, 
the  posters featuring the Prime Minister and government efforts in 
various areas remained on display. SODELPA faced the typical dilemma 
of an opposition that could only attack government efforts without 
any achievements of its own to publicise.
In addition to the constitutional and other political barriers faced by 
SODELPA, most of the major demographic and related changes in the 
country favoured FijiFirst. While SODELPA made much of its rural 
and Taukei support, this base was being undermined. The year after 
the military regime took power in 2006, a national census indicated 
that the population was roughly split between urban and rural areas. 
Even if these figures are accurate—and there are substantial grounds 
for doubting them, including questions about what constitutes rural 
residence when this is located very close to major urban centres and 
places of work including large tourist resorts—the trend was moving 
against rural-based parties. By 2014, unofficial estimates suggest that 
between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of the country’s population lived 
in the Nausori–Suva–Lami conurbation, with a further 20 per cent in 
the west of Viti Levu from Nadi through Lautoka to Ba. Some support 
for these estimates is given by the proportion of votes coming from the 
Central and Western districts: 43 per cent and 38 per cent respectively. 
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So, however places of residence are officially identified as being 
urban or rural, over 80 per cent of the total voting population lives 
on Viti Levu, the most commercialised island in terms of production 
and consumption. The voting population in the other two districts, 
Northern and Eastern, amounts to less than 20 per cent of the total, 
with the Eastern district having fewer than 5 per cent of the voting 
population. 
The voting age was lowered to 18 by the 2013 Constitution, and 
probably 25 to 30 per cent of voters at the 2014 elections were less 
than 30 years old and had not had a ballot previously. FijiFirst, as the 
effective incumbent government, was well placed to capture the 
bulk of the urban and some of the rural youth vote. This was also 
probably the segment of the voting population least likely to enthuse 
over SODELPA’s association with chiefly rule, Taukei land rights and 
demands for a Christian state. Government pre-election moves to 
reduce the costs of schooling, to strengthen tertiary education and to 
‘create’ jobs appealed not only to parents of school-age children and 
young people, but to young voters as well. Changing the distribution 
of lease monies in 2012 away from chiefs to provide equal distribution 
to all mataqali members not only assisted in providing more money 
for households which could be spent on purchased goods, church 
levies and the like, but were also designed to undercut SODELPA’s 
popular base, as well as to bolster the government’s, and consequently 
FijiFirst’s, support among Taukei. Once again, being in opposition 
put SODELPA at a decided disadvantage by comparison to FijiFirst 
because the government could respond directly to these demographic 
and other changes with policies and expenditure. 
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SODELPA’s strategic definition
As already noted, in previous elections Fiji voters were largely forced 
into identity politics that emphasised race/ethnicity.2 The act of 
voting was constructed on these lines, with voters required to line up 
as Taukei, Indo-Fijians or ‘general’ electors (i.e. other races) and to 
cast votes for seats, the majority of which were defined as communal. 
Even as population movement occurred out of rural and into urban 
areas, with production and consumption for the entire voting 
population increasingly commercialised, voters remained trapped in 
these identities in part due to the gross malapportionment favouring 
rural seats. 
The broad features of the various communal electoral arrangements 
sketched above are well known, but less often noted is the fact that 
these electoral features were installed by, and secured the political 
power of, the chiefly aristocracy and indigenous commercial 
buccaneers. The basis of this aristocracy remained heredity, including 
attachments to particular areas of land and forms of labour, particularly 
smallholders of landowning units. That many of the aristocrats 
are becoming increasingly impoverished serves to emphasise the 
universality of their existence as rentiers. The process of aristocratic 
impoverishment in Fiji is similar to that which has occurred in other 
parts of the world, including in Europe. On that continent there is 
popular comedy about poor nobles, full of pretensions and clinging 
on to the last vestiges of their castles and manors, the grand estates of 
the past, of which the British TV sitcom To the Manor Born is a good 
example. There is no less disdain for the aristocracy in Fiji, epitomised 
with the popular appellation for the now abolished chiefly institution, 
namely, the Great Council of Thieves.
2  The confusion between identities is not only found in public discussion of Fiji’s political 
economy but is also common in academic accounts. For one instance among many, see Lal 
2006, pp. 1–2, where race, ethnicity and communities are all employed to distinguish between 
populations. Lal invokes the predominant Weberian liberal form of describing and analysing 
Fiji’s political sociology, which nominates races, ethnicities and communities as forms of identity, 
even occasionally referring to class on a similar basis. This is distinct from and opposed to a 
Marxist understanding, in which race etc. are forms taken by class, that is class as if race, as if 
ethnicity, instead of the liberal pluralist rendering of class and race, class and ethnicity, class and 
community, class and gender, and so on. In this essay, it is not necessary to show the relative 
salience of class over race and ethnicity for Fiji, which would require shifting epistemological 
ground to that liberal Weberian position which is being criticised. 
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If the most important and wealthy chiefs were critical for the first 
phase of indigenous accumulation, in concert with European and 
Indo-Fijian businesses, from the 1980s the second phase aggressively 
broke with this past (Ratuva 2013). While holding political power 
remained important, plundering state assets and using state power 
as the basis of accumulation characterised a particular form of 
accumulation. The Fiji Development Bank and the National Bank 
of  Fiji were utilised by politicians and businessmen and women to 
fund enterprises that largely took over existing commercial operations, 
including through the use of state power to force out earlier owners 
or secure joint ventures. Unlike the coup of 1987, which facilitated 
the commercial advancement of those whose form of accumulation is 
here characterised as buccaneering, the 2006 coup was important for 
the political and commercial marginalisation of many of these earlier 
indigenous accumulators. 
In the case of wealthy Taukei and their Indo-Fijian equivalent, the 
politics of identity could also be used to disguise the causes and effects 
of commercialisation on the mass of the voting population. Where 
households have faced stagnant or declining living standards over 
recent decades, racial and or ethnic identities have been consistently 
used for electoral and other political purposes by the holders of state 
power. Electoral laws that forced voters into Taukei, Indo-Fijian and 
other blocs were only the most obvious expression of the connection 
between identity, state and political power. Even when the screen of 
identity weakened, as in the 1999 elections when voters expressed 
welfare and other grievances against the two main parties, the SVT 
and the Indo-Fijian-dominated National Federation Party (NFP), they 
were forced to vote for other parties that were formed largely around 
racial or ethnic identity. The People’s Coalition, which won the 1999 
elections, was primarily an amalgam of voters signalling reaction 
against the SVT government and a rejection of its coalition partner, 
the NFP. Most electors could express their opposition only by voting 
for the FLP and a number of Taukei parties where chiefly figures and 
their associates held power.
Although the 2014 elections were held under rules that aimed to 
undermine many of the previous advantages held by parties based 
on understandings of identity, the main opposition party, SODELPA, 
nevertheless remained as a reminder of that past. That past included 
the SDL, ‘a party defined by the objective of placating indigenous 
THE PEOPLE HAVE SPOkEN
218
discontent’ (Fraenkel & Firth 2007, p. 75). SODELPA’s main leadership 
comprised two high chiefly figures—Ro Teimumu Kepa, the Roko 
Tui Dreketi of Rewa in south-eastern Viti Levu, and Ratu Naiqama 
Lalabalavu, the Tui Cakau from Cakaudrove in Vanua Levu—and 
also the banned but still active figure of deposed prime minister 
Laisenia Qarase from Lau, who worked his commercial contacts to 
help finance the party’s campaign. Through these figures, SODELPA 
kept the mantle of its Taukei predecessors—the SVT, SDL and CAMV. 
Although both Kepa and Lalabalavu are Roman Catholics in a country 
where Methodists comprise the predominant Christian denomination, 
a spirit of ecumenism among the party’s leadership made it possible 
for this difference to be glossed over. Instead, their hereditary status 
and ‘Christian-ness’ were emphasised in the party’s campaign.
Once the 2013 Constitution was promulgated, and the terms of the 
elections that reshaped the electoral arena for the 2014 contest were 
set out, SODELPA retained its roots in the SDL–CAMV heritage but 
worked to rebrand the past. The most obvious way in which this 
was done involved incorporating the ‘old’ parties SDL–CAMV in the 
new party’s name, regardless of the confusing and rather antagonistic 
political ideologies represented in it. The SDL, the party that saw 
itself as the bastion of indigeneity, was required to anglicise its name 
under new regulations and chose ‘Social Democratic Liberal Party’ in 
an attempt to retain the close association with the SDL acronym, and 
to continue its ‘mighty mission and a sacred cause’ for ‘the people 
of Fiji’ (SODELPA 2014a). While there is not space here to document 
completely how the rebranding occurred, two central concerns of the 
transformation can be noted: religion and land.
Prior to the launch of the SODELPA manifesto, the party struggled 
to come to terms with a key feature of the 2013 Constitution. Section 
4 effectively defined Fiji as a secular state, understood in terms of 
complete religious freedom with no one religion being privileged. 
Sub-section 4(1) reads: ‘Religious liberty, as recognised in the Bill 
of Rights, is a founding principle of the State’ (Fiji Government 
2013). Opposition to this kind of liberal secularism ran deep within 
the SODELPA leadership and among Taukei supporters, so that for 
much of the pre-election period SODELPA’s leaders insisted that 
it would change the Constitution to define Fiji as a Christian state. 
Acknowledging the difficulty of amending the 2013 Constitution 
to attain this objective, and recognising that the party could not 
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win the elections while retaining the ethnic and religious identity 
of its predecessors, SODELPA’s platform became a mishmash of 
compromising statements. ‘The Guiding Principles and Values’ listed 
in the manifesto included ‘The freedom, equality and dignity of all 
religious denominations’. However, the manifesto, which sought to 
‘Reclaim Fiji’, also declared in its ‘Aims and Objectives’ a promise ‘To 
uphold Christian values and principles and to respect the beliefs and 
values of other religious faiths’. Describing the 2013 Constitution as 
‘Godless’, the manifesto spoke of how the Constitution ‘ignored the 
role of Christianity in the development of Fiji’. Secularism became cast 
as an attempt ‘to encourage worship of an unknown deity’. SODELPA 
insisted that when it formed government, a new constitution would 
‘Ensure God’s rightful place in our supreme law’ and ‘uphold Christian 
values and principles ’. While ecumenism made it possible to ignore 
possible clashes between different Christian denominations’ values, 
there was no doubt that religions other than Christianity would 
have a subordinate place in the proposed new document. Instead, 
with Christianity dominant, the Constitution would simply ‘Ensure 
respect for all religious faiths and religious freedom of all citizens’ 
(SODELPA 2014a). 
While commercialisation and urbanisation have provided increasingly 
significant forces to counter earlier regional and rural loyalties, 
the indigenous vote had previously shown great fragmentation in 
specific circumstances, as in 1999. Industrialisation and its effects 
should not be confused with one form of industry—manufacturing. 
In Fiji, the stagnation and even decline of the garment industry has 
been conflated with the ongoing process of industrialisation, which 
reigns in construction, tourism, fishing, some areas of agriculture and 
financial services. To illustrate, the construction of very tall buildings 
for offices and residential accommodation in city and town centres 
occurs through industrial labour processes with complex divisions of 
labour and equipment applied on site in Fiji and in other countries, 
wherever the cement, steel, glass and machinery is manufactured. 
The existence of large tourist resorts, one major component of the 
tourist industry, represents industrialisation in their construction as 
well as in their daily operations: food is prepared on an industrial 
scale in large kitchens, to give just another example of the process at 
work. As the Asian Development Bank (2015, pp. 249–50) has noted 
recently, since 2010, ‘[g]rowth was broad based, with investments in 
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finance, construction, and transport leading the trend …’. The drift of 
population from eastern and northern Fiji, first to the west and south 
and then to urban and peri-urban areas, is to a substantial extent an 
effect of these widespread forms of industrialisation.
Even if SODELPA attracted the great majority of Taukei votes, that 
would give it victory by only a narrow margin. When the votes of 
the non-indigenous population (around 40 per cent of the total) are 
also taken into account, SODELPA’s stance on the ‘respect for all 
religious faiths and religious freedom’ appeared as little more than an 
opportunistic move to broaden the party’s electoral appeal because 
the Taukei vote alone would be insufficient to ensure victory. Disarray 
among the leadership of the Methodist Church, with some sections 
clearly wedded to the initial SODELPA cause of a ‘Christian state’ while 
others attempted to avoid continuing conflict with the government, 
only helped FijiFirst’s campaign to tie SODELPA to its past no matter 
how the final party manifesto glossed over religious fundamentalism. 
Not surprisingly, Prime Minister Bainimarama and FijiFirst made much 
of the SODELPA leadership’s past statements and the party’s heritage 
to show the confusion within its ranks over its position on secularism 
in general and Christianity in particular. 
Another signature component of SODELPA’s position was its stance 
regarding land. Once again, this provided the party with both 
an important strength and a fundamental weakness. SODELPA’s 
leadership constantly attacked the Bainimarama Government and the 
2013 Constitution for undermining indigenous rights, claiming that 
by abrogating the 1997 Constitution, the entrenched protection of 
native land rights had been removed. One specific objection was that 
without a Senate, and the representation afforded the GCC through 
this body, all that was required to change Taukei land ownership in the 
new unicameral legislature was a simple majority vote in parliament. 
While debate on the accuracy of this claim raged during the campaign 
(SODELPA 2014b; FijiFirst 2014), other matters regarding land were 
probably more important in determining voting behaviour.
While SODELPA’s stance was undoubtedly effective in securing the 
votes of Taukei who still farmed land and others who had left the 
land but remained attached to rural life in some form, such voters had 
become a declining proportion of the population. Other Taukei were 
domiciled in villages but employed in wage and salaried positions at 
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tourist resorts and urban centres. Still, others grew crops for urban 
markets and purchased industrial commodities for consumption. 
While commercialisation in all forms transformed the meaning of land 
rights beyond what may be described as traditional production for 
immediate non-marketed consumption, often described as subsistence 
farming, these changes also affected how SODELPA was forced to frame 
its defence of ‘native land rights’. In so doing, the party also had to 
appear inclusive of Indo-Fijian farmers leasing land and to include 
poverty reduction, education and state services in its proposed 
policies. SODELPA was forced to shift its terrain and compete directly 
with FijiFirst as the incumbent government. 
The SODELPA defence of indigenous land rights became primarily 
about the commercial terms of land occupation and ownership, 
as well as the needs of both Taukei and Indo-Fijians displaced from 
land ownership, occupation and cultivation (SODELPA 2014b, 
pp. 21–22, 43–47). Commencing with the usual obligatory reference 
to the 1874 Deed of Cession as the basis for Taukei monopoly of land 
ownership, SODELPA’s manifesto proceeded to list all the actions 
of the Bainimarama Government that had purportedly undermined 
these. The list included appointing government sympathisers to 
staff the Native Land Trust Board (NTLB, now iTaukei Land Trust 
Board) and the opposition to the Qarase government’s Qoliqoli Bill 
dealing with the ownership of coastal areas, including those used 
for surfing. The manifesto also made clear that its principal objection 
was to the transfer of control over native lands away from the chiefs, 
manifested in the GCC, to the minister. As noted above, this move by 
the Bainimarama Government, carried out via decree, had potentially 
serious implications for the amount and distributions of land rents 
that previously went to the chiefly aristocracy. SODELPA’s role as the 
party of rentiers became clearly apparent.
Along with ‘restor(ing) the protection of native land to what it has 
been since 1970’, SODELPA also saw a need to attract leaseholders, 
including the mainly Indo-Fijian cane farmers, and to expand the 
number of people willing to farm increasing amounts of unutilised or 
underutilised land. A SODELPA government proposed to deal with 
this problem in concert with an NLTB in which control was once 
again vested in chiefs, and which would acquire land and lease it to 
farmers. In order to prevent farmers from avoiding rent payments, 
these payments would become ‘a first charge on the proceeds of the 
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farm’, presumably by the expansion of state supervisory capacities 
over agricultural production. That this proposal collided with other 
sections of the manifesto, which objected to government intrusion 
into other areas of the economy, including those dealing with jobs and 
economic growth (SODELPA 2014a, pp. 14–17), made the document 
typical of election propaganda in capitalist economies.
When coupled with the leadership of chiefs and with commercial 
buccaneers, however, the sections of the SODELPA manifesto dealing 
with religion and land rights clearly identified the party’s central 
concerns. The particular matters that dominated the manifesto, as 
well as the conduct of the election campaign along the lines outlined 
by Dr Tupeni Baba below, left the Prime Minister and FijiFirst in 
a powerful position to appeal to voters as representative of a superior, 
inclusive civic nationalism. SODELPA, by comparison, represented a 
particularistic nationalism associated with chiefly rule, the primacy of 
rural life and Christian dominance, even monopoly, which extended 
to an attack on secularism understood in terms of the neutrality of the 
state in matters of religion. 
What does the future hold for SODELPA?
On screen during the election night TV coverage, one of SODELPA’s 
designated urban candidates, Dr Tupeni Baba, discussed some 
early voting figures with Dr Steven Ratuva, Fiji One’s principal 
commentator. Baba, who had tasted electoral victory in 1987 and 
1999 with the Fiji Labour Party and subsequent failure with other 
parties, enthused about the seeming success of SODELPA’s campaign 
strategy. Early results suggested that behind the two main leaders, 
FijiFirst’s Bainimarama and SODELPA’s Ro Teimumu Kepa, other 
SODELPA candidates were prominent in the count and doing better 
than candidates from other parties, especially FijiFirst. Baba proudly 
categorised the initial results as an indication that the strategy of 
selecting candidates, particularly chiefs and others with strong local 
followings was trumping FijiFirst’s preferred direction of concentrating 
attention on the party leader, Bainimarama. He clearly believed that 
local identities and particularisms were being favoured by voters over 
the national unity slogans of the FijiFirst campaign. Ratuva wisely 
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suggested caution in anticipating possible outcomes at a time when 
Bainimarama was already garnering many more votes than Kepa and 
all other candidates. 
When the votes were finally tallied, Ratuva’s caution proved sounder 
than Baba’s enthusiasm. Bainimarama gained over 202,000 of the 
total number of valid votes of 496,364. Kepa, in second position, 
received 49,000 votes, less than a quarter of Bainimarama’s total. 
Attorney General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, also of FijiFirst, finished in 
third place with 13,753 votes. With NFP leader Biman Prasad fourth, 
and another four of the first 12 successful candidates coming from 
FijiFirst, the SODELPA strategy outlined by Baba did not appear highly 
successful. Once votes were distributed according to the proportional 
representation method employed for the first time in this election, the 
redistribution of surpluses gained by Bainimarama, Sayed-Khaiyum 
and other leading FijiFirst candidates meant the party had 32 members 
elected, compared to SODELPA’s 15. Baba added to the ‘unsuccessful 
candidate’ tally, gaining a mere 1,153 votes and finishing 62nd overall 
when the final parliament of 50 seats was determined.
At first glance, the outcome might appear to be a fairly predictable 
triumph for a leader and a party that campaigned on the basis that it 
was the ‘party of every common Fijian’. That FijiFirst was constituted 
as the means for transforming a military dictatorship into an elected 
government under a constitution formulated by that dictatorship did 
not seem as significant as the fact that almost 60 per cent of the voters 
supported the party. Since FijiFirst had also become the clear favourite 
of many substantial firms and commercial figures, their funding 
support enabled the party to outspend its opponents many times over. 
Such funding is now a standard feature of elections in many capitalist 
democracies. 
SODELPA therefore lost out to a party in power that had been able to 
draw on significant commercial support as well as on the resources of 
the state machinery, including the army, over the preceding five to 
eight years to effectively buy votes. Even the overwhelming vote from 
among military personnel for FijiFirst, possibly over 80 per cent of the 
votes cast at military polling stations, could be explained by increased 
THE PEOPLE HAVE SPOkEN
224
salaries and wages and better working and living conditions.3 
Faced  with this centralised concentration of power, the only hope 
SODELPA had was to run a decentralised campaign, counting upon 
localised support and putting up candidates who best fitted this 
strategy. In his pronouncement on TV, Baba was simply expressing 
a wish, rather than a solidly grounded expectation, that the only 
alternative open to SODELPA would work. 
Any separation between local and national campaigns, however, is too 
simple for several reasons. FijiFirst, particularly its leadership, also 
conducted a concentrated ‘grassroots’ campaign. The party had a slate 
of candidates, most of whom were Taukei. They were not high chiefs 
but rather former military officers and white-collar professionals. 
Party leaders, candidates and supporters visited rural areas constantly, 
while government programs concentrated on improving roads, bridges 
and health and education facilities in both urban and rural areas. 
The government, in the form of FijiFirst, also ‘thought local and acted 
local’. It would therefore be simplistic to portray the elections as a 
clash between parochialism, especially of a rural ‘old’ past and a ‘new’ 
non-racial or multiethnic nationalism, even if this appeared to be the 
central thrust of FijiFirst’s campaign. 
SODELPA, too, was forced to devise an election program, as evidenced 
in its manifesto, that presented it as a suitable national government in 
the rapidly changing circumstances of post-2006 Fiji. However, in a 
Fiji where much has changed over the last decade, and where there is 
a large increase not just in the number of young people but also in the 
number of young people who had never voted before, FijiFirst, and 
to a lesser extent the National Federation Party, were better placed to 
represent those changes.
3  A rough estimate using figures provided by the Fijian Electoral Commission of votes cast 
at polling stations used by military personnel suggests that FijiFirst gained in excess of 80 per 
cent of the votes cast. However, there are too many unknowns about these figures for a hard and 
fast conclusion to be drawn; more research is required into a number of matters, including to 
what extent voting was secret, whether only military personnel voted at these stations and to 
what extent prior directions were given by senior officers about how other ranks should vote. 
During informal discussions with young voters prior to the elections, one consistent theme was 
the appeal of parties, FijiFirst and the NFP in particular, who had highly educated, university-
qualified candidates, including those with doctorates. Making Fiji an ‘education hub’ for the 
south-west Pacific is only likely to see this feature of candidates become even more prominent in 
the future.
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Conclusion
By some accounts, and hopes, Fiji’s democracy has been ‘reconstructed’, 
with parliamentary government once again in place. From an optimistic 
perspective, Fiji’s democracy will now revolve steadily around a regular 
party competition conducted within a set of constitutional rules, with 
one or more parties forming government and with a formal opposition 
similarly composed of one or more parties. In the context of the 2014 
result, SODELPA are the losers this time but did well enough against 
considerable odds. Fifteen seats out of 50 and nearly 30 per cent of the 
vote is a substantial base upon which to build in anticipation of the 
next elections.
There are several reasons, however, why some caution should 
be exercised by those who expect, even hope, that electoral and 
parliamentary democracy will be the principal trajectory of Fiji’s 
political future. This was also how the 1999 elections result was 
greeted. Instead, as pointed out soon after the 1999 elections 
(MacWilliam  2001),4 and again recently (MacWilliam 2014), Fiji 
remains a militarised democracy with its Constitution, parliament 
and elections underpinned by a compressed connection between 
members of the military apparatus and other occupants of government 
positions who hold the apex of both political and state power. While 
the leadership of the military has passed from the chiefly families who 
tied political power to state power in the first decades of independence, 
military authority is still critical to how the ruling class in Fiji rules. 
Even as the current Prime Minister and important elected members 
of his government, as well as senior bureaucrats, have ‘retired’ from 
the military positions they held previously, the importance of their 
successors in the RFMF for the government’s power remains. In this 
sense, the connection between the military and the other apparatuses 
of state power remains compressed. Fiji continues to be distinct from 
some other electoral democracies where military power is less overt, 
even though critical for the exercise of political and state power. 
4  The near-universal enthusiasm for the 1997 Constitution and the holding of the 1999 elections 
is undoubted and does not need documentation. Instead MacWilliam’s analysis (2001) developed 
within months of the elections was regarded at the time as ‘controversial’ and ‘sceptical’ by 
Stewart Firth (2001, p. 7). Readers can judge if after the 1999 elections, and now again after the 
2014 elections, Fiji’s democracy was and is ‘thin’ and ‘militarised’. Also see Lal (2007) who also 
used the term ‘militarized democracy’ to refer to Fiji’s post-2006 coup political governance.  
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Optimism about SODELPA’s future, as either an opposition party that 
retains coherence and significance across more than one election, 
or as a future governing party, needs to be tempered by the factors 
outlined above. SODELPA remains the organising centre for a chiefly 
aristocracy that is in the process of being permanently disempowered 
by industrialisation and commercialisation. Rentiers are under attack 
everywhere, not only in Fiji, by advocates of land reform, who view 
rentiers as an undesirable form of the wider class of accumulators. 
The  substantial areas of ‘vacant’ land across the country suggest 
that a major shift is taking place in the role of agriculture—whether 
this sector can be revitalised and further industrialised remains 
to be seen. However, should such reforms take place, land rents 
are likely to become a lesser component of farm production costs, 
further undercutting chiefly incomes and authority. Even if other 
mataqali members receive a greater proportion of rents as a result of 
the government reforms noted above, a generalised attack on rents 
will further cut into the amounts received by chiefs and others. 
The response of mataqali members to any reduction in the total they 
receive, even if is a greater proportion of a smaller total, is unlikely 
to strengthen chiefly authority either. In this context, it is also worth 
noting that even if some workers are pushed back into the countryside 
as farm labourers or smallholders, their existence will not be one of so-
called subsistence, but of labour further subject to capital, entirely 
dependent upon profitability. Chiefly attempts to impose authority 
will be in competition with commercial criteria. 
The political future of the chiefly aristocracy is no brighter as long 
as the close ties between the elected government and the military 
leadership remain. As the events of 2000 and 2006 suggest, these ties 
are critical. With senior military officers less and less drawn from the 
highest chiefly stratum, it is unlikely that the RFMF can be mobilised 
to support the aristocracy’s demands for a return to greater authority. 
Further, any revolt in the countryside led by chiefs in the areas where 
SODELPA’s support remains strongest is not likely to succeed, as the 
military’s close attention to rural concerns prior to the recent election 
suggest. 
Given the extremely challenging procedures for constitutional change 
entrenched in the 2013 Constitution, it is unlikely that future elections 
in Fiji will be conducted under terms more favourable for SODELPA. 
The 2014 election result appears likely to be the high-water mark for 
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the party dominated by high chiefs, particular rural concerns and the 
Taukei buccaneers who were once prominent. How the attachment 
between political and state power represented by FijiFirst, the military 
and leading commercial firms will be played out is of course uncertain. 
But the greater possibility is that the old guard represented by 
SODELPA in the 2014 election cannot reinvent itself as representative 
of the rapidly urbanising and commercialised population that inhabits 
Fiji now.
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Fiji’s evolving foreign policy 




This chapter explores the impact that Fiji’s foreign policy since 2006 
has had on multilateral relations in the Pacific Islands. While Fiji has 
launched policy initiatives on the wider global stage, their impact on 
the Pacific Islands has been indirect and harder to quantify. Therefore 
this chapter focuses on regionally based organisations, rather than 
on bodies with a wider global reach, such as the Commonwealth or 
the G77. In particular, it focuses on the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), 
the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) and the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG). These three organisations have formed the 
focus for the multilateral dimension of Fiji’s foreign policy, either as 
organisations supported by Fiji or standing in opposition in the case 
of the PIF.
Given the small size of many Pacific Island states, both in terms of 
population and economy, multilateralism has long been considered an 
essential part of the region’s framework. Small states have problems 
mustering the human resources, finances and expertise to deliver 
services and perform sovereign functions adequately when acting 
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alone. Multilateral regional cooperation is seen by most development 
partners as the key strategy in mitigating this issue by pooling the 
resources of several states. As such, the state of multilateral cooperation 
in the region is of crucial interest. Prior to 2006, multilateral action in 
the Pacific Islands flowed primarily through the PIF and its associated 
bodies, flanked by a relatively quiescent MSG focused mostly on 
developing trade within Melanesia.
In recent years, there have been challenges to that order, driven 
primarily but not exclusively by Fiji. Since the 2006 military takeover, 
the Fiji Government has launched a series of confident and often 
controversial foreign policy initiatives. It has repeatedly challenged 
the established status quo of regional relations, particularly since its 
suspension from the PIF in 2009. The unprecedented suspension of Fiji 
from the peak body of Pacific Island multilateral relations was a major 
turning point in the region. Rather than isolating Fiji and exerting 
pressure on the Bainimarama Government to step aside, it  fuelled 
Fiji’s efforts to create new avenues for its foreign policy and to sideline 
Australia, New Zealand and the PIF in the process.
As a key part of this new policy drive, the Fiji Government has placed 
a greater emphasis on its relations with the other Melanesian states 
and sought to bypass the central nexus of relations represented by the 
PIF. This new drive has been channelled through bilateral relations, 
but also through attempts to shift the equilibrium of multilateral 
organisations. The primary existing platform for this is the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group. Beyond this Melanesian initiative, Fiji also sought 
to engage with the broader region through a series of initiatives that 
culminated in the establishment of the PIDF. In explicitly challenging 
Australia and New Zealand, Fiji has set itself up as a champion of 
Pacific Island interests against domination by the two largest regional 
forces—Australia and New Zealand. According to Fiji, these two 
countries represent outside powers rather than being part of the 
Pacific Islands region (Dobell 2014), and have been interfering with the 
ability of the Pacific Island states to look for solutions to the region’s 
problems in ways that are appropriate to the unique nature of the 
Pacific Islands (Bainimarama 2013). This has justified a push towards 
a new regional architecture that excludes Australia and New Zealand. 
This new architecture means that the PIF, as presently constituted, is 
incompatible with Fiji’s vision of what Pacific Island multilateralism 
should look like. This has led the Bainimarama Government to 
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ignore the lifting of its suspension from the PIF, at least to date. 
Bainimarama’s position is that Fiji will not rejoin until its own terms 
are met, including the reclassification of Australia and New Zealand as 
development partners rather than full members (Bolatiki 2014a). 
This chapter assesses how successful Fiji has been in its aims. I argue 
that while Fiji has had some success at influencing multilateral 
relations, it has not occurred to the extent that was desired, nor has 
the intended outcome been achieved. More specifically, although 
Fiji’s foreign policy since 2006 has caused a shift in the institutional 
landscape of Pacific Island foreign relations and altered the centrality 
of the PIF to regional cooperation, it has not succeeded in undermining 
the relevance and importance of the PIF as it is presently constituted. 
Rather, the organisation retains a vital and powerful role in the region. 
A shift in the balance of forces has not occurred in the form of a zero 
sum gain by new organisations at the cost of the PIF. Instead, Fiji’s 
policy initiatives have seen a further diversification of multilateral 
structures in the Pacific Islands and an overall strengthening of the 
potential for multilateral cooperation in the region. 
These initiatives have received a boost in strength by the Bainimarama 
Government’s substantially increased legitimacy after its significant 
victory in the 2014 elections. Given that the undemocratic nature 
of the regime prior to the elections was the central focus of attacks 
by critics, and formed the justification for Fiji’s suspension from the 
PIF, Fiji’s position regionally has undoubtedly been strengthened by 
its return to democratic rule. Given the bullishness of the rhetoric 
used by the Bainimarama Government and its stated intent to make 
‘Fiji Great, the pre-eminent Pacific Island nation and one respected the 
world over’ (Bainimarama, quoted in Morris 2014) it seems clear that 
Fiji will continue efforts to enhance its status and push its own agenda 
in the region.
The Pacific Islands Forum
The PIF is both the oldest and the largest multilateral organisation in 
the Pacific Islands region. Its members include all independent Pacific 
Island states, as well as Australia and New Zealand. As all of the non-
independent states of the region attend summits, at least as observers, 
the PIF is the only multilateral body in the region to unite all regional 
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states and bodies at the highest level. Together with the stable funding 
provided by the backing of Australia and New Zealand this means that 
the PIF is both well entrenched and well resourced for its operations 
in the region. Added to this is the fact that the PIF Secretariat (PIFS) 
coordinates the actions of the Council of Regional Organisations in 
the Pacific (CROP), which comprise the majority of the task-specific 
multilateral bodies in the region. Other organisations, such as the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), focus on specific technical 
and advisory functions, leaving the PIF to serve as the peak political 
decision-making body. These factors mean that prior to 2009 the PIF 
was the central hub of virtually all regional multilateral action. 
Given the PIF’s central role, control of the organisation grants a great 
deal of influence over the shape of multilateral relations in the region. 
The common consensus is that the primary influences on the PIF are 
Australia and New Zealand, thus creating a dominance in regional 
relations exceeding the soft power already exerted by the bilateral aid 
provided by these two states. Australia and New Zealand, however, are 
not the only non-Pacific Island powers exerting influence over the PIF. 
With large states such as France and the United States having observer 
status at the PIF, as well as major extra-regional bodies such as the 
Asia Development Bank, there is a significant top-heavy presence of 
other actors in the forum. Even if they are only formally observers, the 
delegations of larger powers at Forum summits can detract attention 
away from the issues on the agenda. As Maclellan (2012) points out, 
this can make it hard for the specific concerns of Pacific Island states to 
be heard, such as in the ongoing issue of West Papua (PACNEWS 2012).
This top-heavy presence and the distraction from Pacific Island 
issues that it causes is only one of several criticisms made of the PIF. 
Another  important source of dissatisfaction is the fact that it only 
engages directly with the national governments of its member states. 
Private sector enterprises and civil society as a whole have inadequate 
access. This ‘democracy deficit’ (Pohnpei 2010) is particularly 
problematic given that many of the Pacific Island states have fairly 
weak formalised governance over their own territories (Bohane 2010), 
and rely heavily on civil society groups such as the churches for service 
delivery and social cohesion. Though these issues were acknowledged 
in the Pacific Plan reform agenda for the PIF (Huffer  2006), there 
has been little action on it to this point. A large part of this lack of 
action has been the accusation against both the PIF and its Pacific Plan 
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reforms that they are mired in too much bureaucracy to be efficient 
(Komai 2013). So far the reframing of the Pacific Plan as the Framework 
for Pacific Regionalism (PIFS 2014) has not brought about a significant 
change in this deficit. As such, there has been an acknowledged need 
for reform of the PIF, with some commentators speculating that without 
reform the Forum could find itself losing relevance (Bohane 2010). 
Following Fiji’s suspension in 2009, the Bainimarama regime fuelled 
these criticisms, attacking the PIF repeatedly. This has been flanked 
by attempts to create competition with other multilateral initiatives 
such as the PIDF, discussed below. These initiatives have been set up to 
compete with the PIF not only politically, but also physically through 
cases of overlapping summit dates (Hayward-Jones 2010). Through all 
of this, Fiji has pushed the notion that, due to its focus on Western 
over Pacific Island interests and approaches, the PIF has lost touch 
with its constituents. According to the Bainimarama Government, 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s roles as both members and major donors 
means that the PIF is too unequal to be functional (Bolatiki 2013). As it 
stands, it is also irrelevant (Pratibha 2013). These criticisms are not 
undisputed, but have gained enough momentum that even supporters 
of the PIF have stated the need for the Forum to ‘reaffirm’ its relevance 
(O’Keefe 2012). This is particularly important given the Bainimarama 
Government’s refusal to rejoin the organisation even after the lifting 
of its suspension (Bolatiki 2014a).
Rhetoric aside, the question that must be addressed is: Has the PIF 
become as irrelevant as the Bainimarama Government suggests? I argue 
that this is not the case. While the PIF has lost some of its influence, it is 
still the peak body of Pacific Island regionalism. It is the best resourced 
organisation of the regional multilateral bodies. What is more, having 
Australia and New Zealand as members provides it with substantial 
security that this will continue to be the case in the future. Apart 
from Fiji, it remains the only one of the generalist multilateral bodies 
in the Pacific Islands that unites all of the region’s states. Currently, the 
PIF lacks the legitimacy provided by having all Pacific Island states 
as members. But unlike the MSG, whose membership is restricted by 
design, and the PIDF, which several states chose not to join despite 
receiving invitations, Fiji’s absence from the PIF was at least initially 
not by choice. And despite the anti-PIF rhetoric, the  Bainimarama 
Government nominated Kaliopate Tavola for the 2014 election of a 
new PIF Secretary-General (Newton-Cain 2014), which does indicate 
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a desire for participation on Fiji’s part. While other fora are often 
attended by lower-ranking government representatives, all  PIF 
leaders’ summits achieve full attendance by the heads of the Pacific 
Island governments. Ironically, this is helped by the strong attendance 
of extra regional observers, despite the fact that this can distract from 
Pacific issues. Even if they are a distraction from Pacific Island issues, 
outside observers such as the United States and China represent crucial 
development partners for the region, and Pacific Island governments 
have good reason to be eager for close ties. As such, it is difficult to 
endorse claims of PIF irrelevance. The Forum’s credibility has been 
damaged by its own need for reform and the exclusion of Fiji, but it is 
far from removed. 
The Pacific Islands Development Forum
The PIDF is the end result of the Engaging with the Pacific Leaders 
(EWTP) summits, a series of conferences held by the Fijian Government 
since 2010. These summits emerged in response to the suspension of 
Fiji from the PIF, as well as the cancellation of the 2010 MSG summit 
(Tarte 2013). The series of EWTP summits led to the formation of the 
PIDF as a permanent international body with meetings in 2013 and 
2014 and plans for future annual summits. The initial PIDF summit 
drew significant attention from both regional states as well as extra 
regional players such as Timor Leste and the UAE (Bolatiki  2014c). 
Despite inviting many extra-regional observers, Bainimarama 
nonetheless sees the PIDF as a forum for Pacific Islanders based on 
Pacific Islander values (briefing to USP staffers cited in Tarte 2013). 
The stated purposes of the PIDF are to serve as a platform for Pacific 
Island action on sustainable development and to aggregate the actions 
of Pacific Island states in the UN Asia-Pacific group (Tarte 2013). 
However, most scholarly and journalistic commentary on the PIDF has 
focused on the challenge it potentially poses to the PIF. Although the 
Fijian Government has denied that the PIDF is intended to compete 
with the PIF (Kubuabola 2013), this is at odds with Fiji’s criticisms of 
the latter organisation and Bainimarama’s thinly veiled barbs aimed 
at the PIF during the PIDF summits. Fiji’s pattern of seeking new 
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partners and new avenues for international cooperation has been too 
systematic for it to be otherwise, and the PIDF is very clearly designed 
to be a vehicle for this policy. 
The membership provisions for Pacific Island states means that 
neither Australia nor New Zealand are eligible for membership, 
though representatives of embassies in Fiji attended as observers 
(Kubuabola  2013). Thus Fiji’s two largest critics and the dominant 
powers of the PIF were excluded from being able to significantly 
influence the new forum. While numerous regional multilateral 
organisations sent observers to the inaugural PIDF meeting, the 
PIF was notably absent. Significantly, the summit was scheduled to 
coincide with key meetings of officials at the PIF. As such there has 
been little doubt that the PIDF was intended by the Fijian Government 
as at the very least a symbol of protest against the PIF. 
The PIDF is the most readily dismissed of Fiji’s multilateral initiatives. 
Even before the launch of the PIDF, experts were voicing scepticism 
(Pacific Beat 2013). In interviews, experts willing to credit the impact 
of Fiji’s foreign policy on the regional order of the Pacific Islands 
have been inclined to take a wait and see approach to this particular 
initiative. There is some evidence to back this position. So far there 
have been no major substantive outcomes from the new forum beyond 
statements of general intent and outcome documents released with 
a delay after the summits. A secretariat has been established in Suva, 
but beyond this the PIDF has been thin on the ground with results. 
Recently, the PIDF has been invited to participate in regional fora such 
as the SPC summit (Islands Business 2014), but again this has yet to 
produce tangible results.
Beyond the lack of substantive results, the funding needed for the 
ongoing operation of the PIDF is uncertain. To this point, the funding 
of the PIDF has relied on the Fijian Government, supplemented 
by one-off donations from development partners such as China 
(Tarte 2013). The Fijian Government has provided a secretariat and the 
ongoing funding for the operations of the PIDF in 2014, but its future 
beyond that point is uncertain. Unlike the PIF, the PIDF does not have 
fully committed developed states to rely on for funding, nor does it 
have the trade outcomes and established clout of the MSG to give 
its members a vested interest in supporting its continued existence. 
Given the tight budgetary constraints of even a relatively large Pacific 
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Island state such as Fiji and the shifting priorities of donor states, 
it is entirely possible that the PIDF may be financially unsustainable. 
The  PIDF may therefore turn out to be a temporary protest action 
against Fiji’s suspension from the PIF. Several prominent regional 
experts interviewed on the matter expressed the expectation that the 
PIDF will not be a lasting phenomenon and would be abandoned as 
soon as Fiji’s PIF suspension was revoked. So far, this has not occurred 
despite the lifting of the suspension. 
I suggest this view is overly pessimistic. Apart from the fact that the 
revocation of Fiji’s suspension has not led to the end of the PIDF, the 
organisation has some strengths. The PIDF is the initiative of a small 
developing country, and yet managed to garner the attention of not 
only regional but also extra regional states. Fiji succeeded in launching 
the PIDF not only with minimal financial support from larger states, 
but did so despite active attempts by Australia and New Zealand to 
isolate the Bainimarama regime on the international stage. As such, the 
PIDF must be viewed as a genuine Pacific Island movement. Though 
several Polynesian states such as Samoa boycotted the inaugural 
session (Pacific Beat 2013), there has been an ongoing commitment by 
key states. And in this context the invitation to participate in other 
organisations, such as an invitation to join the SPC, should be viewed 
as a further sign of support.
While the lack of results to date is indeed an issue, it misses part of 
the point of the PIDF. Pacific Island culture puts great emphasis on 
inclusiveness and dialogue as methods of decision-making and conflict 
resolution. In that respect, holding a well-attended conference can be 
seen as a milestone in and of itself. During the 2013 PIDF summit, 
the rhetoric of a significant number of the speakers was focused on 
finding alternative, Pacific Island solutions to the issues facing the 
region (Tarte 2014). This inclusiveness and the focus on regional 
culture on the part of the PIDF is particularly important in the context 
of the Pacific Plan/Framework for Pacific Regionalism critique of the 
PIF. If the major weakness of the PIF is its lack of inclusiveness of civil 
society and Western domination, then the potential impact of the PIDF 
as an alternative platform for discussion should not be undervalued. 
Jenny Hayward-Jones (2013) of the Lowy Institute has suggested that 
one possible future for the PIDF could be as an ancillary discussion 
group to the PIF, or even as a reform template for the PIF. Part of 
her expectation for negotiations surrounding Fiji’s return to the PIF 
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hinges on ensuring that the approach taken by the PIDF is preserved. 
I suggest that although the PIDF will remain a wholly independent 
platform, and that its existence will not be part of the negotiations 
for the conditions under which Fiji would agree to return to the PIF, 
the notion that the PIDF can complement the PIF is entirely plausible. 
It is important, however, not to overstate the PIDF’s success. Despite 
the attention it has garnered, and the rhetoric surrounding its 
essential mission, it has so far failed in its underlying political goal of 
undermining the PIF. Attendance at PIF summits has not decreased 
since the inception of the PIDF, whether from regional states or outside 
observer bodies. The PIDF was also marred by the absence of some 
of the Pacific Island states, with Samoa’s absence being particularly 
significant, tied as it was to explicit criticisms of the Bainimarama 
regime. The PIDF therefore cannot claim the same level of legitimacy 
in terms of representing Pacific Island states as the PIF. Together with 
the greater financial stability of the PIF, that has persisted even despite 
recent Australian aid cuts, this makes it unlikely that the PIDF will 
detract from, let alone replace, its more established counterpart in the 
foreseeable future. As noted above, all interview respondents were 
confident of the long-term survival of the PIF while acknowledging 
the need for reform. I therefore suggest that although the PIDF 
will make a lasting and worthwhile contribution to Pacific Island 
regionalism, it will be as a separate and hopefully complementary 
platform of cooperation rather than as a challenger to the PIF.
The Melanesian Spearhead Group
The MSG differs from the other two organisations discussed in this 
chapter in that it does not aim to be a platform for the entire Pacific 
Islands. However, much like the PIF and PIDF, it provides a broad 
spectrum political platform rather than an organisation dedicated to 
a specific topic area such as the CROP organisations that specialise on 
particular policy areas. As the Melanesian states make up the majority 
of the region’s population and economic power, the influence of the 
MSG cannot be underestimated. I suggest that the creation of other 
subregional organisations such as the Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG) 
(Tavita 2011) are a direct response to the success the Melanesian states 
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have had in creating a common bloc through the MSG. What is more, 
the strength of this bloc has arguably been increased due to the greater 
energy and emphasis placed on it by Fiji’s foreign policy since 2006.
The Melanesian states have been Fiji’s strongest supporters since 
the takeover in 2006. Not only have MSG states largely refrained 
from criticising Fiji, there has also been a backlash from prominent 
Melanesian political figures such as former Solomon Islands Prime 
Minister Manasseh Sogavare against criticisms from other Pacific 
Island states (ABC 2009). Even beyond that, MSG states have supported 
virtually every initiative of the Fijian government, including sending 
high-level representatives up to and including heads of government to 
events such as the PIDF summits (Manning 2010). Some commentators 
suggest that the MSG has presented a common front, one that has 
‘mobilised around Fiji’ (Walsh 2010). 
This view, however, is not uncontested and there have been questions 
raised about the cohesiveness of the MSG and the question of how 
deep MSG support for the post-2006 shift in Fijian policy really 
runs. Critics of the Bainimarama regime questioned whether or not 
the support of the MSG was more than simply political rhetoric for 
appearance sake (Lal 2012). Following this line of reasoning, the lack 
of criticism of the 2006 coup and the subsequent abrogation of the 
Fijian Constitution may be attributed more to diplomatic inhibitions 
against open criticism of fellow Melanesians. The main argument in 
this context is the cancellation of the 2010 MSG summit in Fiji by 
then chair Vanuatu, which was scheduled to hand over the chair of 
the MSG to Fiji at that summit. Prime Minister Natapei of Vanuatu 
cancelled the meeting, citing concerns about the suitability of Fiji as 
an undemocratic state to chair the MSG. Given the general hesitancy 
of Pacific Island states towards open public displays of conflict, this 
certainly represented a major breach of the norms of regional politics 
among Pacific Island states. 
More generally, critics of the MSG have questioned how cohesive 
and effective the MSG is as a multilateral body. There have been 
other signs that the MSG does not present an entirely unified front. 
Most recently, the relationship of the MSG has been strained by the 
question of admitting West Papuan independence movements as 
members in a similar fashion to the Front de Libération Nationale 
Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS, or Kanak and Socialist National Liberation 
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Front) of  New  Caledonia. Vanuatu’s support for independence for 
Melanesians under Indonesian rule has clashed with Fiji and Papua 
New Guinea’s desire for closer relations with Indonesia (Australia 
Network News 2014). Currently, Indonesia has observer status at the 
MSG while the liberation movements for West Papua have so far been 
unable to achieve any sort of recognised status. The cohesiveness of 
the MSG could also be strained by tensions between its two largest 
member states, Fiji and Papua New Guinea. Issues such as PNG’s 
Manus Island refugee deal with Australia and the Bainimarama 
Government’s refusal to accept PNG High Commissioner Eafeare as 
the dean of Suva’s diplomatic corps caused diplomatic tensions in late 
2013. These tensions prompted observers to suggest that there was a 
real possibility that Melanesia might be facing a fight for leadership 
between Fiji and PNG (Hayward-Jones 2013).
While there are certainly differences of opinion and goals among 
Melanesian states, the MSG is a more cohesive body than its critics give 
it credit for. Though there are some dissenting opinions (Hayward-
Jones 2010), the cancellation of the 2010 MSG summit by Vanuatu has 
been widely regarded in Fiji as due to outside interference on the part 
of Australia and New Zealand (Kubuabola 2013). Though there is no 
direct evidence to support the claim, it is consistent with Australia 
and New Zealand’s policy of isolating Fiji. Regardless of the reason for 
the cancellation, it is notable that the rift between the MSG members 
was repaired quickly, and apparently to Fiji’s satisfaction. In December 
of the same year, a reconciliation ceremony was held by Sato Kilman, 
Edward Natapei’s successor as Prime Minister of Vanuatu, at a special 
meeting of the MSG (Tarte 2011). Given that the next MSG summit was 
held in Suva (Melanesian Spearhead Group 2011), Vanuatu’s boycott 
is best viewed as a momentary ripple, rather than signalling deeper 
disunity. Similarly, while there have certainly been tensions between 
Fiji and PNG that point to the two states having agendas that are not 
completely aligned, the O’Neill government has strongly denied that 
these are signs of a deeper rift between the two states. It would appear 
that the relationship between Fiji and its Melanesian neighbours is 
a robust one that can withstand a certain level of tension without 
affecting the overall closeness of ties or willingness of the MSG 
member states to cooperate. Despite  the occasional ripple, the MSG 
is an important avenue of support for the Bainimarama Government’s 
challenge to the previous regional status quo.
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The question though is how far that sympathy goes. It is important to 
note that the suspension of Fiji from the PIF was unanimous. Thus the 
Melanesian states obviously agreed to it at the time, although they 
may have had some private misgivings. While the apparent consensus 
on Fiji’s suspension stands at odds with subsequent MSG support for 
Fiji, the fact remains notable. While the other MSG members have 
always pushed for Fiji’s suspension from the PIF to be lifted, this 
has always been with the caveat that Fiji returns to democratic rule. 
This proviso was only removed in the build-up to the 2014 elections, 
when most observers started to consider Fiji’s return to at least nominal 
civilian rule inevitable (Dorney 2013). Also, Melanesian leaders have 
not stopped attending PIF summits, nor withdrawn support for PIF 
initiatives. It appears, then, that the growing strength of the MSG 
and its support for Fijian initiatives does not necessarily signal lack of 
support for the PIF. 
The way forward: The post‑2014 elections 
Fiji’s foreign policy since 2006 has evinced a confident search for new 
allies in an attempt to reduce the importance of its relationship with 
Australia. While the Bainimarama regime’s ambitions have not been 
fully realised, his government’s strategies have nevertheless yielded 
some results. Ironically, despite the fact that the core dynamic of 
Fiji’s policy has been to try to circumvent and marginalise the central 
body of regional multilateralism, there has been no fragmentation or 
weakening of the region’s existing multilateral architecture. The new 
channels Fiji has opened up, however, are viable avenues for further 
cooperation both within the Pacific Islands community and beyond. 
However, the other states of the region have not adopted these new 
pathways sufficiently for them to replace the PIF as the main nexus of 
the region’s multilateral architecture. 
Given that Fiji is one of the larger and more developed Pacific Island 
states, it should perhaps come as no great surprise that Fiji has had a 
significant impact on the region. It is located centrally in the region, 
and controls a significant amount of the infrastructure that is key to 
the functioning of its neighbours. From the perspective of a developed 
nation, Fiji’s capacities may seem very limited. But relative to the other 
states of the region, with the exception of PNG, Fiji is not only large, 
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but also much more sophisticated. Ironically, though Fiji has always 
held a leadership role in the region, the fact that organisations such as 
the PIF have been headquartered in Fiji has helped further nurture the 
growth of a political class with the education and drive to step beyond 
the national level and onto the international stage. 
The main issue for the immediate future of multilateral cooperation 
in the Pacific Islands is the relationship between Fiji and the PIF. Fiji’s 
suspension highlighted problems surrounding certain elements of 
PIF practice. Fiji’s suspension also undermined the legitimacy of the 
PIF’s status as representing all Pacific Island states as well as standing 
at odds with the consensus-based ‘Pacific Way’ (Dobell  2008). 
The tension caused by this contradiction was exacerbated by the 
Bainimarama Government’s attacks on the Forum over the next 
several years (Williams 2013). Originally, the suspension was intended 
and expected to put the government of Fiji under pressure to hold 
elections sooner rather than later (TVNZ 2009). But this was to 
prove ineffective and the Bainimarama regime did not become more 
conciliatory towards its critics. On the contrary, it appeared to gain a 
certain amount of kudos as a plucky underdog resisting international 
pressures (Fraenkel 2013). Full reconciliation now appears to be less 
simple than Australia would have hoped. As Fraenkel (2013) rightly 
points out, successfully resisting external pressure has brought 
political benefits to Fiji. Given Bainimarama’s rhetoric as a champion 
of smaller states against metropolitan influences, restoring relations 
is more than just a matter of ‘just kissing cheeks and pretending that 
nothing ever happened’ (Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Qiliho, quoted 
in Bolatiki 2014a). Accordingly, the Fijian Government has spurned 
‘olive branches’ that amounted to less than full restoration of relations, 
such as allowing Fiji to participate in the PACER Plus negotiation at 
lower levels of engagement (Maclellan 2012, p. 364). It was not until 
Australia and New Zealand unilaterally moved to lift sanctions that 
Fijian rhetoric against them began to ease. Yet even with bilateral 
relations between Fiji and the two metropolitan states nominally 
restored to normal, Fiji is still proceeding at its own pace and on its 
own terms on issues such as defence cooperation (Bolatiki 2014a).
Rather than making Fiji seem belligerent or uncooperative, 
the  Bainimarama Government has succeeded in continuing to raise 
questions about the PIF. While this has not been entirely successful, 
as discussed above, Fiji is not alone in asking difficult questions. 
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This is shown by the fact that PACER Plus negotiations were moved to 
a new secretariat, independent of the PIF. Rather than isolating Fiji, 
the suspension handed down from the PIF has dented the Forum’s 
credibility. This successful, hard-line approach by Fiji strengthens its 
position as it negotiates its readmission to the Forum leaders meeting. 
Given Fiji’s rhetoric, there is some doubt as to what Fiji will require 
to agree to attend the Forum again (Pratibha 2013).
Despite Bainimarama’s caginess about rejoining the Forum, it is a goal 
the PIF should pursue. Even leaving aside the potential for there to be 
a future impact on the credibility of the PIF if Fiji continues to attack 
its credibility, Fiji has too important a role to play for the region to be 
excluded from the PIF. The goal of the Forum is regional coordination, 
an aim that would be severely hampered by the absence of one of the 
region’s most developed states. Add to that the geographical fact that 
the Forum’s secretariat is located in Suva, and there is a significant 
incentive for the Forum to bring Fiji back to the table. Credibility and 
logistics are two of the biggest strengths of the PIF, and both selling 
points are enhanced by cooperation with Fiji.
There is also a strong incentive for the Bainimarama Government to 
resume its membership of the PIF. Fiji’s standoffishness towards the 
PIF misses certain realities of the Fijian situation. Even as a relatively 
developed Pacific Island state, Fiji is still a developing country 
dependent on significant amounts of foreign aid. Furthermore, as a 
state spread across a large number of islands, Fiji must cope with at 
least some of the service delivery issues that other Pacific Island states 
face. The need for cooperation on as wide a basis as possible is still 
very much in Fiji’s interests, as the energetic pursuit of multilateral 
initiatives demonstrates. Beyond that, Fiji also has an interest in 
closer ties to development partners, many of whom pay a great deal 
of attention to the meetings and actions of the PIF. This means that 
Fiji has much to gain by renewing participation in the PIF. Given 
the attempt to have a Fijian Secretary-General elected, it is hard to 
believe that this is a state of affairs that Fiji will wish to sustain much 
longer. Despite the rhetoric of the Bainimarama Government, the 
Fijian government will have to face up to the continued significance 
of the PIF and that attempts to sideline the Forum are going to be 
unsuccessful. As Brij Lal has pointed out, culturally, geographically 
and financially, Fiji  has more to gain from its traditional allies and 
development partners than from entirely new affiliations (Lal 2012). 
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According to Lal, Fiji’s return to the PIF is inevitable, not only from 
the perspective of the Forum, but also on Fiji’s part. The analysis put 
forward in this chapter supports this viewpoint.
The central question facing the PIF is under what conditions will Fiji 
agree to resume attendance? Bainimarama’s demand that Australia and 
New Zealand cannot be both donors and members will not be met. 
Not only would the loss of the financial stability Australia and New 
Zealand provide be disastrous for the PIF, it would also be difficult 
politically. As much as Australia and New Zealand are more developed 
and Westernised than the smaller member states, they are still part of 
the region. New Zealand in particular has a strong claim to being an 
Islander state through its Maori heritage. If the PIF wants to serve as a 
platform for all of the Pacific Islands then Australia and New Zealand 
have a role to play as members. This is not to say that there is no room 
for a solution. The call for more voice for the nonmetropolitan members 
has been a strong one, and Bainimarama is in a position to further 
invigorate that part of the reform agenda for the PIF. Australia and 
New Zealand should not be excluded, but a shift in the institutional 
balance of the PIF for the other states is both possible and necessary to 
strengthen the Forum. In the Pacific Way tradition of compromise and 
negotiation, I predict an equitable solution in the mid-term, one that 
will result in a PIF further strengthened by reform.
What this settlement is not likely to involve is an end to the PIDF or 
a lesser interest in the MSG. Jenny Hayward-Jones’s idea of the PIDF 
becoming a supplementary body of the PIF is an interesting one, but 
on balance it seems unlikely. Fiji and the other Melanesian states have 
benefited from establishing alternatives to the PIF. The Bainimarama 
Government’s intention to sideline the PIF may not have succeeded, 
but there is still sufficient groundwork laid for these organisations 
to contribute productively to regional cooperation. Moreover, both 
organisations are sufficiently different from the PIF to have the potential 
to be complementary rather than conflicting elements of Pacific Island 
regionalism. The MSG is a specifically subregional grouping and is 
therefore able to operate in a more focused manner and with fewer 
stakeholders. However, it lacks the scope to make truly regional 
decisions. The inclusion of civil society by the PIDF gives it the 
ability to be more inclusive and find solutions to development issues 
beyond top-down government policy. On the other hand, including 
non-governmental bodies means that it is unsuitable for the formation 
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of treaties or other actions that require sovereign power to take their 
full effect. These differences mean that the MSG and PIDF will operate 
more effectively as facets of a diversified regional architecture rather 
than as competitors to an organisation whose role they are unsuited 
to fully assume. 
This more diversified regional architecture is the logical progression 
once a settlement is reached and Fiji re-engages with the PIF. There is 
still a potential for duplication of effort, but if both organisations play 
to their strengths then this will leave Pacific Island regionalism on a 
stronger footing than it was before 2006. Though the Bainimarama 
Government did not manage to undercut the PIF, its multilateral 
policies since 2006 should still be viewed as a success. If the hurdle 
of re-engagement can be taken properly then it will leave the regional 
architecture of the Pacific Islands on a stronger footing than it was 
in 2006. 
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A pragmatic approach 
to a successful election: 
A personal reflection 
Alisi Daurewa
Introduction
Filled with relief, yet a little saddened with the realisation that this 
moment would not return, I thanked God for gifting Fiji with the grace 
of a peaceful general election, after eight years under an unelected 
government led by former military commander Rear Admiral Voreqe 
Bainimarama, who removed Laisenia Qarase’s elected government for 
alleged corruption and racism in a coup in December 2006.
The night was Wednesday, 17 September 2014, Fiji’s general 
election day.
According to the 2014 Electoral Decree’s Part 3, 19 (p. 234), the 
President, acting in accordance with section 59 of the Constitution 
must issue a writ to the Electoral Commission in every election. This 
task was performed by the Chief Justice (Gates) who was acting 
as president on 4 August, in the absence of His Excellency Ratu 
Epeli Nailatikau, who was away overseas. On Monday morning, 
22 September 2014, upon receipt of the Final National Results Tally 
from the Supervisor of Elections (SoE) in accordance with section 103 
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of the Decree, the Fijian Electoral Commission (FEC) allocated the seats 
of parliament in accordance with 104 and 105 of the Decree and by 
11am announced the names of 50 candidates elected to parliament. 
At noon on that day the writ was returned by FEC to the President 
of the Republic of Fiji, conveying the decision of the Fijian electorate 
in accordance with 106 of the Decree. Bainimarama and his FijiFirst 
Party won 32 seats. They formed the government while the Social 
Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA) and National Federation Party 
won 15 and three seats respectively. They subsequently formed the 
Opposition. Later that day, we witnessed Bainimarama sworn in as 
Prime Minister of Fiji by the President, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau.
Appointment of the Electoral 
Commissioners
The seven members of the FEC were appointed by the President on 
9 January 2014 as required under the 2013 Constitution. Chen Bunn 
Young is the Chairman of the Electoral Commission. He is a lawyer 
by profession, who has been running his private law firm for the last 
30 years. Father David Arms is a priest belonging to the Columban 
order in the Catholic Church. He is the only member of the Commission 
to have had some experience with elections, as a member of the former 
electoral commission. Professor Vijay Naidu is a development scholar 
in the School of Government, Development and International Affairs at 
the University of the South Pacific. Jenny Seeto is a senior partner for 
the international chartered accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Larry Thomas is a renowned playwright and filmmaker. James Sowane 
is a successful tour operator in the tourism industry. I am a practitioner 
and advocate for people-centred development. 
At the time of our appointment, the 2014 Electoral Decree was still 
being drafted, a supervisor of elections had yet to be appointed, and 
most of the staff at the elections office were on temporary employment. 
What was reassuring though was the presence of technical consultants 
funded by Australia, New Zealand and the European Union, who had 
begun the preparatory work for elections with help from staff at the 
Fijian Elections Office (FEO) and the Office of the Attorney General.
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Initially we realised that we were going to have to take a hands-on 
approach and began at least with what was doable despite the absence 
of necessary frameworks and personnel mentioned above. Our first 
task was the appointment of senior and middle management staff 
and the members of the FEC participated as chairpersons of several 
interview panels. This was an ongoing commitment for an additional 
three months. At times it was onerous because we were still committed 
to our other work, but we persevered nevertheless because we saw 
our role as a national calling. I thought the government was wise to 
appoint seven commissioners because it comfortably accommodated 
for the quorum of four in cases when some of us were absent. 
The Supervisor of Elections
With a similar constitutional process to the appointment of members 
of the FEC, Mohammed Saneem was appointed by the President of 
the Republic of Fiji on recommendation by the Constitutional Offices 
Commission, which prior to the general elections comprised the Prime 
Minister and the Attorney General, who was also the Minister for 
Justice and Minister for Elections. Saneem had been an employee of 
the Ministry of Justice as Acting Permanent Secretary. The Minister 
for Elections had told some of us that the SoE would be an independent 
expatriate so it came as a complete surprise when the minister told us 
of Saneem’s appointment. However, being practical people we were 
prepared to work with Saneem because he was already performing 
some functions of the SoE and under the circumstances we did not 
have the luxury of time. For my part, I found Saneem to be readily 
accessible. Having said this, the issue of who decides on operational 
policies is unclear. Soon after its appointment, the FEC had begun 
discussion with some of the technical consultants on developing 
policies and operational guidelines. However, after the appointment 
of the SoE this was not given the priority it deserved. On its part, the 
FEC was limited from pursuing this further in the absence of its own 
technical consultant, for which it had made an unsuccessful request. 
The importance of policies with clear operational guidelines cannot be 
overemphasised. From a governance perspective, this is an area that 
needs urgent attention and I am hopeful the FEC will be given the 
institutional support needed to effectively address this issue. 
THE PEOPLE HAVE SPOkEN
252
The Electoral Decree and other related 
decrees
Despite oral and written representation on the draft electoral decree, 
very little was accepted by the Solicitor General. We were pleased 
though with the inclusion of two submissions on other decrees: the 
Immunity Decree and the right to appeal against the police officer 
making the decision to revoke a meeting permit. This was at the end 
of March 2014, the same time as Mr Saneem’s appointment as SoE. 
There were concerns raised as some members of the public feared that 
a new voting system, plus choosing a number as opposed to a name, 
would be confusing. I believed that the assumption that rural people 
were ignorant was an insult to their intelligence. When I observed 
pre-polling in the outer islands of the Lau group, I was impressed to 
find aged voters voting with ease and without any problems. I soon 
found out that figures were not foreign to them because of their early 
exposure as Christians to reading the Bible, where they were required 
to cite the numbers of chapters and verses daily from the book of 
Psalms. They also dealt with numerical digits on a daily basis through 
counting money, remembering and dialling mobile numbers and 
through other means. 
The roadmap to elections
By February 2014, despite our concern with the delay of the Electoral 
Decree and the appointment of the SoE, we went ahead and created 
a roadmap for the general elections with emphasis on voter education. 
We also realised that the success of actualising the roadmap would 
have to be based on a pragmatic approach, an example of which was 
utilising the opportunity the government had begun for us in engaging 
international technical consultants to work at the FEO. Jerome 
Leyraud, the team leader for the consultants, further developed the 
roadmap until we were ready to meet with development partners. 
Leyraud was highly valuable because of his international and legal 
expertise with elections. Unfortunately, we were not able to retain him 
to serve the commission after his term expired in April because the 
Attorney General did not approve our request and instructed us to use 
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the services of the Solicitor General. We did not feel bound to go to the 
Solicitor General for advice all the time as we wanted to maintain our 
freedom to obtain legal advice elsewhere to ensure our independence.
Election partners
One of the strategic decisions we made was to ensure that all 
presentations and dialogue with potential partners and donors were 
to be conducted at the FEO building, which at that point needed 
renovation. This was to enable them to experience first-hand the state 
of our work environment, which at that time needed urgent attention.
Our presentation of the roadmap on 12 March 2014 was met with 
overwhelming support from the development partners. The roadmap 
included our strategy for voter education based on three simple 
questions: ‘What is voting?’ ‘Why Vote?’ ‘How to vote?’ The voter 
education process was to be staggered in three stages over the 
six months that were left before the elections. By coincidence and 
fortunately for us, the Fiji Women’s Rights Movement was already 
engaged in civic education at that time, addressing the ‘What’ and 
‘Why’ of voting via media outlets. This meant that we only needed to 
work on the ‘How to vote’ aspect.
Thus began a series of consultations, which the SoE continued 
with after his appointment at the end of March 2014. The support 
of development partners was manifested in the 54 per cent external 
contribution to the total general elections budget of FJD$39,284,637. 
According to FEC’s 2014 Report (p. 8), the total expenditure for FEO 
as at 31 December 2014 was FJD$27,763,815. 
In addition to development partners, I thought our regular meetings 
with political parties, media organisations, NGOs (including those 
concerned with disability issues), the police and representatives of 
the transport industry were very helpful. This continued well after 
the appointment of the SoE because we were conscious of the need to 
be on track with groups we respected as primary partners because of 
the important role each played. After all, the success of the general 
elections was also going to be dependent on their collective support. 
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The task for the FEC was to establish a relationship with the different 
groups in recognition of the important role each played in the general 
elections within a very short period of eight working months, for 
we were appointed in January and the general elections were in 
September. Our meeting schedule changed according to the need and 
circumstances and we stepped back while the SoE continued meeting 
with the different groups. However, the FEC continued to meet with 
the police for security updates and the transport sector for logistical 
purposes, to address the rural electorate not regularly serviced by 
public transport. 
Secretariat issues
While each commissioner was tasked with a certain responsibility, 
overall, the work of the FEC was affected by inadequate secretariat 
support for the initial five months of our appointment. Part of my 
task was to ensure that our minutes, correspondence and decisions 
were registered and regularly updated. Thankfully, the inclusion of 
two additional staff before the elections helped reduce our burden. 
Our secretariat staff worked hard, usually under trying conditions, 
because we were ourselves under a lot of pressure and were thus often 
demanding. They were always on hand to help us even late at night 
and they were incredibly patient and tolerant with us. In addition, 
we did not have a separate budget, which meant that we had to seek 
financial outlays for the work we did, including our claims for sitting 
allowance which were being approved by the SoE whose work we had 
responsibility over. This was an institutional conflict of interest that 
we tried to deal with as best as we could.
Polling observation
The commissioners participated as observers in both pre-polling and 
the actual poll day, including the counting of votes. In doing so, 
we developed our own checklist, which was helpful because lessons 
learnt from the pre-poll were reported to the SoE for consideration 
for poll day processes. The commissioners covered all four divisions, 
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travelling the rugged terrain of the Colo (hinterland) in both Viti Levu 
and Vanua Levu, the coastal areas, and the unpredictable waters of the 
Lau and Beqa islands. 
Lau Province pre‑poll
I travelled to Lau in the Eastern Division, where the electorate voted 
by pre-poll. Lau is one of 14 provinces in Fiji and consists of several 
small islands. The islands are the farthest from the main island of Viti 
Levu and some of its islands, such as Ono-i-Lau, are nearer to the 
nearest Tongan island than to Suva. Amongst the provinces, Lau is 
considered the most challenged in terms of accessibility because its 
several small islands are scattered and because of the unpredictability 
of the weather. 
Three groups of officials from the FEO administered the pre-poll 
in Lau, with each group travelling by ship, the cheaper and more 
practical option. I accompanied the third and biggest group in the 
government ship Iloilovatu, assigned to Northern Lau, which is made 
up of the islands of Oneata, Moce, Komo, Vanuavatu, Lakeba, Nayau, 
Cicia, Vanubalavu and all small surrounding islands—Tuvuca, Ogea, 
Katafaga, Susui, etc. We left Suva on Wednesday, 3 September 2014 
after a delay of one day because of a mechanical problem with the 
ship. The third group consisted of 22 officials and 14 police officers. 
They were divided into seven teams. I accompanied the team as far as 
Cicia Island and returned by plane on Wednesday, 10 September. 
While the FEO had already undertaken the task of ensuring protocols 
were observed and logistical arrangements made in their initial visit to 
the provinces before the elections, on arrival in the village, the chief 
and/or elders were presented with i sevusevu (ceremonial offering of 
yaqona to the host, made in respect of recognition and acceptance of 
one another). From then on, the villagers took over the organisation 
and prepared food and bedding for the visitors. The Turaga ni Koro or 
village headman in each village played an important role in mobilising 
the villagers to vote. Aside from myself, the only other observers 
present were polling agents from SODELPA. I did not meet any polling 
agents from other political parties.
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The polling officials worked hard, often under trying conditions. 
Some who travelled in the Iloilovatu suffered from seasickness. For the 
team leaders, their dilemma was conforming to the voting schedule 
prepared by the FEO. This was difficult to follow because on sea, the 
ship’s captain dictated which island to berth at first in accordance 
with the weather pattern. At times, this meant conducting the pre-poll 
in more than one island in one day, as they did for Nayau and Cicia 
islands, where Nayau polling was during the day and Cicia polling 
was in the evening on 8 September 2014. The polling agents did not 
return to the ship until the early hours of the next morning. On shore, 
they were met with friendly people but the terrain for some was not 
friendly. In Nayau, a policeman smashed his expensive mobile phone 
when he fell down a cliff with the empty ballot box on the team’s way 
to a village on the other side of the island. Miraculously, he recovered 
in an instant without any damage to himself or the ballot box.
The electorate in most parts of Northern Lau thought voting was easy. 
The turnout was about 78 per cent. From observation and discussions 
with the voters, a number of factors were identified as vital in making 
voting easy and these included the following: a majority of the polling 
stations were in village community halls, some in schools and one in 
a private residence; all were within easy walking distance; there was 
an easy flow of voters into and out of the polling station; the polling 
officials assisted where necessary, including helping those with 
disability issues and taking the poll to the sick and the weak at homes 
and in hospital beds; a boat carting voter instruction booklets arrived 
in Lau ahead of the polling teams; the booklets were distributed to the 
people before polling day. By the time the same booklets were given to 
the voters in the polling stations, most of them were familiar with the 
process. Some polling officials explained the process whilst handing 
out the polling paper. Voters who regularly read the Christian bible 
were not intimidated by numbers and this included the octogenarians, 
most of whom were women. In some villages there were question and 
answer sessions with the author after the sevusevu, whilst waiting for 
the polling officials to set up the polling stations.
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Table 1: Details of polling in five Lau islands 
Date Island Station Voters List No. Voted % Voted
4/9/14 Moce Nasau 286 221 77%
4/9/14 komo komo 112 86 77%
5/9/14 Lakeba Tubou 490 299 61%
6/9/14 Lakeba Yadrana 135 107 79%
6/9/14 Lakeba Waciwaci 154 103 67%
6/9/14 Lakeba Vakano 52 42 81%
8/9/14 Nayau Salia 87 68 78%
8/9/14 Cicia Tarakua 105 89 85%
8/9/14 Cicia Naceva 53 43 81%
8/9/14 Cicia Lomati/Tabutoga 119 106 89%
8/9/14 Cicia Mabula 297 248 84%
Total 1,890 1,412 78%
The table above includes only those polling stations I visited and those 
I was able to obtain data for from the respective presiding officers. 
At the Tubou polling station, the low turnout of 61 per cent was partly 
due to an administrative oversight. Twenty people who produced 
identification cards were not included in the voters’ roll. Secondly, 
and a common concern shared by all the islanders, the pre-poll was 
unexpected. Despite radio announcements from the FEO advising the 
change in the method of voting, it appeared many of the islanders were 
caught by surprise. A majority still expected to vote on 17 September. 
Hence those who were elsewhere, like the Methodist Church ministers 
and their respective island delegations who were in Suva for their 
annual conference, joined the list of non-voters from Lau. 
International interest
The FEC was hosted by the Australian and New Zealand Electoral 
Commissions in July and August 2014 respectively. These visits 
provided  insight into their electoral systems and increased 
my appreciation of engaging non-government workers in the 
administration of elections, which Fiji has now adopted. When the 
Multinational Observer Group (MOG) arrived later in Fiji, it was 
good to meet with some of those we had met earlier in Australia and 
New Zealand. 
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Conclusion
Overall, for the commissioners, the road to the elections was not 
an easy walk. There were disagreements between the FEC and SoE, 
as eventually evidenced in the court proceedings filed in the High 
Court to determine what the SoE was bound to do upon ‘directions’ 
given him by the FEC. But, much like a rough journey, we managed 
to negotiate our way through sharp pebbles and rocks under the able 
leadership of our chairman because each one of us was committed and 
determined to ensuring there was an election to give the Fijian people 
the opportunity to vote for their government. 
In the end, as they say, the rest is history. Fiji went to the polls with 
0.7 per cent of invalid votes. Out of a total 591,101 registered voters, 
500,078 or 84.6 per cent actually voted.
To be able to pull this off within eight months, it had to be an 
election with a pragmatic approach plus a lot of faith. I was honoured 
to have served my country with the other six commissioners, who 
brought with them their unique professional skills, vast and diverse 
experiences and deep wisdom. As a team we didn’t forget to laugh! 
The SoE and his team, including over 9,000 poll-day workers and the 
technical consultants, worked tirelessly. They showed that cooperation 
and commitment towards a common national purpose could overcome 
obstacles. I couldn’t have asked for more. 
Disclaimer
This is the personal opinion of the author and not of the Fijian Electoral 
Commission of which she is a member. 
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Having grown up in Fiji, I maintain strong connections with the 
country through family, friends and work, even though I moved 
to New Zealand more than a decade ago. As the Fiji Programme 
Development Manager in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MFAT), I was closely involved in managing New Zealand’s assistance 
for the Fiji elections. Furthermore, I was fortunate to be one of six 
officials who joined five New Zealand parliamentarians to observe the 
elections as a member of the Multinational Observer Group (MOG). 
In this paper, I describe my experience of participating in the MOG, 
discuss the role of the MOG, and describe New Zealand’s support for 
Fiji’s elections preparations. I hope this is of wide interest and a useful 
contribution to the body of literature on Fiji’s historic 2014 elections. 
The views and conclusions presented are my own and not the view 
or position of the New  Zealand Government. The MOG’s media 
statements and its subsequent report provide the considered views 
of the observation team and I draw on those heavily in this chapter.
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The paper does not examine or analyse the electoral framework and 
the pre-election conditions, although they are important determinants 
of a free and fair election. This task is left to others who are more 
qualified. The MOG Report findings (2014c, p. 30) concluded that 
voters, political parties and the media were reasonably free to engage 
in the electoral process. The elections were well run and there was 
no evidence of attempts to influence the process or outcome. The 
elections were credible and reflected the will of the Fijian people. 
New Zealand policy settings and 
assistance for the Fiji elections
Much has been written and said about the merit or otherwise of New 
Zealand’s policy settings toward Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama’s 
Administration (the Administration) after the 2006 military coup. 
New Zealand did not impose economic sanctions, but restricted travel, 
official contact with the Administration, and limited aid funds being 
channelled through central government. New Zealand aid to Fiji 
continued throughout the period with an average total aid flow of 
NZ$5.2 million per year. The political and diplomatic sanctions were 
targeted at the Administration leadership and its associates and not 
aimed at ordinary Fijians. By the end of March 2014, the New Zealand 
Cabinet had removed all restrictions on contact and cooperation with 
Fiji except for defence cooperation. However, these restrictions were 
also lifted by the end of 2014. 
The New Zealand Government had always said it stood ready to assist 
Fiji’s return to an elected government, provided the Administration 
demonstrated a commitment to holding free and fair elections with 
a firm date. The initial approach to New Zealand was during the 
first half of 2012 when the Administration sought assistance from 
donors for voter registration and the design of a new constitution. 
This was a significant step forward because New Zealand was able 
to respond positively to both requests. New Zealand’s technical 
assistance contributed to the successful launch of voter registration 
in July 2012, using Fiji’s newly acquired electronic voter registration 
(EVR) system. Soon after, New Zealand, along with other donors, 
funded the Fiji Constitution Commission to undertake nationwide 
consultations for a new constitution. Although the draft constitution 
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by the Constitution Commission, chaired by Professor Yash Ghai, was 
rejected by the Administration, the public response was heartening. 
The Commission’s open consultative process provided a platform 
for the people of Fiji to comment on the future of their country and 
exercise their political rights for the first time since 2006. 
In mid-2013, the Administration invited New Zealand, the European 
Union (EU) and the Commonwealth to undertake a needs assessment 
of the Fijian Elections Office (FEO) to gauge its capacity to conduct 
elections in 2014. Melissa Thorpe of the Zealand Electoral Commission 
(NZEC) was a member of the assessment team. The New Zealand and 
EU team members concluded that it was operationally feasible for the 
FEO to organise a free and fair election by September 2014, provided 
preparations began immediately or the likelihood of success would 
diminish rapidly. 
It was clear from the outset that timelines would be extremely tight 
for the FEO to undertake the preparations necessary to hold elections 
by September 2014. To understand how challenging the timelines 
were for the FEO, it is worth noting that in the case of New Zealand, 
the NZEC began planning and preparing for the 2014 elections soon 
after the 2011 elections. For the FEO, added delays were another issue 
to contend with as the already compressed timeframe was squeezed 
further due to holdups in promulgating a new constitution, issuing 
electoral laws and recruiting staff. 
The joint New  Zealand and EU assessment helped New Zealand 
and other donors decide how to assist Fiji’s elections preparations. 
New  Zealand’s main contribution was the deployment of technical 
advisers to the FEO to assist with: 
• planning; 
• developing policy, process and systems; and
• staff recruitment and training. 
New Zealand also funded the cardboard voting booths and designed 
and built a database that helped fast track the processing of over 
15,600 applications to recruit 9,000 polling day workers. Assistance 
was also extended to cover observation visits to New  Zealand by 
the Supervisor of Elections and three members of the Fiji Electoral 
Commission. 
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New Zealand’s assistance was delivered through the NZEC, which 
had responsibility for running the New Zealand elections just three 
days after the Fiji elections. The highly experienced technical advisers 
deployed in Fiji were drawn from the NZEC’s pool of election officers 
in the field. The New Zealand advisers worked well with the Fiji 
Supervisor of Elections and his staff and advised the Fiji Electoral 
Commission when needed. Together with advisers from Australia and 
those funded by the EU, the New Zealand team made an important 
contribution to the successful delivery of the Fiji elections. 
As Fiji’s election day drew nearer, and following an invitation from 
Fiji, New Zealand also agreed to provide 11 observers to the MOG. 
The New Zealand team was led by former deputy prime minister 
the Right Honourable Wyatt Creech, and consisted of four former 
parliamentarians (Hon. Richard Barker,1 John Hayes, Dr Paul 
Hutchison, and Ross Robertson) and six MFAT officials made up the 
rest of the contingent. All except Creech were short-term observers. 
Multinational Observer Group
The Administration invited four countries (Australia, India, Indonesia 
and Papua New Guinea)2 to co-lead the MOG. This was a departure 
from the usual practice of using multilateral or inter-governmental 
organisation-led missions. The MOG was also very broad with 
92 observers representing 15 countries and organisations, which 
provided greater legitimacy. The Administration also ensured the 
MOG worked under common terms of reference (agreed between the 
Administration and the co-leads). This enabled the Administration to 
keep an overview of the process and ensured the group worked well 
administratively. 
The terms of reference (Multinational Observer Group 2014a, p. 1) 
stated that the MOG’s two objectives were to:
1  At the time of MOG mission Hayes, Hutchison, and Robertson were MPs, but have 
since retired.
2  PNG subsequently declined Fiji’s invitation to co-lead the MOG.
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assess whether the voter processes of the FEO facilitated and assisted 
the Fijian voters to exercise their right to freely vote and whether the 
outcome of the 2014 Fijian General Election broadly represented 
the will of the Fijian voters; and 
provide recommendations going forward on how future elections can 
be improved in terms of integrity and effectiveness. 
This scope allowed the MOG to assess various aspects of the electoral 
process including the functions of the FEO; voter registration; public 
education; alternative means of voting; nomination and candidate 
registration; election day operations; vote counting and results; 
dispute resolution; and reconciliation of ballot papers.
Countries invited to send observers submitted nominations that were 
endorsed by the Supervisor of Elections and then formally issued with 
identification cards. This two-step accreditation process allowed the 
Administration better management over the process. There were no 
domestic observers accredited, but this did not stop the Concerned 
Citizens for Credible Elections, a coalition of Fijian NGOs, from 
conducting research on the elections and compiling a report of its 
observations.3 
Clear and regular communications were an integral part of the MOG 
Secretariat’s business and this was very well managed. Regular 
briefings to the media and other stakeholders ensured that all 
were kept informed. The MOG’s transparency, professionalism and 
independence enhanced Fijian confidence in the electoral process. 
This, according to the MOG Coordinator (27 August 2014, Fiji Sun): 
goes to the heart of these sorts of observer activities, it’s about providing 
confidence, it’s not just about the international [communities’] 
confidence in what’s happening in Fiji it’s about providing some level 
of confidence to the Fijian voting public that in fact this election will 
be as good as it can be in terms of its integrity and effectiveness. 
3  The coalition of 10 NGOs included the Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre; Pacific Dialogue; Social 
and Economic Empowerment Programme; Fiji Council of Churches; Ecumenical Centre for 
Research, Education and Advocacy; Academics from the School of Social Science (Fiji National 
University); Academics from the School of Government, Development and International Affairs 
(University of the South Pacific); Citizens’ Constitutional Forum; Fiji Women’s Rights Movement; 
and Dialogue Fiji.
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The New Zealand team leader, the Rt Hon Wyatt Creech, arrived as 
one of the long-term observers (LTO) on 22 August. He joined other 
LTOs and participated in all aspects of MOG Core Group, including 
pre-election preparation, visiting and talking to villagers throughout 
Fiji (including the outer islands) to interview voters, parties, election 
officials, candidates and civil society organisations on election issues 
generally. More specifically, the observers sought to gauge the public’s 
comprehension of the electoral processes and attitudes towards the 
elections. Creech took part in pre-polling observation missions as well, 
and on election day he was in Levuka, Fiji’s former capital. During 
his month-long assignment, Creech reached some of the more remote 
places in Vanua Levu, Taveuni and the Lau Group, easily making him 
the most intrepid MOG member. He was tireless and got on with the 
job, undeterred by long ferry rides, bumpy drives, and having to trek 
through difficult terrain.
The majority of the MOG, however, were short-term observers (STO) 
who arrived in time for a comprehensive briefing two days before 
the elections. This day-long briefing was invaluable in going over the 
terms of reference, which included a code of conduct. The observers 
received useful presentations from the Fiji Supervisor of Elections and 
members of the Fiji Electoral Commission on the technical aspects of 
the elections. The observers were paired to cover designated areas, 
met their liaison officers and drivers, and armed with maps, phones 
and tips on culturally appropriate behaviour they were ready for 
deployment the next day. 
Observing the elections
On Election Day, the MOG members visited a total of 455 out of 
1,489 polling stations (approximately 31 per cent of polling stations 
operating on 17 September) and observed polling and counting across 
the country. I was paired with a Suva-based South African diplomat 
and allocated the Lautoka4 Central area. We visited 11 polling venues 
that consisted of 40 polling stations.
4  Lautoka is the second largest Fijian city, lying in the heart of Fiji’s sugar cane growing area 
in western Viti Levu, 24 kilometres north of Nadi. Lautoka spans an area of 16 square kilometres 
and had a population of 52,220 (per 2007 census).
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Our early arrival in Lautoka on 16 September allowed time to drop 
into the Elections Office and pick up information on the polling venues 
we were allocated. All of the venues were schools except for two—
one a  community centre and the other a building belonging to the 
Housing Authority of Fiji. The largest polling venue had nine voting 
stations and the smallest had one. At a couple of venues, I observed 
the delivery of the sealed ballot boxes containing ballot papers, 
election materials and documentation. At other venues I witnessed 
polling-day workers (PDW) setting up in an orderly fashion. Police 
were present at all polling venues in an unobtrusive manner, away 
from the polling areas. 
On arrival at a polling station, I introduced myself to the presiding 
officer, who checked my identification card then got me to complete 
and sign a logbook. The PDWs were meticulous in following process, 
such as reading aloud from the instruction manual to inform observers 
about what was being done. This ensured that the political party 
officials (PPO) and I were following procedures. It was positive to 
see the high number of women engaged as PDWs, including highly 
competent women presiding officers. 
I also noticed that there were more women than men PPOs observing 
the elections. The PPO presence at polling stations was generally low 
and the smaller parties were usually absent. My conversations with 
a number of PPOs indicated that they were ill-prepared as election 
scrutineers. This is echoed by the MOG Report (2014c, p. 13), which 
noted that the:
Political parties and the FEO gave insufficient weight to the importance 
of agents (PPOs) in guaranteeing the electoral process. The FEO 
provided some training, but it was entirely focused on the electoral 
process, rather than agents’ role in the process.
Despite this and a general lack of political party support for PPOs on 
election day, most officials were stoic and stayed till the votes were 
counted. 
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Voting
Early on election day, I made a quick drive by a cluster of venues before 
calling in at Tilak High School, which had seven polling stations, to 
observe PDWs set up before polling started at 7.30am. Outside each 
venue people were queuing up, many arriving over an hour before 
polling began. It was a public holiday and many people had clearly 
decided to get the voting over and done with to free up the rest of the 
day. As it turned out, a smarter choice might have been to vote later 
in the day when there were fewer queues. Voters appeared genuinely 
upbeat, good natured and full of anticipation. The atmosphere was 
generally positive and at times festive. This accords with the MOG’s 
Preliminary Statement that noted:
The 2014 Fijian Election, the first election since 2006, was 
enthusiastically embraced by the voters of Fiji who were keen to 
participate in the democratic process. The election was conducted in 
an atmosphere of calm, with an absence of electoral misconduct or 
evident intimidation.
The FEO election material promoted voting as a national responsibility 
with slogans like ‘My election, My Fiji’ and ‘I’m voting because I‘m 
Fijian’. Fijians were clearly motivated by these messages and the 
urging of leaders, including the Chair of the Fiji Electoral Commission, 
with 84 per cent of registered voters casting their votes.
It would appear that the FEO had not anticipated a surge at the start 
of polling and PDWs were not prepared for this. Better anticipation 
and planning could have averted some delays and the frustration 
experienced by some voters. By mid-morning, long, slow-moving 
queues were frustrating voters who had been standing in the hot 
sun for two to three hours. At venues with multiple polling stations, 
PDWs directing voters to the correct queues in the first instance 
would have prevented people from lining up for the wrong polling 
station. Proportionally, however, such incidents were few and election 
officials quickly worked out the issues and managed them. Most able-
bodied voters completed their ballots with ease, usually within a few 
minutes, while those needing assistance took longer. I was pleased 
to see election officials go out of their way to assist voters who were 
elderly, pregnant, unwell or had disabilities—they were allowed to 
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vote on arrival without queuing. The slowest aspect of the voting 
process was verification. Under pressure the PDWs carried out their 
duties assiduously, with the MOG Report (2014c, p. 3) noting that:
Despite a new, unfamiliar and complex voting system, the Fijian 
Elections Office administered the election effectively. Polling officials 
were well-prepared and voting procedures were generally followed 
correctly.
The bright orange fluorescent vest, white bula shirt5 with the MOG 
logo, and large photo IDs worn by MOG observers made them easily 
identifiable. This also made it easy for observers to interact with voters 
and election officials. Many voters were curious about my presence, 
while others welcomed and thanked me for being there. Some voters 
complained about the delays and the way the elections were run. On a 
handful of occasions, I helped voters find their designated polling 
stations by texting the ‘545’ number, a dedicated telephone number 
set up by the FEO for voters to either text or call to find their polling 
station. The system was innovative, quick and worked well if one had 
a mobile phone.
Counting
Polling stations closed at 6pm, but at most venues things had 
quietened down well before then. I returned to the same polling 
station at Tilak High School where I had witnessed the start of polling 
in the morning, this time to observe the conclusion of voting and 
counting. Again, the presiding officer was meticulous in adhering to 
procedures, first making a final call before closing the polling station, 
then reconciling the number of ballot papers used against the roll, 
followed by the sorting and counting of votes. Counting 500 votes 
took almost four hours, an indication of the arduous process involved. 
After the results were double checked, a copy was displayed outside 
the polling station and the provisional results were reported to a call 
centre in Suva. Everything was packed into the ballot box, sealed 
and then sent back to Suva. As with voting, the PDWs were very 
diligent in adhering to the counting process. I spent Saturday at the 
5  Fijian name for a Hawaiian-style floral shirt
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Vodafone  Arena, the vote counting centre in Suva, to observe the 
counting of postal votes because by then the bulk of the counting had 
been completed and the results displayed around the hall. 
Elections—critical for Fiji’s progress
Fiji’s 2013 Constitution introduced for the first time an electoral system 
that was not based on ethnicity. The 2014 elections for a 50-member 
unicameral legislature was conducted under an open list proportional 
representation system, which also lowered the voting age from 21 to 
18. For many reasons the elections were a much anticipated and closely 
followed event for Fijians as well as for the broader international 
community, including the large Fijian diaspora abroad. A credible 
election would reinstate Fiji as a democratic country and help restore 
political relations between Fiji and its Pacific neighbours—particularly 
with Australia and New Zealand. More importantly, the elections 
answered immediate questions like: 
• How well would the new electoral system fare?
• What would voter turnout be? 
• What would the elections outcome be? 
• Would the results be accepted by Fijians? 
According to the MOG, the elections were very well run despite 
the limited time to prepare and logistical challenges caused by 
geographical spread and remoteness. While there were some anomalies 
on election day, these were isolated cases and not unexpected, given 
that the electoral system was new and untried. In the bigger scheme 
of things, the administrative issues encountered were minor and did 
not compromise the integrity of the elections. Voter turnout was high. 
According to the Fijian Elections Office (2014, p. 2):
a total of 84.6 per cent of Fiji’s 591,101 registered voters voted in 
the 2014 General Election. Only 0.75 per cent or 3714 of the 500,078 
ballots cast were invalid, a record low for an election in Fiji. 
A total of 248 candidates from seven political parties and two 
independent candidates contested the elections. Bainimarama and his 
FijiFirst Party won close to 60 per cent of the votes to claim 32 of the 50 
parliamentary seats. The Opposition (made up of the Social Democratic 
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Liberal Party and the National Federation Party) secured 15 and 
three seats respectively. The other political parties and independent 
candidates did not gain any seats because they did not secure 5 per cent 
of the total votes cast as required by the 2013 Constitution. Fijians and 
the international community have largely accepted the result, assured 
by the MOG’s declaration on 18 September 2014 that: 
(a) the outcome of the 2014 Fijian Election is on track ‘to broadly 
represent the will of the Fijian voters; and (b) the conditions were in 
place for Fijians to exercise their right to vote freely’. 
Conclusion
Some feel that the Administration’s decision to postpone the elections 
from 2009 helped Frank Bainimarama and FijiFirst get elected. 
While there may be some truth in this claim, it would be difficult 
to verify. The additional time certainly allowed the Administration to 
consolidate power, demonstrate its ability to govern, and implement 
policies that have had immediate tangible benefits and won support. 
Examples of such policies include the introduction of free school fees 
and bus fares, improvements to roads and village infrastructure.
The MOG found (2014c, p. 30) that:
Despite compressed timeframes, a complex voting system and some 
restrictions in the electoral environment, the conditions were in place 
for Fijians to exercise their right to vote freely; and
The election broadly represented the will of Fijian voters.
The MOG concluded that the elections were credible and the Fijian 
people had spoken, with almost 60 per cent of voters choosing 
FijiFirst. This was a comprehensive show of support for Bainimarama. 
The elections paved the way for Fiji’s return to democracy. 
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Concluding note: The election 
to end all coups?
Steven Ratuva and Stephanie Lawson
Predicting political futures is no easy task, even when there are 
clear patterns of historical behaviour to act as indicators of likely 
developments. But in Fiji, the multiplicity of internal and external 
factors that have shaped the country’s social, economic, political 
and cultural life always has the potential to direct events along an 
unexpected trajectory. The lessons of the past should keep us alert to the 
possible widespread resurgence of indigenous nationalism, something 
that could very well occur in adverse economic circumstances. Another 
possibility is a split within FijiFirst. If Bainimarama were to vacate 
the leadership, for one reason or another, is the party likely to retain 
the coherence it has achieved to date? Bainimarama’s departure from 
the political scene seems unlikely, barring serious illness or worse, 
but if the stability of a system depends largely on the personality of 
one individual, as the present system seems to, it does not bode well 
for the longer term. Then there is the role of the military—one can 
scarcely rule out the possibility of another coup, although, again, 
this would be a longer term rather than an immediate prospect. 
It  seems, then, that there can be no certainty about Fiji’s political 
future, especially when it comes to the prospects for the consolidation 
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of democratic constitutionalism. The best we can do is to venture some 
generalisations based on how we interpret the past and present and 
how these may be projected into the future.
Between 1987 and 2014 there have been seven elections and four 
coups. This amounts to a ratio of one coup to every two elections, 
which has inspired terms such as Fiji’s ‘coup culture’ and ‘coup cycle’, 
as well as the epithet ‘coup-coup land’. These terms make a point about 
the ever-present possibility of extra-parliamentary means of regime 
change in Fiji. This has been evident elsewhere, especially in Latin 
America, Asia and Africa, although the pattern of coups and military 
rule has generally withered away as local and international political 
circumstances have changed; Thailand being a notable exception 
at the present time. The question for Fiji and its political future is: 
Have the forces that have fostered coups abated? 
The aftermath of the 2014 elections has seen a continuation of 
indigenous nationalist demands, expressed in different forms. These 
include an attempt to form a Taukei Christian state in Ra and Nadroga 
provinces and continuous demands for greater Taukei and land rights 
by community groups and parliamentary representatives. Then there 
is the fast-changing arena of industrial, tourism, infrastructural and 
economic development generally, which, while delivering many 
benefits, has also widened the socioeconomic gap further, with 
implications for those who feel left behind in the surge of development. 
These forces must be handled carefully, not only by the state but by 
political parties, religious organisations, civil society groups and the 
community at large, all of which have a role to play in ensuring that 
stability is maintained in a peaceful and legal manner. The return of 
parliamentary government can only enhance the ability of all these 
groups to contribute.
A number of inter-related practical approaches may be useful in 
addressing the issues outlined above, including expanding the space 
for continuous dialogue between different political parties and groups, 
enhancing the ability of the state to respond positively to people’s 
concerns, especially in combating poverty and inequality by ensuring 
a more equitable distribution of resources and making development 
more people-centred. If the fostering of neoliberal economic policies 
comes at the cost of social dislocation and the further marginalisation 
of poorer communities, this would be recipe for long-term instability in 
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a country that is still going through a transition from semi-subsistence 
to participation in a globalised capitalist economy. This is especially 
the case among rural and peri-urban Taukei. A related issue is the 
growing movement of people between rural and urban areas, which 
invariably gives rise to new patterns of social interaction, not all of 
which may be positive. Those at the periphery are at risk of being left 
out in the South East Asian-style state-driven developmental approach 
discussed in Chapter One.
There is also the ever-increasing use of the social media through 
mobile phones and the Internet, alongside traditional media 
such as radio, newspapers and television, which instantaneously 
overcome geographical boundaries and enhance active campaigning 
and mobilisation by political groups and individuals, all making 
the transmission and sharing of political grievances easier. At the 
same time, the state’s surveillance system has become much more 
sophisticated, based on lessons learnt internationally as well as the 
experience since the 2006 coup.
Another issue of concern is that, since coming to power, FijiFirst’s 
strategy of maintaining its hegemony has overshadowed attempts 
at dialogue or inter-party cooperation. Democratic politics may be 
adversarial, but consensus and cooperation are still required at various 
levels, especially in a country traumatised by repeated military 
intervention. Instead of going through a national reconciliation 
process to bring the different groups together and mend the fractures, 
Bainimarama’s method of suppression, mainly by deploying legalistic 
means, is a strategy that is more likely to allow wounds from the coups 
to continue to fester rather than heal. A subtle but influential strand 
in Fiji’s coup politics is the strong element of victimhood and the way 
in which the psychology of vengeance and counter-vengeance has 
motivated coup players. When Chaudhry was prime minister, he saw 
himself as a victim of the 1987 coup who had managed to survive and 
turn the table on his former adversaries. He attempted to reintroduce 
some original Labour Party policies in relation to land development. 
But this simply intensified indigenous nationalist passion and he was 
swept from power in 2000 by the Speight coup. 
Then there was the attempted mutiny in 2000 by members of the 
Fijian special forces against Bainimarama, to avenge what they saw 
as Bainimarama’s betrayal of the Speight coup. There can be little 
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doubt that the traumatic effect of the attempt on his life during the 
mutiny became a deeply embedded psychological force, which helps 
to explain Bainimarama’s unrelentingly vengeful attitude towards 
those involved in the 2000 coup and, beyond that, towards those 
who oppose him politically. On the other hand, the Social Democratic 
Liberal Party’s attitude towards FijiFirst and Bainimarama has to some 
extent been shaped by the personal experiences of some party leaders 
and members who were victims of Bainimarama’s repressive policies 
after the 2006 coup. 
The cycle of vengeance and counter-vengeance has the potential to 
nurture and amplify discord and to threaten national security in the 
long run. In politics, time does not necessarily heal the pain. Rather, 
time may provide a reservoir of memories where grievances and the 
desire for vengeance are stored until circumstances appear ripe for 
their resurrection. We have seen this in Fiji time and again. This is also 
the key reason transpolitical dialogue is so important at the present 
time to provide a democratic space for political players to engage in 
serious discourse about both the past as well as the future of Fiji’s 
security and stability. 
Although there is now a government installed through a democratic 
process, creating a democratic political culture involves more than 
just an election. A distinction needs to be made here between 
formal democracy and people’s democracy. The former refers to 
adherence to legal and constitutional rules, while the latter involves 
human relationships and interaction in a participatory and mutually 
consensual way. While formal democracy provides the basis for the 
rule of law, people’s democracy ensures that citizens participate or 
are engaged both directly and indirectly in a meaningful way in the 
political process without stifling restrictions imposed by authorities. 
The future growth of democratic political culture in Fiji will depend 
on the interplay between the two aspects of democracy. This also 
highlights the importance of the role of civil society organisations, 
faith-based organisations, media, youth, women and other citizen 
groups in providing avenues for meaningful participation for ordinary 
people. These diverse voices need to be incorporated into an inclusive 
framework of national engagement. Constant dialogue, transparency, 
communication, listening, acceptance of diversity, inclusiveness and 




One of Fiji’s great assets is the resilience of its people and their ability 
to overcome constant disruptions to democratic governance. While it is 
true that many people left the country following coups, the population 
by and large has confronted the challenges and adapted to changing 
circumstances. While scholars have largely focused on issues of ethnic 
or racial tension and political fragmentation, there is little recognition 
of the reservoir of goodwill and resilience which has kept the country 
free of civil war or serious violence, as has occurred in the Solomon 
Islands and Bougainville and in other regions such as the Balkans or 
parts of Africa in recent years. 
Civil wars generally erupt on the basis of deeply embedded fractures 
within society that give rise to a desire by competing groups to 
completely subjugate or even ‘cleanse’ the country of the other group 
by violent means. This has not been the case in Fiji, where tension has 
been limited largely to competing ethnic elites and has not necessarily 
been replicated between communities on the ground. While there 
were isolated cases of intimidation and violence during and following 
the coups, there has been no large-scale, organised or spontaneous 
inter-group violence. There are several reasons for this. First, there 
is the absence of military-style organisation within the communities, 
due at least in part to lack of arms. Virtually all arms in Fiji are in the 
hands of well-disciplined security forces and this, ironically, has been 
a key stabilising factor. A second factor is the restraining capacity 
of the Taukei cultural system itself. While indigenous nationalists 
have used ‘culture’ as leverage against other ethnic groups to serve 
their political interests, this has been balanced by the Taukei sense of 
social accommodation and peace-building. Arguably, this has acted 
as a powerful restraining force. Having said that, other groups have 
also adhered strongly to non-violence, including the Indo-Fijian 
community, which has been the main target of indigenous nationalist 
groups but which has always exercised considerable restraint. 
An important historical factor underlying restraint in all communities 
is the post-independence multiracial experiment under Ratu Mara’s 
Alliance Party, which, despite its problems, contributed to an 
atmosphere in which mutual coexistence was recognised as the only 
viable way forward for Fiji’s society as a whole after independence. 
This followed a peaceful transition to independence in which all 
political groups cooperated to ensure that the process was smooth and 
without rancour. Thus, although Fiji’s history shows there are issues 
THE PEOPLE HAVE SPOkEN
278
that have the potential to inflame passions, there are other factors that 
have the capacity to minimise and absorb conflict and to encourage 
peaceable coexistence and interaction. Fiji’s future stability depends 
on nurturing the latter rather than simply suppressing discontent. 
It is important to note that the threshold for violent conflict or extra-
parliamentary intervention can be dangerously lowered when tension 
is protracted and unchecked. Judging by the deep-seated tension 
between political parties and political leaders in the new parliament, 
it will take a considerable effort to move towards a political culture in 
which such tensions are ameliorated and democratic constitutionalism 
can be consolidated. This means, above all, a system under which 
those who win office through free and fair elections are recognised as 
the legitimate government, regardless of its ethnic composition. 
By the same token, opposition parties also have a legitimate and 
important role to play in offering criticism and alternative views. 
Indeed, democratic constitutionalism depends on the legitimacy 
of both government and opposition. But democracy in Fiji will no 
doubt fare much better when the dividing line between government 
and opposition is not demarcated largely by ethnicity. As the 2014 
elections results indicate, the dichotomous pattern of Taukei vs Indo-
Fijian parties of the past is no longer the dominant pattern. Instead, 
FijiFirst has become the centripetal political force, attracting by 
far the most cross-ethnic support. Under the new electoral system, 
ethnically based parties cannot win elections purely on the basis of 
their traditional support. Having said that, communal identity and 
loyalty will remain major factors in Fiji’s social and political life.
We have noted previously, however, that politics in Fiji has never 
been ‘all about race’ and other factors such as socioeconomic disparity, 
commercial interests, power plays within communities, and so forth, 
have been and will remain important elements in Fiji’s complex 
political dynamics. Then there is the paradoxical role of the military, 
the most powerful institution in the country. Bainimarama claimed an 
impressive victory in September 2014 on a platform that was explicitly 
anti-communal. Yet the very institution that underpinned his rise to 
power and subsequent victory, and which has greatly enhanced status 
under the current Constitution, remains almost 100 per cent Taukei, 
with no indication that this will change in the foreseeable future. 
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15. CONCLUDINg NOTE
The greatest challenge facing the future of democracy in Fiji remains 
the legitimation of the parliamentary system to the extent that it 
becomes integral to a democratic political culture and accepted 
as such by all participants in the political process, including the 
military. Fiji has learnt the hard way that extra-parliamentary means 
are painful and destructive. For all the criticisms that can be made of 
Fiji’s 2014 general elections, it has at least seen the return of electoral 
democracy and parliamentary politics, which in turn provides the 
key forum for the expression of diverse views, interests and agendas. 
The various authors of this book have themselves put forward diverse 
views, but there is no doubt that each has sought to seriously explore 
the conditions under which democratic stability can be achieved and, 
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